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Abstr ac t
This study is an evaluation of a process of strategic planning in the 
Missionary Society of St. Columban. Four Regions of the Society, 
Korea, Fiji, Chile and Britain were taken as a representative sample. 
The documentation from their planning processes was analysed and 
108 members were surveyed by questionnaire. The study found that 
strategic planning could be profitably used by an international 
missionary organization and that it could help the Society improve: 
its sense of direction and unity; communication; participation; and 
morale. It also proved a valuable instrument for renewal, long-term 
change and leadership training. The study identifies a number of 
conditions for successful planning processes in missionary 
congregations and concludes that different planning approaches are 
valuable at different times in the life cycle of the organization. In the 
earlier stages the more rational and formal approach to planning 
seemed the best approach for the Columbans. Once the members had 
begun to think systematically about the future, it was clear more 
attention needed to be given to process, leadership, vision, managing 
cultural change, building learning communities and increasing the 
organization's capability to become more responsive and relevant.
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Ch a p t e r  l  t h e  Pr o b le m  a n d  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h is  Stu d y
Introduction
Today organizations throughout the world are faced with difficult corporate choices 
about redefining their mission, restructuring and retraining in order to remain 
relevant and survive into the 21st Century. Religious organizations are no 
exception. Many are in a state of crisis as they try to cope with questions about their 
relevance, the need to rethink their major apostolates, a dramatic decline in the 
number of entrants and ageing membership. Missionary organizations, such as the 
Missionary Society of St. Columban, share most of these problems. Since the end of 
the Colonial period and the growth of local churches there has been a radical 
questioning of their role, value and contribution. Spread throughout the Third 
World they have also lived through coups, revolutions, famines and profound and 
widespread poverty. These events have challenged their self-understanding in a 
profound way. As international organizations based in many diverse countries they 
have experienced these crises to differing degrees and at different times resulting in 
distinct and sometimes divergent understandings of their vocation among their own 
members.
The Missionary Society of St. Columban1 faced with these problems decided at its 
General Assembly in Pusan, Korea in 1988 to undertake a radical assessment of all 
its works so as to plan more systematically for the future. The hope was that a 
secular process, such as strategic planning, could be transferred from the world of 
business to an international missionary organization and would help the Society 
clarify its identity, identify the real missionary needs and plan realistically for the 
future.
This chapter will have five sections. The first is a statement of the problem. The 
other four are explanations of: i] the purpose of this study; il] its significance; iii] the 
assumptions and limitations of the study; and iv] definitions of important terms.
1 In this thesis the Missionary Society of St. Columban is also refered to as "the Soceity" and "the 
Columbans'.
I. Statement of the Problem
a] The missionary crisis and the search for a new identity.
According to David Bosch [1991] mission today is in a state of profound crisis 
concerning the foundation, motivation and nature of mission. Others who talk of 
this crisis are, Gomez [1986] and Amaladoss [1987, 1988, 1989]. Pope John Paul II, 
while he would probably not agree with the details of their analysis, recognised the 
crisis when he wrote his encyclical letter, Redemptoris Missio or Encyclical Letter on 
the Permanent Validity of the Church's Missionary Mandate . The encyclical was 
written to assert the-lasting validity of the Church's mission and to give special 
encouragement to missionaries and missionary societies. "The special vocation of 
missionaries 'for life' retains ail its validity .... Therefore the men and women 
missionaries who have devoted their whole lives to bearing witness to the risen Lord 
among the nations must not allow themselves to be daunted by doubts, 
misunderstanding, rejection or persecution." [John Paul n , 1991 #66].
Missionaries are normally generous people full of good will and conviction. They are 
sufficiently convinced of the value of the Christian message and concerned about the 
plight of their brothers and sisters in the Third World to leave their homes and live 
most of their lives in a foreign country. Traditionally they suffered many physical 
hardships but they were needed, respected, convinced of the need to "save souls" 
and buoyed up by the obvious benefits they were bringing to the underprivileged. 
They had few questions about the validity of what they were doing. However, as 
Bosch [1991] pointed out, earlier mission was often built on shaky foundations. The 
success of Christian mission frequently became the foundation of mission. 
Confidence about mission has now been replaced by a profound malaise and a loss 
of nerve. These days the hardships of the modern missionary relate more to 
questions of meaning than physical deprivations. Missionaries are no longer in 
charge, not as needed or respected and they personally have many questions about 
the value of what they are doing.
Some of the reasons for this malaise in missionary life today are i] the growing 
realisation of the validity of other religions; ii] the general crisis of meaning in the 
West; iii] the end of the Colonial period and the growth of independent local 
churches; iv] a theological shift in the understanding of mission and salvation; v] 
increased expectations in the areas of culture, religion and language; vi] social
turmoil in many of the countries missionaries work in; vii] the challenge posed by 
the growth of feminism and lay mission; and vii] the gap between the new 
expectations of missionaries and their actual training.
i] The validity of other religions. For centuries Christian missionaries have given 
their lives to "save souls". The conviction that the Church was the only way to 
salvation made up for all the hardships. So it was profoundly disturbing for 
missionaries when, through their own experience and through the pronouncements 
of the Second Vatican Council, they grew to appreciate the validity of other religions. 
Vatican II in Lumen Gentium #16, Nostra Aetate . #2-5, Ad Gentes #9 and Gaudium 
et Spes. #22 affirmed that much of the other religions of the world was holy and 
true and that they could be a way to salvation. [Abbott, 1966], The growing realisation 
of the validity of other religions has disturbed many missionaries' unwarranted 
certainties and robbed them of much of their motivation. Why "suffer the pangs of 
exile and the stings of mosquitoes" if people will be saved anyway? It is bad enough 
to have a difficult job to do but much worse when one is left wondering if the difficult 
job is worth doing at all. [Bosch, 1991]
The Church and many missiologists, e.g. Amaladoss [1988], Gomez [1986], Shorter 
[1988] and Bosch [ 1991 ], insist on the necessity of a dialogue as an essential part of 
mission, but the change from "conquest" to dialogue has left many missionaries 
feeling lost. They were more accustomed to proclaiming a "precious message" than 
to listening to the divine-human dialogue that has been going on in the midst of 
their new people for centuries. [Knight, 1986; Mantovani, 1986; Amaladoss, 1988]. Ad 
Gentes #34 instructed that missionaries "must be "scientifically prepared for their 
task, especially for dialogue with non-Christian religions and cultures". [Abbott, 1966], 
But to this day most missionaries have not been adequately trained for dialogue.
ii] The general crisis of meaning in the West. Western civilisation not only doubts 
mission but doubts itself and missionaries share much of that doubt. In the West 
scholars in almost all disciplines [including theology] are preoccupied with 
metaquestions. This in itself is indicative of a crisis or paradigm shift. Particular 
manifestations of this crisis in the missionary world are a] the growing appreciation 
of the validity of other religions, b] the advance of science which seems to have made 
God irrelevant; c] the guilt we feel before the poor of the Third World; and d] the 
vigour of these young Churches who refuse to be dictated to and whose theology is
more vibrant. All of this has led to profound uncertainties in the Western Churches 
and many Western missionaries have lost the courage to "convert" the world, some 
may even doubt whether they have much to offer at all. [Gomez, 1986; Bosch, 1991].
ill] The end of the Colonial period and the growth of independent local churches. 
The age of mission to Africa, Asia and Latin America coincided with the age of 
Colonialism and while the interests of the missionaries and the colonial powers did 
not always coincide, missionaries often profited from the structures set up by the 
colonists and were identified in the minds of many indigenous people with the 
colonial powers. With independence there has been a growth in nationalism and a 
resurgence of indigenous religions and cultures. This has marginalised the 
missionaries and their churches as foreign elements. [Amaladoss, 1989; Hiebert, 1987; 
Bosch, 1991]. Nowadays in Asia the only countries from which missionary visas are 
easily obtainable are Japan, Korea and the Philippines. One can obtain missionary 
visas for Taiwan and Thailand with some reservations. In some countries 
nationalism has resulted in resentment of former missionaries. Almost everywhere 
missionaries are less appreciated and have had to take secondary places in local 
churches. Missionaries are no longer central to the life and future of the young 
churches. Most major decisions are made without their input and they often find 
ourselves seriously out of tune with the new priorities of local churches that are 
often disappointingly nationalistic, bureaucratic and conservative. [Gomez, 1986; 
Bosch, 1991].
There has been a similar shift in the theology of mission. Vatican II places the 
responsibility for mission on the bishop and local church. Ad Gentes #38. [Abbott, 
1966], Local hierarchies are in charge almost eveiywhere and some of the most 
vigorous Regional Bishops Conferences can be found in Asia [Federated Asian 
Bishops Conference, FABC] and Latin America [CELAM]. Many missiologists now 
talk about the need for the missionary to be invited by the local church. Today this 
may seem the only right and natural thing to do but it is a "Copernican revolution" 
for missionaries who originally set up these local churches and possibly educated 
most of the new local leaders. To highlight this change in role, power and 
responsibility some of the more common images for a missionary these days are 
"guest" or "stranger". [Joinet, 1972,1974; Gittins, 1989].
As local bishops and priests take over the running of traditional "missionary" 
churches there are increased expectations of foreign missionaries. A higher degree 
of linguistic competence, greater cultural sensitivity, historical, political and social 
understanding are regarded as essential.
The local Churches, especially in Asia, have come of age and are fast approaching 
self sufficiency with regard to staffing the traditional parishes and works. Since that 
is what most missionaries have been trained to do and have always done, they now 
feel very insecure about their future. The missionaries who seem most acceptable 
are fellow "Third Worlders". Nowadays the emphasis is on a "South" <— > "South" 
exchange of missionaries or on missionaries going from "South" > "North".
v] The theological shift in the understanding of mission and of salvation. There 
have also been a dramatic shift in the theology of mission since Vatican II. [Richey 
Hogg [1985], Gomez [1986] and Bosch [1991] give a good overview of these 
developments. Perhaps the most profound theological development has been the 
great increase in appreciation of the role of the human in peoples' religious lives. 
[Frazier, 1985]. Vatican II, especially in The Church in the Modern World, looked much 
more positively on the world, embraced all history and saw within it the purpose of 
God. Abbott [1966] There is now a stronger emphasis on the necessity of liberation 
for true evangelization and on a holistic view of mission that includes creation as 
well as revelation. These views found expression and support in the two major 
themes of Paul Vi's papacy, "justice" and "evangelization". In his definitive On 
Evangelization in the Modern World he provided an excellent and convincing 
theology linking but not reducing evangelization to liberation and the struggle for a 
just society. [Paul V I , 1975]. This new combination of human and spiritual, heaven 
and earth, body and soul, evangelization and liberation is what is meant by the 
biblical image of the "Kingdom of God". The Kingdom or Reign of God is seen as 
being much wider than the Church. The Church is only a sign and servant of the 
Kingdom, rather than the sole possessor of eternal life. The focus in mission 
theology is now on the Kingdom or Reign of God rather than on the Church. The 
official church is still ambivalent about this new understanding. "Kingdom of God" 
and "Liberation" are confusing concepts for many missionaries, most of whom are 
Church-centred people who received their theological education before Vatican II 
and before images such as the Kingdom of God became theological mainstays.
vi] Increased expectations of missionaries In the areas of culture, religion and 
language. Another new aspect of evangelization highlighted by Paul VI's On 
Evangelization in the Modern World, and now a major emphasis in modern mission 
is inculturation or the evangelization of cultures. Paul VI stressed that "every effort 
must be made to ensure a full evangelization of culture, or more correctly of 
cultures". [Paul VI, 1975 #20], These days missionaries are expected not just to 
proclaim the doctrines of the Catholic Church, albeit in the language and symbols of 
their new peoples, but to inculturate or incarnate the Gospel in this culture. 
[Amaladoss, 1989 b; Shorter, 1988; Roest Crollius, 1986]. Such an approach to mission is 
much more demanding on the missionary who must now have a profound 
understanding of his own Christian religious experience and culture as well as a 
deep understanding of the culture of his new people and a facility with their 
language and symbols.
vi] Social turmoil. Many of the countries where missionaries work are in a state of 
social turmoil and they cannot help but be caught up in this. Much of this has been 
well documented elsewhere, but the economic and political conditions in many Third 
World countries are worse now than they were 10 years ago. This has added to the 
pressure and demands on missionaries.
vii] The growth of lav mission and feminism. The growth of lay mission and of 
feminism are major challenges to largely clerical missionary congregations and to 
the various local churches many of whom do not fully understand or appreciate the 
contribution lay missionaries and women can make to international mission.
viii] Lack of training for these new expectations. Even from this brief and far from 
complete review of major changes and challenges in the missionary world it is little 
wonder that mission is in a state of crisis and missionaries are searching for a new 
identity. Besides their traditional duties as pastors they now have become aware of 
responsibilities to work for Justice, to incarnate the Gospel in cultures not their own 
and to dialogue with peoples of other faiths. These are frightening expectations on 
many who had no training for these new missionary tasks and only wanted to be 
priests overseas. In these circumstances many missionaries, including Columbans, 
feel overwhelmed. Too many demands are being made on them. The reality is that 
no one, no matter how talented or well trained, could take on all these new
challenges of mission. What seems to be needed are strategic choices, planning, 
renewal and retraining.
In addition to these challenges, missionary societies share the life cycle problems of 
any organization. Historians of religious congregations such as Cada talk of five 
phases in a religious institution's life cycle. 1] Foundation. This is a time of grace, 
charism, enthusiasm, extraordinarily gifted and convinced members. 2] Expansion. 
A time when the original charism and inspiration are institutionalised and codified. 
The founder may still be alive. The membership is still above-average in commitment 
and skills. 3] Stabilisation. A feeling of great success pervades the group. The works 
prosper. Activism begins to dominate. Members tend to be carried along by the 
success/prestige of the community's activities, rather than by deep personal 
commitment or vocation. People join at this phase who would never join at any other 
phase. 4] Breakdown. A period of disruption and disillusionment... Institutional 
structures and belief systems disintegrate, giving way to widespread doubt and 
stress. This phase is precipitated often by a minority's dissatisfaction with the 
internal life of the group or the relevance of its works. 5] Transition to total 
extinction, minimal survival or revitalisation. [Cadaet al., 1979],
Many missionary groups, including the Columbans, seem to be in the Breakdown 
Phase. An additional problem in the Breakdown Phase is that there are likely to be 
a large number of people who joined in Phase 3 who would not have joined during 
any other Phase. These people may not have the commitment and imagination to 
make the changes demanded in Phase 4.
b] The Missionary Society of St. Columban
The Missionary Society of St. Columban is an exclusively missionary society within 
the Catholic Church. It was founded in 1916 by two Irish priests, Edward Galvin 
and John Blowick, for the conversion of China. Both were secular priests and many 
of the Society's first members were staff or students of St. Patrick's College, 
Maynooth. The Society is not a religious order and would prefer to see itself as "the 
missionary arm of the secular clergy". It spread to the United States in 1918 and to 
Australia in 1919. The majority of members come from these three countries, plus 
Britain and New Zealand. In the past ten years members have also been accepted 
from the Philippines, Korea, Fiji, Vietnam, Chile and Peru.
At first the vision did not extend beyond China, but gradually the Society expanded 
to the Philippines [1929], Korea [1933], Burma [1936], and Japan [1948]. When 
mainland China was closed to missionaries in the 1950's, the Society responded to 
the urgent call of Latin America and Columbans went to the poor in the new urban 
settlements in Lima, Peru and Santiago de Chile [1951]. The Society also started a 
new mission in Fiji [1951]. They went to Pakistan and Taiwan [1978]. New missions 
were opened in Brazil [1985], and Jamaica and Belize [1986]. Finally in 1989 the 
Society established a Mission Unit in its original mission, China. At present it has 
704 priest members, 1 brother and 89 students working in 18 different countries.
The purpose of the Society. The Constitutions of the Society define its nature and 
purpose as:
C.101. The Missionary Society of Saint Columban is an exclusively 
missionary Society sent by the Church "to the Nations", to proclaim and 
witness to the Good News in Jesus Christ of the fu ll Christian liberation and 
reconciliation of all peoples.
C. 102. Crossing boundaries of country, language and culture, the Society has 
as its specific objectives:
to establish the Church among peoples to whom the Gospel has 
not been preached;
to help Churches mature until they are able to evangelize their 
own and other peoples;
to promote dialogue between Christians and those of other 
religious traditions;
to facilitate interchange between local Churches, especially those 
from which we come and those to which we are sent; 
to foster in local Churches an awareness of their missionary 
responsibility.
The structure of the Society. The Society has a highly centralised structure. The 
Chief Executive Officer of the Society is the Superior General and he is assisted by a 
Vicar General and 3 Councillors. Together they make up the General Council whose 
powers are considerable. In effect the General Council: a] appoints members to the 
various Regions or Mission Units through out the world; b] appoints all major
officers of the Society, e.g. Directors of Regions and Coordinators in Mission Units, 
Regional/Mission Unit Bursars and all members of formation staffs; c] approves 
budget applications for all the Regions and Mission Units throughout the world; d] 
accepts new missions and closes old ones; and e] is ultimately responsible for the 
animation and visitation of all Regions and Mission Units.
The Society is divided into Regions & Mission Units. There are 10 Regions in the 
Society: Australia & New Zealand, Britain, Chile, Fiji, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Peru, 
the Philippines, and the United States. These Regions are administered by Regional 
Directors and their Councils. Their powers and responsibilities relate to the internal 
running of their Region. They are expected to provide it with leadership and 
direction. They make all internal appointments, negotiate with the General Council 
about getting new staff from other Regions, decide on budget submissions to be sent 
to the General Council. There are also 6 Mission Units in the Society: Belize, Brazil, 
China, Jamaica, Pakistan and Taiwan.
The culture of the Society. Although the Society is highly centralised especially in 
the allocation of resources, personal and material, in most of its day to day 
operations it is highly decentralised. Its structure coincides most closely with a 
Professional Bureaucracy. [Mintzberg, 1983]. The Columbans are a service-oriented 
organization, made up of highly trained professionals who would normally expect to 
be allowed to meet the needs of their people in relative freedom. The situations they 
face are highly varied and it would be impossible and counter-productive to try to 
organize them from Central Administration. Members are protective of their freedom 
and resist being 'organized'. There is a democratic culture which limits what 
administrators can do. There is a strong demand for consultation and participation 
in decision making processes.
The primary co-ordinating mechanism for the Columbans is the standardisation of 
skills. Members receive 7-9 years training in missionary priesthood before taking up 
their overseas appointment. Up till recently that was seen as sufficient for life and it 
did enable members to work effectively in a great variety of countries with little 
guidance, supervision or administration. It was a satisfactory co-ordinating 
mechanism until the beginning of the crisis in missionary identity. As Mintzberg 
[1983] points out professional bureaucracies cope well with complex but stable 
environments. The situation missionaries face today is complex and it is no longer
stable. Missionaries are finding their professional training, which placed greater 
emphasis on priestly rather than missionary formation, no longer adequate.
c] The Columban history leading up to Its decision to plan.
Columbans are faced with the same crisis about missionary identity as many other 
missionaiy organizations. In fact they may be more exposed than many others 
because of working in so many different environments. Involvement in each country 
has expanded the members' interpretation of the Society's role and objectives. 
Bernard Cleary, Superior General 1982-1988, outlines the history of this expansion. 
The Society was originally founded for China and the emphasis was on proclaiming 
the Gospel to those who had not heard it [primaiy evangelization]. Of the other early 
"mission" countries, Korea and Burma were similar missions. The Philippines, a 
largely Christian country but in need of priests, was considered "a Region outside 
the missions". However, since World War n the major expansion in the Society's 
mission has been in the Philippines, Fiji and Latin America. Cleary outlines how 
this shift in the balance of personnel resulted in a similar shift in the Constitutional 
understanding of the Society's purpose. Up till 1970 the emphasis was on 
conversion or "primaiy evangelization", but from then on there has been growing 
tendency to accommodate the various other Columban experiences. Cleary's 
challenge to the 1988 General Assembly was, "I think it is time for the Society to 
review and endeavour to clarify its position. Do we wish to go further down this 
path of less clearly defined mission, call a halt at the present stage or re-affirm a 
commitment to primary evangelization?" [Cleary, 1988 p. 6].
The General Assembly evaded this question and opted for an historical, inclusive 
answer to what it means to be Columban. However, it did adopt another of the 
Superior General's related challenges, namely, the challenge to all Columbans to 
assess the missionary needs of their local church and the quality of the Society's 
present apostolates so as to plan more effectively for the future. Becoming More 
Missionary #148-150. There were a number of reasons for deciding to assess and 
plan, i] It was seen as part of the Society's search to become more missionary, to 
discover a new missionary identity, ii] There was a feeling that the Society was 
drifting or coasting and that it was time to assess its apostolates to see if the Society 
was meeting the most pressing missionary needs, iii] Some delegates wanted to 
open a new mission and felt that an assessment would reveal if we had the men to
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spare, iv] Finally it was a response to a decline in membership and a desire to use 
their personnel as effectively as possible.
The decline in the number of members had just begun to bite and has become more 
serious since 1988.
Totals from the Society Personnel Directory
Year Priests Brothers Students
1985 797 2 86
1986 791 2 99
1987 769 1 102
1988 756 1 112
1989 735 1 122
1990 730 1 91
1991 713 1 87
1992 704 1 89
Figure 1.1
In 1981 the Society had commissioned the Center for Applied Research in the 
Apostolate [CARA] to produce a report entitled, Manpower For the Eighties and 
Nineties: Personnel Projections to 1999. [Sullivan & Kuruvilla, 1981]. They produced 
both pessimistic and optimistic projections for the Society.
CARA's Pessimistic & Optimistic Projections for the Society
Actual
Count
1992
1989 
Pess. Optim.
1994 
Pess. Optim.
1999 
Pess. Optim.
704 721 759 624 680 524 599
Figure 1.2
The problem is more serious if you look at the age distribution of members Society 
wide.
Age Distribution 2
Under 35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+
19 57 160 211 174 96
Figure 1.3
The Society's future prospects are not strong either. Although there are 89 students 
at present the Society has not attracted many new candidates over the past five 
years.
The "Refounding" Groups. Shortly after the 1988 General Assembly a number of 
"Refounding" groups formed throughout the Society. The two major ones were in 
Ireland and Korea. It is difficult to say how many Columbans joined these groups as 
they were loosely structured and the membership changed constantly, however more 
than fifty people attended at least one meeting. There would be more who 
sympathised with their objectives. The groups were inspired by Arbuckle's book, 
Out of Chaos: Refounding Religious Congregations. Arbuckle believes that most 
religious organizations are at present in a state of chaos. This chaos is inevitable 
and even essential to break down rigid barriers. It is the opportunity for creativity. 
The way out of chaos is for the congregation to recognise the chaos and want to 
refound. This is most effectively done by individual pathfinders, "intraprenuers" or 
"refounders". The problem today is that the implementers or problem-solvers are 
dominant and the pathfinders have been marginalised. It is the responsibility of 
leadership to foster creativity and these pathfinders or refounding persons. [Arbuckle, 
1988]. The major demands from the Refounding groups were for a] a formal study of 
refounding and its relevance for the Society; b] more "hands-on" leaders who were 
committed to the Society's policies; c] better processes for the selection of leadership; 
and d] better leadership and support structures to enable involved and committed 
members to participate in decision-making.
2 The figures quoted are for permanent members and include some students. It is difficult to find up 
to date figures but these were calculated early in 1993 and give a reasonable idea of the age structure of 
the Society.
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EE. The Purpose of this Study.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether strategic planning can be 
transferred to an international missionary congregation and to evaluate how well the 
process has helped the Society.3 Did it help renew the Society and prepare it for the 
future. A particularly focus is in evaluating whether the process was effective in the 
ways frequently mentioned by the advocates of strategic planning, namely was it 
effective in:
a] helping the Society gain a clearer and more unified sense of direction;
b] enabling the members to identify the missionary needs in their 
environment;
c] helping the Regions to be more realistic about their personnel 
resources;
d] enabling the various Regions to make the appropriate changes, 
expansion in some areas and cutbacks in others;
e] improving communication within the Regions;
f] improving morale, a sense of satisfaction and participation;
g] lengthening the time horizons of leaders and helping leaders and 
members to think more systematically about the future;
h] improving the Directors' and the General Council's leadership skills;
i] enabling the Society to become a more flexible, adaptable and self- 
correcting organization;
j] providing the Regions with plans/criteria against which to measure
future decisions.
It is also hoped to identify the special difficulties the Society encountered in 
transferring the process of strategic planning from the commercial to the missionary 
world and what adaptations needed to be made to help other international 
missionary organizations in their planning processes.
m. The Significance of this Study
The problems facing the Missionary Society of St. Columban are real and they are 
shared by many other religious and especially missionary organizations. It is hoped
3 The period covered by this study is from June 1989 - May 1992 when the individual questionnaires 
were returned to the author. Although the process has continued since then it seemed the logical 
terminus for the study as it would be difficult to correlate later developments with the results of 
questionnaire.
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that this study will help improve the Society's present planning process. Success in 
this process is important for the life, morale, efficiency and future of the Society and 
its 704 members. It will also have a considerable effect on the thousands of people 
with whom Columbans work.
So far there is very little written about strategic planning in religious congregations 
and nothing on strategic planning in international missionary organizations.4 It is 
hoped that this thesis will establish that religious and missionary congregations 
have something to learn from the world of business and that it will prove a small 
contribution to the literature on strategic planning by extending it to this new field.
Finally, since there are a number of other international missionary organizations 
facing similar problems to those of the Missionary Society of St. Columban this 
research may help them to learn from the Columban experience and design a better 
processes for themselves.
IV. Assumptions and Limitations
Before continuing with this study, it is necessary to make two comments. Firstly, it 
is important for the reader to know that the author of this study is the Vicar General 
of the Missionary Society of St. Columban, i.e., the second-in-charge of the Society 
throughout the world and a member of the General Council. As such he has been 
one of two people officially responsible for the whole process of strategic planning. 
He has been intimately involved in all stages of the planning process at the central 
level, designing the process, reviewing all the Regional Plans of Action and 
organizing training in leadership and planning.
Secondly, it is important to remember that the methodology of this study is akin to 
Action Science. [Argyris, 1983; Peters & Robinson, 1984; Gummesson, 1991], It was more than 
a controlled experiment. It involved a genuine attempt at strategic planning and 
demanded quite a deal of learning, relearning, adapting and reformulating as the 
process of strategic planning went on. The methodology of this study can best be 
described as participative and flexible. It involved a process of on-going learning
4 A search of ABI/INFORM produced only two articles under the subjects 'strategic planning' and 
'religious organizations' and none under 'strategic planning', 'international' 'religious organizations’.
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and correction. FYora the beginning each stage has been adapted or reformulated in 
the light of the results of the previous stage.
V. Definitions of Important Terms
It does not seem necessary to further define the two major terms in this study, 
namely the Missionary Society of St. Columban and strategic planning. The Society, 
its purpose, membership, structure, history and current problem have already been 
described at length. The literature on strategic planning will be reviewed in Chapter 
2 and the Columban process of strategic planning fully described in Chapter 3.
Ch a p t e r  2 A  R ev ie w  o f  t h e  L it e r a t u r e  o n  St r a t e g ic  Pla n n in g
Introduction
The concept of strategy made its first real impact in schools of management in the 
early 1960s. But like many concepts in the field of management it has proven 
difficult to find an agreed, comprehensive definition. Mintzberg in his article, 
Opening Up the Definition of Strategy, gives five possible definitions: plan, ploy, 
pattern, position and perspective. [Mintzberg, 1988], Although a number of these 
definitions are compatible, for example, strategy as perspective is compatible with 
either strategy as plan or pattern, it is not possible to reconcile all these definitions 
of strategy. Perhaps the one thing that can be said to be essential to the definition 
of strategy is that it is fundamentally a qualitative mode of thinking. It is concerned 
with the future direction and development of the organization rather than its 
operational activities.
The first section of this Chapter will review the literature and developments in 
strategic planning in the hope of developing the theoretical basis from which to 
evaluate the Columban planning processes. The second section will give some more 
detailed comment on two crucial planning questions: the need to change the culture 
of an organization and the vital role of leadership. The third section will report on a 
search for similar research projects. In the fourth, there will be some discussion of 
the special difficulties of strategic planning in a international, not-for-profit religious 
organization. The final section is devoted to presenting the model used by the 
Society in the early stages of its planning process. Comments and conclusions as to 
which school or theory proved the most helpful in designing or understanding the 
Columban process of strategic planning will be given in Chapter 5.
I. The Various Schools of Strategic Planning
The first major works on strategic planning were Chandler [1962] Strategy and 
Structure, Ansoff [1965] Corporate Strategy, and Learned, Chistensen, Andrews & 
Guth [ 1965] Business Policy: Text & Cases. All of these had a rational approach to 
planning. It was a time of growth, expansion and diversification. The principal 
interest of the early writers, Ansoff and Andrews, was to plan the best possible fit 
between the opportunities and threats in the environment and the strengths and
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weakness of the company. It was hoped that a company could through analysis and 
planning avoid the threats, grasp its opportunities and maximise the achievement of 
its objectives. Planning was seen as an intentional and prescriptive process based 
on a rational model of decision making.
However, as the 1970s and 1980s progressed the world entered into first stagflation 
and then global competitiveness. The situation became so much more dynamic and 
unpredictable. People came increasingly to view institutions as social systems so 
strategic planning started to turn away from mathematical models and rational 
approaches to stressing human creativity, flexibility and entrepreneurship. New 
strategists found the economic, rational, intentional and prescriptive approach of 
the early strategic planners too formal and unreal and preferred a more emergent, 
incremental, crafting and learning approach to strategic planning and change. 
Schools of planning began to multiply to the extent that when in 1990 Mintzberg 
produced his comprehensive review of the literature, Strategy Formation: Schools of 
Thought, he identified ten different schools of strategic management. The first three 
the design school [Andrews], the planning school [Ansoff] and the positioning school 
[Porter] belong to the rational prescriptive approach. Six others, the 
entrepreneurial, cognitive, learning, political, cultural and environmental schools 
belong to the more descriptive, emergent, learning approach to planning. The final 
configurational school, Mintzberg's own school, combines all the other approaches 
into a single perspective to be used in different ways at different stages in an 
organization's history. [Mintzberg, 1990 b]
For the purposes of this essay the schools can best be dealt with under the two 
broader headings: the prescriptive, rational, deliberate and formal schools of 
planning and the incremental, emergent, learning schools.
a] The Rational, Prescriptive Schools of Planning
To understand all the schools of planning it is important to first understand the 
rational or prescriptive approaches to strategic planning. They not only came first 
chronologically but even critics like Mintzberg acknowledge that they also provide 
the basic concepts and the vocabulary that has helped to inform a good deal of 
strategic thinking. [Mintzberg, 1990 b].
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The author has also adopted Mintzberg1 s approach [1990 a & b] and concentrated on 
the design school and the work of Andrews to introduce the prescriptive or rational 
schools. For Andrews the word "strategy" implies a conscious and systematic rather 
than haphazard or incremental approach to allocating the resources of an 
organization so as to take the maximum advantage of the opportunities in its 
environment.
The key concept of rational, prescriptive schools is that of match or fit. Find out 
what you are good at and match it with what the world wants and needs. It is based 
on the two pillars, external appraisal to detect the threats and opportunities in the 
environment and internal appraisal to identify the company's strengths and 
weaknesses. The manager then tries to relate opportunities to resources in the hope 
of coming up with the best possible strategy. One of the best definitions of strategy 
is given by Thomas [1988], "strategy is defined as an organization's activities and 
plans designed (1) to match the organization's objectives with its mission, and (2) to 
match the organization's mission with its environment in an efficient and effective 
manner. Strategic management is the process used to develop, refine, and 
implement actions in order to achieve the desired outcomes." p. 5.
Mintzberg [1990 b] identifies the central premises underlying Andrews's theory of 
strategic planning as:
i] Strategy formation should be a controlled, conscious process of
thought. Andrews would equate emergent strategy with erosion or 
drifting.
ii] Responsibility for that control and consciousness must rest with the 
chief executive officer: that person is THE strategist.
iii] The model of strategy formation must be kept simple and informal.
iv] Strategies should be unique: the best ones result from a process of
creative design.
v] Strategies emerge from this design process fully formulated.
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vi] These strategies should be explicit and, if possible, articulated, which 
also favours their being kept simple.
vii] Finally, only after these unique, full blown, explicit, and simple 
strategies are fully formulated can they be implemented.
Andrews [ 1980] himself presented his process succinctly in the following figure.
FO R M U LA TIO N IM P LE M E N TA TIO N
• 1. Identification of __
opportunity  and risk
I t
2. Determining the company's 
material, technical, 
financial, and 
managerial resources
I t
3. Personal values and
aspirations of senior------------
management
I t
4. Acknowledgement of 
noneconomic responsibility' 
to society
CORPORATE
STR A TEG Y:
Pattern of
purposes and 
policies 
defining the 
company and 
its business
1. Organization structure and •  — 
relationships 
Division o f  labor 
Coordination o f  divided 
responsibility 
Information systems 
■ 2. Organizational processes « 
and behavior 
Standards and measurement 
M otivation and incentive 
systems 
Control systems 
Recruitment and development 
o f managers
• 3. Top Leadership —■ ■ ■ •» ■
Strategic 
Organizational 
Persona/
Figure 2.1 [Andrews, 1980, p. 28].
The other two prescriptive schools are the planning school inspired by Ansoffs, 
Corporate Strategy [1965] and the positioning school based on Porter's Competitive 
Strategy [1980]. Ansoff and his followers would have a much more developed and 
sophisticated approach to identifying an organization's strengths and weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats than the design school. He places much more emphasis 
on factors like: product-market scope, growth vectors, competitive advantage and 
syneigy. This school grew to dominate the field in the 1970s and it seems that the 
majority of textbooks on strategic management would come from this school. [Steiner, 
1979; Lorange, 1980; Harvey, 1982; Thomas, 1988]. Porter's background was in economics 
and industrial organization so the positioning school has developed an even more 
carefully structured economic analysis to develop strategy. Since the Missionary 
Society of St. Columban had more markets than competitors and little need for
detailed economic analysis, little use was made of the more sophisticated aspects of 
the planning and positioning approaches.
The Planning Process followed by the Rational School
It is important to understand the rational school's approach to strategic planning 
because: i] it was the founding school and to a certain extent still provides the basic 
concepts and vocabulary of strategic planning, ii] without an understanding of the 
details of the rational approach it is difficult to understand the later criticisms, and
iii] most of the early stages of the Columban planning process were based on the 
rational model of planning. One of the most important influences on the early 
stages of the Columban process was Steiner [1979]. This section will be based on 
his process as it presents an accurate and popular model of the rational approach.5 
c.f. Figure 2.2 for his illustration of the structure and process of strategic planning.
The process begins with the plan to plan. This is crucial part of the leadership's 
responsibility. If the planning process is to succeed it is important that all involved 
have a clear understanding of what the top management has in mind. The next four 
stacked boxes represent the situation audit. These will give the managers and 
planners the information about the environment and the internal resources of the 
organization that are significant for the growth and prosperity of the organization.
The next three boxes to the right show the gradual build up of the plan from 
clarification of the basic mission, purpose and objectives of the organization through 
the outlining of medium range plans to achieve these objectives to the even more 
concrete short term plans.
These plans once adopted must then be implemented and periodically reviewed or 
evaluated. The two directional arrows and the loops back are meant to show that all 
these elements constantly affect one another. The process is cyclical and never 
ending. For once a plan has been successfully implemented you have a new 
situation and company and must begin to plan again for the new opportunities and 
threats.
5 Others such as Lorange [1980], Harvey [1982] and Thomas [1988] could be used but their approach 
is basically the same. Coghlan [1987] is another member of the rational school who was perhaps even 
more influential in the Columban planning process but since his contribution was largely in applying 
planning to religious congregations discussion of his contribution will be left till later in the Chapter.
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Figure 2.2 Structure and Process of Business Companywide Planning, [Steiner, 1979 
p. 17].
The boxes Information Flows and Decision and Evaluation Rules are meant to show 
that information must flow throughout the organization during the planning
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process. The process of strategic planning should be interactive [requiring frequent 
dialogue with members of the organization] and iterative [it will not be perfect at first 
and needs to be frequently reworked].
The following are the key concerns that Steiner and others of the rational school 
pick out for more detailed comment.
Leadership
All the authors of the prescriptive schools of planning are unanimous that the chief 
executive officer [CEO] must be involved in and supportive of strategic planning for it 
to be a success. This is not a task to be delegated entirely to a planner. For Steiner, 
planning is top management's highest responsibility and the most frequent cause of 
the failure of planning processes is the lack of involvement of the organization's 
leaders. [Steiner, 1979].
It is at the beginning of strategic planning that top management must be specially 
involved. The CEO must initiate the plan to plan and be clear in his/her 
expectations. They should personally communicate the planning objectives to the 
organization. They must create the climate for planning [open-mindedness with 
regard to new alternatives; mutual respect for fellow managers and planners; the 
ability to face unpleasant facts and be honest about weaknesses, to accept critical 
evaluations and so forth]. [Steiner, 1979]. For that reason they themselves will 
need: flexibility, open-mindedness, the ability to listen, tolerance, patience and 
discipline. [Lorange, 1980].
Situation audit
The purpose of the situation audit is to identify and analyse the key trends and 
forces that could have an impact on the organization's future. The situation audit is 
fundamental to all planning. It is more than a stage of planning. It should become 
a way of thinking especially among middle managers so that the organization will 
remain flexible. [Steiner, 1979].
Basic mission.
One of the most important responsibilities of top management is to clarify the basic 
mission of the organization. It is only on this foundation that the more detailed 
objectives, strategies and tactical plans can be developed. [Steiner, 1979]. Unless 
there is a clear statement of basic mission to give consistency to the whole process
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then it is likely that the firm will lack direction, morale will fall, resources will be 
wasted or diverted from the basic purpose into disparate projects and the 
organization will be less efficient and effective in fulfilling its mission. [Thomas, 1988], 
The key role of the mission statement is to guide and to motivate employees. Later it 
will also be used to evaluate the success of plans and projects.
However, it is difficult to decide how concrete an organization should be in 
articulating its basic mission. The incremental, emergent schools of strategic 
planning often criticise the formal planners for being too specific and thereby 
blocking initiative and inviting resistance. The formal planners were also aware of 
this. [Steiner, 1979] notes that in business most statements of purpose are 
expressed at high levels of abstraction or vagueness. "Vagueness nevertheless has 
its virtues. These statements are not designed to express concrete ends but rather 
to provide motivation, general direction, an image, a tone, and/or a philosophy to 
guide the enterprise." p. 160 Excessive detail could: rally internal opposition, stifle 
creativity and participation by lower managers, close off legitimate markets and 
make the firm too rigid. Steiner is doubtful about the usefulness of writing down the 
basic mission except for larger organizations where it is necessary to crystallise the 
focus.
From long-range objectives to detailed plans
It is very important for effective strategic planning that these abstract, positive, and 
often vague mission statements be developed into more concrete goals or objectives. 
Only when they are made concrete can people in the organization understand 
exactly what they are supposed to be achieving. Objectives are part of the 
increasing specification of mission statements that will eventually lead to a plan. 
Thomas has described objectives as "the targets or intermediate goals needed to 
translate a firm's mission statement into specific, concrete, measurable terms. 
Objectives represent milestones in the firm's implementation of its chosen mission. 
Objectives frequently include (1) the desired state or condition, (2) an index for 
measuring progress toward the attribute or desired state, (3) a target to be achieved, 
and (4) a time frame within which the target is to be achieved. In other words, 
objectives specify 'what' is to be achieved and by 'when1. How objectives are to be 
accomplished is the focus of planning activities." [Thomas, 1988 p. 7f], He gives an 
interesting diagram which clearly illustrates the progression in strategic planning.
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Organization's
Strategy
Objectives
Components
Policies
Mission
Determined By
Each organizational, 
in conformity with other 
policies
Unit manager, with 
approval of supervisor
Unit together with top 
management
Top Management
Stakeholders
Small Scope of Operations Included Large
Figure 2.3 . Components of a Strategy. [Thomas,1988, p. 8].
Steiner outlines a number of criteria for objectives. They should be suitable, 
measurable over time, feasible, flexible, motivating and understandable. They 
should receive managerial commitment. People should participate in formulating 
them. Finally, they should be limited in number and linked. [Steiner, 1979].
Implementation
Implementation is key to the success of any organization for a plan is valueless until 
it is implemented. However, implementation is complicated and must involve 
appropriate changes in the structure of the organization, in the culture, control and 
communication mechanisms and in the reward system. "The implementation 
process involves both differentiation, the breaking down of plans into basic 
elements, and integration, the coordination of diverse functions into cohesive 
action." [Harvey, 1982 p. 258]. i] Differentiation. The key tasks and sequences of steps 
needed to implement the plan must be identified and decided upon. People must be 
appointed to these various tasks and given a thorough understanding of what they
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are expected to do. The resources, physical and human, should be made available. 
A time table for each task should be decided upon. Motivation and incentive 
systems set up. ii] Integration. Appropriate systems to coordinate the efforts of all 
the individuals and groups involved must be devised and implemented. A system 
which will provide managers with the information they need established. Training 
programmes to improve managerial and worker capability in making and 
implementing plans should be held. Above all the top management must work hard 
at guiding, motivating and integrating all the members of the organization to 
successfully implement the plan. [Steiner, 1979; Harvey, 1982],
Overcoming resistance
Steiner [1979] in a chapter entitled, The Human Dimension of Implementation, 
reminds us that strategic planning often provokes resistance because planning: i] 
alters personal and work relationships; ii] changes information flows, decision 
making and power relationships; iii] highlights conflicts in organizations; iv] 
introduces risks and fear of failure for managers; v] places intellectual demands on 
managers; vi] stimulates authority conflicts; and vii] makes people feel 
uncomfortable because of the uncertainty involved in deciding, planning and 
implementing.
He recommends a number of ways of overcoming anti-planning biases. 
Management should a] recognise the problem and try to minimise it; b] lead the 
planning process by providing a conceptual rationale and ensuring the operational 
roles are adequate; c] only introduce planning after considerable discussion; d] not 
ask people to do the impossible; e] compose all committees with care and f] reward 
effective planning. [Steiner, 1979].
It will also be extremely difficult to successfully implement a plan which is at serious 
variance with the culture of an organization. It is important that the leadership of 
an organization work carefully, sensitively and systematically to change its culture 
so that it will be more supportive of the new plan. "Organization effectiveness can be 
increased by creating a culture that achieves organizational goals and at the same 
time satisfies members' needs." [Harvey, 1982 p.247].
Structure
A good organizational structure will not guarantee good results but a well-conceived 
strategic plan can be thwarted by a structure that does not provide the necessary
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authority and resources to the people chosen to implement the plan. It is crucial 
that there is a direct relationship between planning, control and structure. [Steiner, 
1979; Harvey, 1982 and Coghlan, 1987]. Responsibility, authority and resources 
need to be assigned within the structure so as to facilitate the new strategic thrusts 
of the organization. According to Daft [1986] the four key components in the 
definition of organization structure are: i] allocation of tasks and responsibilities to 
individuals and departments; ii] reporting relationships, levels of hierarchy, span of 
control; iii] grouping of individuals into departments and departments into the 
organization; iv] communication, co-ordination, integration in vertical and horizontal 
directions. If a plan is to be successfully implemented it is important that 
adjustments are made to all these components so that the structure supports the 
plan.
Evaluation and control
Evaluating the performance of an organization is an integral part of the strategic 
management process. It is the only way an organization can know how successful it 
has been and what modifications need to be made to its strategic plans. The focus 
of managerial control is on results. Control seeks to ensure that an organization is 
actually producing the desired results. The basic control process involves three 
steps: establishing standards, measuring performance against these standards and 
correcting deviations from the standards. [Steiner, 1979; Harvey, 1982, Thomas, 1988]. 
They emphasise the importance of having some factual measurement of the actual 
performance and the organization.
Communication
Shared knowledge of the organization's goals and good communication are essential 
for the effective and efficient running of any organization. Throughout the planning 
process it is crucial that i] top management clearly communicate to the members the 
purpose of strategic planning and the organization's mission and long term 
objectives; and ii] that there is adequate flow of information so that the situation 
audit will be valid and the decisions, implementation and evaluation correct. The 
communications system keeps members informed and acts as a motivating force, 
building up group ownership and co-operation. Shared knowledge of the goals of an 
oiganization is essential for an effective and efficient organization. Leaders are 
responsible for the development and maintenance of communication and agreement 
within an organization. However, they should be careful to balance communication 
of information with information overload.
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Motivation and reward
Finally, organizations give rewards or incentives to individual and departments who 
most successfully implement the organization's plans. These rewards can be of 
various types ranging from the more extrinsic rewards such as: pay, promotion, 
fringe benefits, job security, stock options, generous budgets through to more 
intrinsic rewards like recognition, praise, more interesting work, satisfaction, 
development of professionalism and greater powers of discretion. It is important 
that there be adequate rewards for long-term performance as well as short term 
results or the organization's long-term future might be put in jeopardy. [Lorange, 
1980]. The incentive system should be designed to encourage accurate reporting of 
results. [Steiner, 1979; Lorange, 1980]. Finally there should be a proper balance between 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Both have their place. Most enjoy the extrinsic 
rewards and they are especially appropriate where routine tasks predominate and 
tight control is needed but where imagination, creativity, professionalism and 
initiative are required the more intrinsic rewards are also important. At this end of 
the spectrum motivation often comes from satisfaction in a good performance. 
[Steiner, 1979].
The advantages of strategic planning
Steiner [1979], Harvey [1982] and Thomas [1988] refer to a number of studies 
indicating that firms that plan strategically outperform firms that do not. Some of 
the particular advantages the rational planners would identify with strategic 
planning are:
i] Strategic planning gives direction to an organization. For Steiner [1979] 
"formal strategic planning asks and answers some key questions in an 
orderly way, with a scale of priority and urgency." p36. Without planning 
the urgent can drive out the important. [MacMillan, 1986].
ii] Strategic planning introduces a new set of decision forces into an 
organization that prepare it to face future challenges. [Steiner, 1979].
iii] Strategic planning develops the management skills of the organization 
and provides useful opportunities for systematic learning by forcing 
managers to ask and answer the type of questions that mangers must deal 
with. [Steiner, 1979; Lorange, 1980; Thomas, 1988].
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iv] A well-organized planning system is an extremely useful communications 
network, fostering discussion and exchange among all levels of management.
[Steiner, 1979; Thomas, 1988].
v] Strategic planning encourages managers to look at the system as a whole 
and can help promote the better integration of the company. [Harvey, 1982].
vi] Strategic planning creates a standard against which to measure all short­
term, decisions. [Steiner, 1979].
vii] Finally strategic planning assists in the allocation of discretionary 
resources. [Thomas, 1988].
b] The Incremental, Emergent or Learning Schools
The rational, prescriptive schools were popular in the 1960s and 1970s but as time 
went by and the situations facing most organizations became more dynamic, growth 
more problematical and change more necessary, experts started to question whether 
the rational, intentional control proposed by planners of the prescriptive schools was 
possible. Could the future be foreseen with any accuracy; could the mind of even 
the most brilliant CEO hold all the information; did successful leaders or managers 
actually operate in such a formal, stylised way; did implementation only start when 
plans were fully formulated and did not fully articulated plans create rigidity and 
resistance? As experts increasingly came to view organizations as social systems the 
emphasis in strategic planning turned away from rational, intentional pre-planned 
approaches to stressing learning, incremental ism, human creativity, flexibility, 
entrepreneurship and vision. The number of critiques is large and diverse. 
Mintzberg [1990 b] classified them into seven different schools. The following are 
the major critiques.
Wrapp
The earliest criticism of formal, rational, prescriptive planning was of the image of 
leadership it presented. Wrapp [1988] could not reconcile it with his experience of 
day to day managers and the way they actually made decisions. He believed: i] it is 
impossible to set down objectives that will be relevant for any reasonable period of 
time; ii] it is impossible to state objectives clearly enough to be understood by all;
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and iii] detailed policies complicate matters by raising internal resistance. Therefore 
he believed Good Managers Don’t Make Policy Decisions, but:
• keep well informed and keep open the information pipelines, 
especially on the informal level;
• focus their time and energy, taking on only a limited number of 
significant issues;
• play the power game, working out where the blocks and the support 
will be and developing a good sense of timing;
• practise the art of imprecision, because it is not possible to be precise 
over the long term. They keep the options open believing policies 
evolve over time. They give a sense of direction with open-ended 
objectives;
• muddle with a purpose. They don't push total packages but spot 
opportunities and relationships in the stream of operating problems 
and decisions.
Loasbv
Another early criticism came from Loasby in his article, Long-Range Formal Planning 
in Perspective, first published in 1967. While acknowledging the numerous 
advantages of strategic planning he questioned whether because of too formal a 
process of strategic planning you would: miss the dangers you do not foresee; 
become less flexible because of a plan set in stone; block fresh thought and 
imagination; over-control managers; and obscure rather than illuminate the 
necessary uncertainty there is in the future of any company. He was extremely 
doubtful about the advantages of long-range planning and advised leaders and 
managers to do as little as possible and instead to tiy to develop a flexible 
organization that can make quick decisions. [Loasby, 1988].
Lindbolm
An even more important critic was Charles Lindbolm who in 1959 published a 
provocative article, The Science of 'Muddling Through'. Lindbolm's thesis violated 
almost every premise of rational management or planning. He suggested that in 
reality policy-making is a messy and complicated business where managers can not 
possibly hope to do much more than to react to crises as they come up. Lindbolm 
elaborated his theory of "disjointed incrementalism". He saw policy-making as 
serial, remedial and fragmented. Mangers solved problems with little regard to
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ultimate goals. He saw the policy-maker as "a shrewd, resourceful problem-solver 
who is wrestling bravely with a universe that he is wise enough to know Is too big for 
him".
Quinn & Logical Incrementalism
Later Quinn was to take up Lindbolm's criticisms. He agreed with Lindbolm on the 
Incremental nature of the process but insisted that it was logical and not disjointed, 
incremental and not piecemeal. Managers consciously and proactively move the 
organization forward in incremental steps towards their vision of the future. Quinn 
called the process logical incrementalism. He regards strategic planning more as a 
process than a plan. The strategy is the final outcome of all the interactive learning, 
coping, innovation and building of consensus rather than something that can be 
fully formulated and then Implemented. All these processes build the organization's 
capability to face the future and organizational capability is much more important 
than a plan.
Quinn's manager does not face the same responsive organization that the formal 
planners seemed to deal with. He pictures the manager as the shrewd politician 
working to overcome resistance, build consensus and manage coalitions. The logical 
incremental process suggested by Quinn includes the following steps:
i] Create pockets of commitment by testing ideas, providing broad goals, the 
proper climate and appropriate resources; allowing initiatives; building on 
successes and challenging at the appropriate time.
ii] Avoid pushing for consensus too early. This will keep people onside and 
open to all the possible alternatives. It will also avoid early failures which 
will undermine everyone's confidence in strategic planning.
iii] Subtly eliminate alternatives once a strategy has been agreed upon.
iv] Focus attention on consensus and commitment.
v] Empower champions to feel responsible for the new strategy and nurture 
it along to success.
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vi] Develop strategies Incrementally, but not piecemeal. It is the 
responsibility of central management to see that although strategies may be 
developed incrementally, they must be made to fit together in a unified, 
integrated and cohesive whole appropriate to the environment.
vii] Recognise continuing dynamics. Executives must gain consensus and 
support for the new strategy, but in a way that allows for room to modify or 
terminate the strategy if necessary. [Quinn, 1980]
Quinn believes that implementation does not have to wait till the strategy is fully 
formulated. Both go hand in hand and help to build up momentum for change, for 
innovation and for learning. He recognises a number of good results from planning. 
It: i] provides a discipline forcing managers to look ahead carefully; ii] requires 
rigorous communication about goals and the allocation of resources; iii] stimulates 
longer term analysis; iv] generates a basis for evaluating and integrating short-term 
plans; v] lengthens time horizons and protects R&D; vi] raises the comfort levels of 
managers; and vii] creates the psychological backdrop about the future against 
which managers can calibrate short-term decisions. In general the advantages of 
strategic planning are linked more to the process than to the actual plan. However, 
there are times when it is advisable to be specific In formulating your goals: in times 
of major transitions, after a crisis and when you want to precipitate action. [Quinn, 
1988].
The Mintzberg - Ansoff debate
Perhaps the most vocal critic of the formed, rational and prescriptive schools of 
strategic planning is Mintzberg. In 1990 he wrote an extensive critique of the 
rational approach to planning entitled, The Design School: Reconsidering the Basic 
Premises of Strategic Management, in the Strategic Management Journal. [Mintzberg, 
1990 a]. Mintzberg's major criticisms are:
i] because of the highly stylised, formal and rational nature of their planning 
processes they have denied themselves the chance to develop.
ii] because of its promotion of thought independent of and prior to action it 
has denied itself the opportunity to learn. Mintzberg doubts if any 
organization can determine its strengths and weaknesses or any other major
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part of its plan independent of trying to put it into practice. To plan we need 
to learn from both action and reflection. He is critical of the rational 
planners' tendency to separate formulation from implementation. It detaches 
thinking from acting the combination of which provides the organization the 
only real opportunity it has to learn and to adapt in rapidly changing times.
iii] he can not accept that structure should follow strategy. His 
understanding is that structure plays a significant part in determining which 
strategy the oiganization can follow while at the same time it is important 
that adoption of a new strategy will result in and should be supported by a 
change in structure. However, the possibilities will be limited by the present 
structure. "We conclude, therefore, that structure follows strategy as the left 
foot follows the right in walking. In effect, strategy and structure both 
support the organization. None takes precedence; each always precedes the 
other, and follows it, except when they move together, as the organization 
jumps into the new position." [Mintzberg, 1990 a p. 183].
iv] he believes that making a strategy explicit often promotes inflexibility. 
Mintzberg is particularly concerned that in times of increasing 
unpredictability it is impossible to accurately foretell the future and explicit 
formulation of a strategy might bring the learning process to a premature 
closure, would act as blinders and might give a false sense of understanding.
One of Mintzberg's major strengths is a wonderful facility for identifying images that 
powerfully convey his criticisms and present his ideas. Unfortunately, it is also one 
of his weaknesses because, although his images and generalisations are telling and 
basically accurate, they are often open to criticism in detail and he tends to 
generalise too much. Ansoff replied in Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, 1991 
and argued with much of the detail of Mintzberg1 s argument. He claimed Mintzberg 
was inaccurate in his details, in his methodology of picking on Andrews and then 
generalising across the other formal planners, in picking on dated texts and then 
denying growth and development to the school and so forth. He is particularly 
critical of Mintzberg's tendency towards 'proof by sweeping assertion. This is 
probably an accurate comment on Mintzberg's style of argument. Ansoff is correct 
in criticising the extreme but logical outcome of Mintzberg's argument that strategy 
should never be made explicit and can only be formulated in predictable
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environments. There is little need for strategy at that time and most managers try to 
predict even in times of rapid change. That is their job even though they should 
remain, humble, tentative and open. In the event, Ansoffs reply did produce more 
guarded conclusions from Mintzberg. "We both know that we shall get nowhere 
without emergent learning alongside deliberate planning." And he accepts Ansoffs 
idea of 'strategic learning’, cognition-trial-cognition-trial. "You call it 'strategic 
learning1. I have no problem with that so long as you don't pretend it can be 
formalised. And in return I'll promise never to claim that planning shouldn't be 
formalised." [Mintzberg, 1991 p.465].
It would probably not be productive to report the debate much further. There will be 
some more critical comment in Chapter 5.
Mintzberg - crafting emergent strategies
Mintzberg's facility for insightful images is best seen in his article, Crafting strategy 
[ 1987]. He likens strategic planning to the work of a potter. The potter at her wheel 
has a vision of what she wants to create but no detailed plan of how to achieve it. 
What she does have is her skill and experience, and she draws on these to shape the 
wet clay into her vision. However, the vision may change as it is implemented and 
the pot emerges from this combination of past experience, present competence and 
vision. Through the image of the potter Mintzberg makes a number of valuable 
points, i] Strategies are both plans for the future and patterns from the past. Often 
it is only possible to discern the pattern in an artist's work or in an organization's 
development as we look back over the past, ii] Strategies need not be deliberate - 
they can also emerge as they do with in the potter's hands. This allows action to 
drive thinking so that formulation and implementation merge. Deliberate planning 
and learning go hand in hand or as Mintzberg prefers to put it "strategy making 
walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emergent", iii] Effective strategies 
develop in all kinds of strange ways. The potter's errors often become opportunities. 
Managers need to develop within the organization's grass roots a capacity to learn,
iv] Strategic reorientations happen in brief, quantum leaps. Ironically the veiy 
concept of strategy is rooted in stability, not change. Major shifts in strategic 
orientation occur only rarely, most of the time they pursue a given strategic 
orientation. Eventually, as the world changes a strategic revolution must take place. 
The manager's art is to recognise when the time is ripe, v] Management is an art. To
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manage is to craft thought and action, control and learning, stability and change. 
[Mintzberg, 1987].
Pascale - the Honda effect
One of the studies most frequently quoted by the critics of rational, prescriptive 
planning is Pascale's, The Honda Effect [1988]. For years the success of Honda's 
efforts to take over a substantial portion of the United States motorcycle market had 
been explained by people like the Boston Consulting Group in terms of deliberate 
well-planned strategies. Pascale's interviews with the five Japanese executives 
involved showed that it was much more haphazard and opportunistic than that. He 
concludes, "we tend to impute coherence and purposive rationality to events when 
the opposite may be closer to the truth. How an organization deals with 
miscalculation, mistakes, and serendipitous events outside its field of vision is often 
crucial to success over time." [Pascale, 1988 p. 122]. He believes that the success of 
Japanese business firms should not be put down to the big brains of their planners 
and managers but to the little brains throughout the company who contribute 
incrementally to the quality and market position these companies enjoy today. 
Middle and upper management saw their primary task as guiding and orchestrating 
this input from below rather than steering the organization from above along a 
predetermined strategic course.
Hamel & Prahad - Strategic Intent
Hamel & Prahad also argue that the key to Japanese business success is not well 
thought out strategies, but the commitment of Japanese managers to create and 
pursue a vision of their desired future. They call this Strategic Intent. Strategic 
intent may be as short as Komatsu's "Encircle Caterpillar" or Canon's "Beat Xerox", 
but they believe it works. It does this by focusing the organization's attention on the 
essence of winning; motivating people by communicating the value of the target; 
leaving room for individual and team contributions; sustaining enthusiasm by 
providing new operational definitions as circumstances change; and using intent 
consistently to guide resource allocations. [Hamel & Prahad, 1989]. They are critical of 
western strategic planning because it limits thinking, resources, staff and 
possibilities.
Peters & Waterman. Kanter. and Handv
At the same time similar points were being made by Peters & Waterman [1982], 
Kanter [1989] and Handy [1989] in their studies of successful organizations and new
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perspectives on management. Peters & Waterman in their book, In Search of 
Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies [1982] identified eight 
attributes for excellence. 1. A bias for action; 2. Close to the customer; 3. Autonomy 
and entrepreneurship; 4. Productivity through people; 5. Hands-on, value driven; 6. 
Stick to the knitting; 7. Simple form, lean staff; 8. Simultaneous loose-tight 
properties. Similar points were made by Kanter in When Giants Learn to Dance: 
Mastering the challenges of Strategy, Management, and Careers in the 1990s [1989]. 
She argued that today's corporate giants need to learn to dance as nimbly and 
quickly as mice to survive in a rapidly changing world. They must slim down their 
structures around their core competencies to find synergy, form strategic alliances 
and encourage innovation and entrepreneurship within their organizations. On this 
side of the Atlantic, Handy in The Age of Unreason [1989] was also contending that 
in the future organizations will need to be smaller, more flexible and less 
hierarchical. Unlike Peters & Waterman and to a less extent Kanter, he did not 
believe in "one best way" and identified three generic types of organization which will 
dominate the future.
II. Some Specific Areas Needing Special Comment
There are two areas that all schools acknowledge as important and which may need 
further comment. They concern a] changing an organization's culture; and b] the 
quality of leadership needed for successful strategic planning.
a] Changing an Organization's Culture
As our understanding of strategic planning has developed people have become aware 
of the importance of an oiganization's culture in planning and in managing change. 
However, although almost every school talks of the importance of the organization's 
culture, it is not obvious how profoundly they understand its influence.
Schein [1985] defines culture as, "the pattern of basic assumptions that a given 
group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid, and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems", p.9 The organization's basic 
assumptions have worked so often they have come to be taken for granted by the 
members. They have dropped out of awareness and so cannot be questioned. This
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illustrates the strength of their hold on the members. They have become the 
common sense of an organization and will in future unquestioningly define what is 
normal, practical and wise. Because of previous successes, the culture of an 
organization becomes the primary determinant of the success of future strategies. 
[Coghlan, 1987,1988,1989; Connolly, 1986].
Culture has often been compared to an iceberg. Its more explicit or overt 
manifestations: rites, customs, structures, symbols can be identified by the careful 
observer, but the majority implicit and covert aspects: the assumptions, taken for 
granteds, implicit values and so forth, lie deep beneath the surface and are all the 
more powerful because of this.
Organizational Iceberg
Direct i1 'e
Overt Aspects
Covert Aspects >
Hidden, Subtle, Implict, Unconsicious
Fears, Assumptions, Relationships, Prejudices 
Deeply-held & unquestioned Beliefs, Culture\ 
Models, etc.,
f  Non- 
Directn e
Short
- Financial Systems
- Job Descriptions
- Structure of 
Government
- Policies
- Buildings
Figure 2.4 Adapted from Selfridge & Sokolik [1975]
As can be seen from the diagram, genuine cultural change will require a long time. 
Burnes [1992] quotes research claiming that it can take from six to sixteen years.
Many, Schein [1985], Mintzberg [1987], Pascale [1988], Hamel & Prahad [1989], 
Peters & Waterman [1982], Kanter [1989], Handy [1989] and Burnes [1992], believe 
that cultural change is the responsibility of leaders or senior managers. Schein 
[1985] would go so far as to claim that creating and managing culture is the only 
thing of real importance that managers do.
But how do managers or leaders go about changing an organization's culture? 
Schein [1985] believes that the first step is to understand the nature of the existing 
culture. This can be done by analysing the values that govern behaviour and 
uncovering the underlying, unconscious assumptions. Areas of particular interest 
are: processes of recruitment and induction of new members, responses to critical 
incidents, and the beliefs and values of the organization's "heroes". These findings 
should then be discussed with members, paying particular attention to anomalies. 
This analysis can then be a good basis for a strategy to change the organization's 
culture through the fostering of new symbols, visions, images, beliefs, values and 
styles.
Argyris also outlines a convincing theory of how to promote cultural change. Argyris 
does not talk specifically of culture but of the difference between the "espoused 
theories" and the "theories-in-use" that people actually operate out of. He 
graphically illustrates how individuals and organizations can trap themselves in 
"defensive routines" that are automatic and insulate our mental models from 
examination and lead to "skilled incompetence". He details a process of action, 
observation and intervention he uses to uncover our taken-for-granteds and help 
free us for learning. The first level involves helping the members to become aware of 
the inconsistencies and gaps produced through one's behaviour. The second 
involves realising the dilemmas and paradoxes resulting from one's behaviour. The 
third involves learning how the actions of the first two levels combined to create 
group defensive routines and self-reinforcing patterns. The final level involves 
learning how all three previous levels combined to cause individuals to censor, 
distort or block out the information coming to them, rendered ambiguous and 
inaccessible proper communication and made change extremely difficult. [Argyris, 
1983,1990].
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Finally, at times when radical cultural change is needed you may need new leaders 
without history and who do not have anything to defend. [Gummesson, 1991]. Burnes 
[1992] also highlights the paradox that those in the best position to change a culture 
are often those most inculcated with the old ways and they may have to be replaced.
b] The need for leadership
It was Selznick writing on Leadership in Administration in 1957 who first introduced 
some of the concepts that have since become foundational to planning. However, 
his principal concern was leadership. He saw institutional leadership as more than 
administrational management and believed that the primary role of the leader was 
the promotion and protection of values. Selznick [1988] It is ironic that in many 
respects the pendulum has now swung back to emphasising the need for leadership. 
Practically every author mentioned in this brief review of the literature has seen the 
role of the leader as crucial. Langley has gone so far as to suggest that, "The call for 
strategic planning is really a plea for leadership and direction." [Langley, 1988 p.49]. 
There are two aspects of leadership that are becoming increasingly important in the 
literature and deserve more detailed comment.
Organizations need leaders more than managers
It is becoming increasingly obvious that organizations need leaders rather than 
managers if the are to be successfully renewed and revitalised. Two people who 
have written on the difference between leaders and managers are Zaleznik and 
Leavy. Zaleznik [1992] believes that the difference is psychologically based. They 
are two different personalities. Managers are people who prefer order and control. 
They are reactive, problem-solvers and work within the system. They like to belong 
and work with a wide range of people but do not have deep relationships. Leaders 
are the reverse. They have a greater tolerance for chaos and lack of structure. They 
do not have the same need to belong and are often intense people to work with. 
They are problem-finders and transformational rather than transactional leaders 
because of their capacity to create vision. Zaleznik suggest that they are best 
formed through apprenticeships in one-to-one relationship with older successful 
leaders. Leavy [1992] also believes that it is the leader's capacity for generating 
vision that separates him or her from a manager. His analysis of two Irish leaders, 
Dr. Tom Walsh and General Michael Joseph Costello, showed that such leaders were 
rare people of deep conviction, passion and a sense of history. They were able to 
motivate other members of their organizations to play their part because of their
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capacity to generate visions connected with the deeper values and larger purposes 
than the merely economic.
Leaders as builders of learning communities
Senge also highlights the need for leaders who can generate vision. He believes that 
vision-driven change is to be preferred to problem-driven change. The motivation for 
the latter disappears the moment the crisis is past but the motivation for vision- 
driven change is internal and persists into the future. Senge notes that the rate at 
which organizations learn may become the rate at which they will survive. He points 
out that leaders are responsible for generative rather than adaptive or problem­
solving learning. The key to this lies in creating a vision which in turn will create a 
tension between what is and what might be. The leader as designer tries to create a 
vision and design a learning organization. As teacher, the leader helps to define the 
current reality and to bring to the surface people's mental models of important 
issues. He or she also tries to get people thinking systematically. Finally as 
steward, the leader is servant and steward of the people they lead and of the larger 
purpose or mission of the organization. Senge [1990],
m. Other Research Projects
A search of DIALOG [Dissertation Abstracts Online], July 1991, revealed no research 
dealing with an organization similar to the Columbans. The closest was research 
into planning practices in institutions of Higher Education and these only make 
general points covered in the wider review of the literature.
A search of ABI/INFORM, February 1993, produced similar results. A search under 
the subject "strategic planning" produced 6909 articles, under "strategic planning" 
and "nonprofit oiganizations" produced 58 articles, "strategic planning" and 
"religious organizations" produced only 2 articles and "strategic planning", 
"international" and "religious organizations" none. The two articles on strategic 
planning in religious organizations related to fund-raising programmes for 
Evangelicals and for Covenant House in New York. Although there were no similar 
programmes of strategic planning among the 58 articles concerning non-profit 
organizations there were some interesting points. The most helpful article was "Are 
You Ready for Strategic Planning?" in Nonprofit World, 1990. In this article, Kerry 
Laycock points out that in the rush to become involved in strategic planning many
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non-profit organizations fail to: ajconsider how appropriate it is for them, b] 
diagnose their own needs, and c] prepare themselves. He identifies four key 
questions an organization must ask itself before beginning a process of strategic 
planning: ij Is the organization strong and stable enough for this undertaking? ii] Is 
the need for change recognised? iii] Are the necessary resources of time, money and 
personnel available? iv] Is there enough commitment?
However, since most of the research is geared to strategic planning in business 
organizations, colleges, health services, semi-state bodies and so forth, there were 
special difficulties that did not seem to be taken into account in previous research. 
These will be dealt with in Section IV
IV. Special Questions for Planning in an International, Not-For- 
Profit, Religious Organization
The Missionary Society of St. Columban is an international, not-for-profit, religious 
organization. Each one of them poses special questions for strategic planning.
a] International Organizations
A major difficulty faced by international organizations when planning is the difficulty 
of communicating across vast distances and across a high degree of differentiation 
caused by different cultures, apostolates and circumstances. [Harvey, 1982, Thomas, 
1988]. It is hard for the central management to meet the various national managers 
face to face to prepare and motivate them for planning. Most communication has to 
done by mail and the volume of complex information that must be exchanged makes 
the task veiy difficult. [Harvey, 1982]. There is little opportunity for the seminars that 
would normally be necessary to ensure that middle management understands what 
is required of them and is enthused about the process. Isolation, lack of training 
and reliance on communication by mail means that the process is extremely 
dependent on the skills and attitudes of national directors. Making adjustments 
and giving feedback is also troublesome.
In addition, groups in different countries can have vastly different experiences of and 
attitudes towards planning. They are frequently moving in different directions and 
at different rates. Some have had experience of planning. For others the sudden 
introduction of a full-blown process of strategic planning comes almost as a culture
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shock. There can also be strong resistance to planning in some cultures or 
circumstances. Lorange [1980]
A multitude of social, political, economic and cultural differences makes the setting 
of common objectives, the assessing of the internal and external environment, 
integration, planning, implementation and evaluation extremely difficult. The range 
of strategic alternatives is wider for international organizations making strategic 
choices all the more difficult. [Harvey, 1982, Thomas, 1988]. For example, in the case of 
the Columbans, the demands of mission in countries as varied as Korea, Chile, 
Britain and Fiji make it difficult to agree on a common mission statement. 
Comparison is problematical and it is difficult for the General Council to decide 
which mission should have precedence over the others with regard to personnel and 
material resources. International organizations have the further difficulty that many 
of their people are difficult to move between countries because of the demand of 
learning new languages and cultures.
However, international organizations may need strategic planning as much if not 
more than national organizations. Their competing but highly varied demands are 
more likely to lead to fragmentation, drifting and lack of direction. Hence it is 
crucial that top management provides the various countries with clear criteria with 
which to plan and with adequate information on the state of the organization as a 
whole. But top management needs to be diplomatic in the way it initiates and 
manages strategic planning or it will be seen by middle management in the various 
countries as another case of centralisation. [Lorange, 1980]. It also needs to develop 
more regional autonomy. Detailed long distance management is just not possible. 
Each subsidiary needs to be planted in local soil, Ohmae [1989], i.e., related to local 
concerns and having freedom for local initiatives and creativity. It is the job of 
central leadership to provide the central vision and values that hold the organization 
together and the training and exchange between countries that will further cement 
the sense of common purpose.
b] The Not-For-Profit Sector
According to Steiner, politics dominates decision-making in the not-for-profit sector 
[NFPS] whereas economics dominates business decisions. Not-for-profit 
organizations tend to be more pluralistic than commercial organizations. There are 
many interest groups trying to influence decisions in the NFPS. Mission statements,
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purposes and objectives are therefore vaguer. The criteria for decision-making are 
less concrete. Implementation is also more difficult because of less clarity in the 
lines of command. [Steiner, 1979], They are also likely to have quite a number of 
professional members and their professional loyalties can undermine their 
allegiance to the organization. [Thomas, 1988],
These characteristics complicate strategic management. Conflicts about goals 
restrict planning possibilities. Divergent goals allow employees to undertake 
competing and sometimes conflicting activities in the belief that they are 
contributing to the organization. Ambiguous operating goals create opportunities for 
goal displacement and internal political differences. Professional values and 
traditions limit the speed at which professionals change behaviour in response to 
changing social needs and the demands of a new plan. Vague mission statements 
and objectives make it difficult to communicate to members what the organization is 
meant to achieve. [Thomas, 1988].
c] Religious Organizations
Finally, religious congregations also have special characteristics that must be taken 
into account by leaders and planners.
Religious congregations are primarily concerned with discovering, affirming and 
promoting the holy, transcendent, sacred or ultimate meaning of life and with 
establishing community. Central to religious congregations are faith, the sense of 
call or vocation and commitment to life-long apostolic service. These values are 
considered essential. They determine organizational processes and become the 
principal criteria in training new members, selecting leaders, choosing apostolates, 
decision-making, planning, life-style, evaluation and so forth.
Religious congregations have difficulty in writing clear, definite mission statements. 
[Alvarez, 1984; Guy, 1988; Guy & Hurley, 1990 a & b]. This is because of the lack of 
specificity and intangibility of their goals and the idealism of their members. The 
combination leads to a great variety of possible interpretations of what the 
congregation is about. This ambiguity limits the leader's ability to create a unifying 
vision and to decide priorities. It also makes it impossible to judge the effectiveness 
of a congregation because of the lack of a yardstick. [Guy & Hurley, 1990 a & b]. 
Members are reluctant to see cutbacks made in their apostolates because more than
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their work is at stake. They have joined the congregation for life. Their apostolate is 
not just as a means of earning a living for a limited period of time. They see their 
apostolates as a vocation more than a job and since they are celibate and often live 
where they work their apostolate colours their whole outlook on life. The mission or 
identity of their congregation and their particular apostolates are often more 
personal to them than they would be to members of a business company.
Alvarez found many religious congregations either have no mission statements or 
have ones that are not very helpful because they neglect hard questions like 
deciding i] a future direction for the next 10 - 15 years, or ii] who are to be the 
preferred "consumers" of the congregation's ministry. These are the difficult 
questions for the congregation because they have real implications for the lives of 
the members and for the distribution of personnel and other resources. Religious 
try to avoid conflict in deciding concrete directions for the future. However, "conflict 
avoided at this time is simply postponed until the next point of decision making, and 
the mission statement, the object of months of development, turns out to have very 
little real value to the group". [Alvarez,1984 p.30].
Guy in her analysis of the mission statements of 6 Irish congregations came to 
similar conclusions. Mission statements because they are normally general, positive 
statements are open to many interpretations. However, without further specification 
it is impossible to determine whether a congregation is being effective. She argues 
that two further steps are needed: i] a long-range statement of what the
congregation wants to accomplish, and ii] the establishment of objectives that are 
short-range, specific, challenging but realistic. [Guy, 1988].
For religious congregations motivation and reward systems are especially complex as 
they do not have the usual avenues of financial reward. Coghlan found that, for 
religious, motivation comes from approval and from the assignment of key 
resources, especially personnel. But the strongest "motivation for a religious is 
grounded in the sense of vocation and mission. It is inseparable from the sense of 
personal calling from God and from a deep commitment to the particular religious 
order that is a fundamental life commitment." [Coghlan, 1987 p.49]. For that reason 
leaders in religious orders and missionary societies will not be successful in 
promoting strategic plans unless they can show the intimate connection between the 
new objectives and the fundamental mission, religious motivation and history of the
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organization. Of course, rewards like more personnel, generous budgets, more 
discretionary power and approval are important but the strongest sense of 
motivation comes from a sense of being faithful to the mission of the congregation 
and God's ca ll.
Members of religious congregations are generally sceptical about the methods of big 
business. They distrust the profit motive as being far removed from the ideals of self 
sacrifice that are supposed to motivate religious. They feel that it is impossible to 
measure the value of their work which is often intangible or ’’supernatural". Finally, 
because of they believe God frequently works in ways beyond human understanding, 
they resist planning and prefer to allow for freedom of the Spirit.
There is some truth in all these claims but there is also an element of escapism. Not 
everything they do is immeasurable. Often appeals that their work is immeasurable 
is a flight from accountability. It is possible to plan and still leave room for freedom 
for the Holy Spirit. Actually confronting the dramatic disproportion between the 
demands of the environment and their small resources may require a good deal 
more faith and courage than just drifting along.
However, no leader or planner in a religious congregation can ignore the members' 
sense of vocation and be successful. "The rational, political, contingency 
approaches to decision-making of the secular arena are insufficient for the faith 
perspective religious bring to decision-making. Religious decision-making must be 
grounded in the faith on which mission and vocation are based. Discernment is the 
process that integrates prayer and decision-making, taking the process of making 
decisions beyond what is rational or political to the level of the sense of the 
promptings of the Holy Spirit." [Coghlan, 1987 p.47].
Discernment is an ancient practice in the Christian spiritual tradition. It was 
especially promoted by St. Ignatius, the founder of the Jesuits, who developed a 
practice of discernment as the basis of his Spiritual Exercises. The process of 
Christian discernment Is meant to help an individual or community decide what in 
this particular situation they must do to follow Christ in the here and now. There is 
no fixed method but some of the essential steps would be i] to thoroughly research a 
question so that it can be phrased as clearly as possible, ii] to tty to place this 
question in the context of what would best promote the Reign of God, ill] efforts to
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get in touch with one's own image of God and with the congregation's history with all 
its blessings, iv] efforts to become aware of and, in as far as possible, free of your 
prejudices and fears, v] honest sharing with other members of the community of 
what has happened in one's prayer, vi] the decision and vii] more prayer and sharing 
to see how the decision rests with the community in order to confirm it.
Discernment, as a religious experience in decision-making, should be a core 
dynamic in strategic planning for religious groups. Placing the decisions in the 
context of God's call enables religious to overcome their normal prejudices and fears 
and is more likely to motivate and unite the congregation behind the decision.
V. A Model of Strategic Planning for Religious Organizations
Coghlan [1987] presents a simple model developed for strategic planning in religious 
congregations. It tries to take into account some of the problems peculiar to planing 
for religious congregations.6 [c.f. Figure 2.4].
Vision. The religious congregation or missionaiy society begins planning by 
clarifying for itself its Core Mission. This core mission is found in its Constitutions 
and its early history plus its most recent Chapter or Assembly documents.
Environmental firan. The second phase is the Environmental Scan or analysis of 
the environment in which the congregation works. The congregation tries to identify 
the pastoral or missionaiy needs of the society in which it works and lives.
Internal Review. The congregation tries to make an assessment of its past 
performance and take a realistic look at its resources, physical and personal, both 
now and into the future. The review will have both a quantitative and qualitative 
dimension. It is an important and often neglected stage of strategic planning in 
religious congregations.
6 The Columbans used this model in the earliest stages of their planning process.
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Vision
[Core Mission] 
- Constitutions
Internal Scrutiny 
at Corporate Level
- Actual Resources 
-Personnel
-Numbers
-Ages
-Skills
- Physical Resources
-Apostolates
- Other Resources
-Current Apostolates 
-Strengths & Weaknesses 
-Tradition
-Prouds and Sorries
Environmental Scan 
at Corporate Level
[Context for Ministries]
- Needs
-Changes in society 
-Justice and Peace 
-Local Church
- Analysis of Needs
- Assumptions
- Scenarios
Strategic Posture
Mission Statement
[Corporate Strategic Thrusts] 
[Corporate Apostolic Objectives] 
[Criteria] 
[Guidelines]
Figure 2.4 Strategic Posture in the religious order Coghlan [1987] p. 47
Strategic Posture. Strategic comprises the primary issues to be addressed in the 
next 3-5 years as derived from the integrated picture of core mission, environmental 
scan and internal review. Strategic thrusts should contain specific and meaningful 
planning challenges addressed to all levels of the organization and articulated in a 
way that will convey a sense of the critical tasks that eveiy unit has to deal with.
"Typically, strategic posture in the orders studied was expressed in terms of criteria, 
numbering about four. Establishment of criteria is a way of pinning down the 
intangibility and immeasurability that Newman and Wallender pointed to as the 
ambiguous factor in not-for-profit enterprises." [Coghlan, 1987 p. 47]. All the ministries 
of the congregation are then assessed in the light of these criteria. The strength of
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the corporate commitment will depend on the degree to which this particular 
ministry meets the criteria. Coghlan mentioned one congregation that categorised 
their ministries according to three levels of priority, 'growth', 'high maintenance' and 
'low maintenance'. "'Growth' apostolates were defined in terms of opportunities for 
new contemporary operations arising out of the strategic process and characterised 
by an input of younger personnel and clear fulfilment of province criteria. 'High 
maintenance1 were areas where there was a traditional ministry that the province 
continued to value highly. With a reduction in religious personnel the character of 
these ministries would change, and they would be expected to adapt to the 
province's strategic criteria. The third category was that of 'low maintenance' which 
consisted of the ministries the province would continue to staff as long as it had 
personnel to staff them and were centres of valuable activity by members who would 
work in a way that their health and age permitted. These apostolates would be 
phased out gradually." [Coghlan, 1987p. 48]. This process is also referred to as "colour 
coding". Growth apostolates are coloured green, high maintenance apostolates blue 
and low maintenance apostolates red.
It is not easy to identify which school Coghlan belongs to. In many respects his 
method, Core Mission - Environmental Scan - Internal Review — > Strategic Posture 
is the formal prescriptive planning model. However, his end product is a strategic 
posture rather than an inflexible detailed plan, something much closer to the 
concept of strategic intent or vision championed by the emergent, learning schools.
Finally, Coghlan's study of strategic planning in five different religious orders found 
that "the concepts from the strategy literature are directly transferable, even in a 
non-competitive, non-commercial context". [Coghlan, 1987 p.50]. He also identified a 
number of common strands that made for successful planning in the five 
congregations he studied. The key ones were: i] Each order emphasised core 
criteria that became the focus of the different strategic activities, ii] Their strategies 
pinpointed key issues arising out of the core criteria and the needs of the 
environment, iii] Process was very important. Building a process of systematic 
reflection was a critical success factor, iv] Considerable time was devoted to 
consultation and consensus building. They needed a wide variety of top-down and 
bottom-up interaction and participation in defining the strategy. Consequently 
consensus and motivation were strong, v] All used task forces, vi] Organizational 
structures were adapted where necessary to facilitate the implementation of
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strategy, viil To be successful at planning one also needs to focus on Issues of 
Internal organizational maintenance, such as continuing education, care of the 
retired and elderly, community life, viil] It was crucial that the leadership played a 
clear role In owning the processes and in activating them in their formulation and 
implementation." [Coghlan, 1987 p. 50].
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Ch a p t e r  3 Me t h o d o l o g y
Introduction
This chapter outlines i] the important factors which determined the choice of 
methodology, and ii] the details of the methodology.
I. Important Determining Factors
There were three factors that influenced the choice of methodology for this thesis. 
They were the researcher's dual role, the need for a cyclical and flexible methodology 
and the actual history of the Columban process of strategic planning.
a] The researcher's dual role
It is important to remember that the author as Vicar General of the Missionary 
Society of St. Columban has been intimately involved in organizing all stages of the 
planning process. He helped design the process, review all the Regional Plans of 
Action and organise training in leadership and planning. In other words the author 
has been both researcher and senior executive. There are significant advantages 
and disadvantages to such a dual role. As Gummesson points out in his book, 
Qualitative Methods in Management Research [1991] the role of senior executive 
provides the most comprehensive access to the organization and its strategic issues. 
Of course, there are disadvantages to having a dual role. They mostly relate to 
possible lack of time, focus, objectivity and adequate theoretical background. 
[Gummesson, 1991], The methodology of this thesis tries to make the most of the 
advantages while guarding against the disadvantages.
b] The need for a cyclical and flexible methodology
This study was more than a controlled experiment. It involved an actual attempt at 
strategic planning and demanded quite a deal of learning, relearning, adapting and 
reformulating as the process of strategic planning went on. This is consistent with 
the interactive and iterative nature of strategic planning [Steiner, 1979] and with 
the more process oriented understandings of strategic planning [Quinn, 1980 and 
Mintzberg, 1987]. Mintzberg has gone so far as to conclude, "we believe the starting 
point for research should increasingly be case and context as opposed to concept. 
We need to ask more questions and generate fewer hypotheses - to allow ourselves 
to be pulled by the concerns out there rather than by the concepts in here". 
[Mintzberg, 1990 b p. 208], The research style of this study is akin to that of Action
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Research where the researcher not only studies a social phenomenon but also 
participates and actively influences the course of events Argyris [1983] and Peters & 
Robinson [1984], The approach required constant learning and adaptation. To that 
extent it did involve what Argyris [1983] calls double-loop learning. It can be 
represented as follows:
Inter-
AcflonReflection .............. > Action ................ > Evaluation ................ >
vention
Figure 3.1
When it came to developing a methodology for this thesis the original inspiration 
came from experts in education research. [McGuigan, 1983; Burgess, 1985; Sherman & 
Webb, 1988]. It was only as more of the theory of planning was researched that it 
became clear that the methodology being used was largely that of Action Research.
c] A brief history of the Columban process of strategic planning
To understand the methodology of this thesis it is also necessaiy to know the histoiy 
of the Columban process of strategic planning. The two are intertwined and 
interdependent. The process was as follows:
Phase 1. The Columban process of strategic planning was originally mandated by 
the 1988 General Assembly held in Pusan, Korea. The General Assembly meets 
once every six years and among other things evaluates the state of the Society and 
plans for the future. The 1988 General Assembly realised that given the changing 
demands of mission it was imperative that the Society review its present 
commitments. To ensure that the Society made the best possible use of its 
resources the General Assembly recommended that every Region/Mission Unit make 
an assessment of the missionary needs of its local church and of the Columban 
apostolates and resources. These assessments were to lead to a plan of action 
drawn up in accordance with their new priorities and, if necessary, to a 
restructuring of their present commitments. Becoming More Missionary [ 1988] #148- 
150. While the Regions /Mission Units were given the primary responsibility of 
carrying out the assessment and planning process, the General Council was called 
upon to initiate and coordinate it.
Phase 2. On 20th July, 1989 the General Council wrote to each Director reminding 
him of his responsibility to carry out this assessment and providing him with 
guidelines, Assessment of Society Commitments - Guidelines from the General 
Council. The General Council also summarised the Constitutional material that 
could serve as criteria [Core Mission] and recommended a possible process. It was 
then left to the various Regional Directors to develop a plan that would ensure the 
Society was as effective and efficient as possible in pursuing its mission in their 
country.
Phase 3. Over the next 6 - 1 2  months each Regional Director attempted with the 
help of his Council and members to review their resources, assess the missionary 
situation in their country and draw up a plan of action for the future. These plans 
were then forwarded to the General Council for review and comment. [These and 
subsequent drafts of the Korean, Fijian, Chilean and British plans along with related 
correspondence are available on request. ]
Phase 4. The General Council reviewed each plan of action as it arrived and 
returned it to the Directors with comments. With the exception of Chile, most of the 
first drafts were poor. Many Directors did not appear to understand what was 
required of them. The environmental scans were poor. They seemed to lack a 
method of analysis to make sense of all the data they had collected. The internal 
review of Columban resources was also weak. Regions avoided coming to grips with 
the very real decline in personnel. There was a pronounced reluctance to prioritize 
and to make cutbacks. The local leadership often did not lead. They preferred to let 
the assessment take its own course, rather than give direction to the process. 
Consequently what emerged were vision statements, directions for the future rather 
than concrete plans of action.
The General Council decided that a Second Phase of planning was required. They 
wrote to the various Directors stressing the need for detailed plans of action with 
clear, concrete objectives and a definite calendar.
Phase 5. Second drafts of the various Regional plans of action were forwarded to the 
General Council. On the whole these were a decided improvement. This time no 
comment was made on them.
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Phase 6. Instead the General Council used the second drafts to prepare for an Inter- 
Regional Meeting of the Society, which was held in Melbourne, Australia between 
24th April and 10th May, 1991. The Inter-Regional Meeting was attended by all the 
members of the General Council plus all the Regional Directors and Mission Unit 
Coordinators. The purpose of the meeting was to provide some training in planning, 
discernment and leadership and to give an opportunity for the various local leaders 
to share their respective plans with their peers. Facilitators were employed to enable 
the most productive sharing and to train the Society's leadership in some of the 
skills of planning.
Evaluations at the end of the meeting were very positive. It was an important stage 
in our planning process because up till then the General Council had communicated 
with most Directors only by letter. Understandably most were confused about the 
task that faced them. Many were reluctant "planners" because up till then they had 
not been convinced of the need for or value of such long-term planning. This 
meeting provided them with more understanding of the process, plus the motivation 
and some of the skills they needed to assess and plan. At the end of the meeting it 
was decided that each Director, on returning to his Region, would work with his 
members to improve his plan in the light of what he had learned in Melbourne. It 
was also agreed that this third draft would be forwarded to the General Council by 
March 17th, 1992.
Phase 7. In April - May, 1992 the General Council reviewed the various third drafts 
and sent comments to the individual Directors along with a request for a final 
reworking of their plans to be completed by October 1st, 1992.
Briefly the whole process can be represented as follows:
First Draft Feedback Second Draft Melbourne Third Draft
mid -1990 by General Council Early 1991 Meeting March, 1992
Figure 3.2
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n. Methodology of this Thesis
To be consistent with this process a methodology was chosen that can best be 
described as a mixture of quantitative and qualitative approaches to research. 
[Burges, 1985; Sherman & Webb, 1988; McGuigan, 1983; Argyris, 1983, Gummesson, 1991].
a] Two major sources of evidence
The methodology concentrates on two major sources of evidence: i] an extensive file 
of documentation7, and ii] a questionnaire designed in the light of personal 
experience of the Columban process and an on-going analysis of the documentation.
Study of the various drafts presented by each Region over the past three years 
provides the first real evidence as to how effective strategic planning was in helping 
the Columbans prepare for the future. A glance at the first drafts reveals that veiy 
few understood the purpose of planning, but by the time of the third drafts it is clear 
that most Directors have come to appreciate the need to be more realistic about 
personnel resources, to identify growth areas, to make cutbacks and to plan in some 
detail.
A review of the documents tells a lot about the effectiveness of strategic planning, 
however to provide independent evidence and to confirm the results of the analyses 
of the documentation, a questionnaire was designed and sent to all the members of 
three Regions, Britain, Chile and Fiji and to a representative sample from a larger 
Region, Korea. The questionnaire was designed to assess whether there is any 
evidence in the membership's attitudes and circumstances to support the claims 
made for strategic planning.
The hope was that the results of the analyses of the documentation and of the 
questionnaire would be mutually informing.
7 There are three drafts of plans of action from each country along with official correspondence and 
Guidelines from the General Council.
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Analysis of the plans
arising from the analysis
Figure 3.3
Analysis of the documentation sharpened the focus of the questionnaire and 
assisted in the analysis and interpretation of the survey data by validating survey 
results. On the other hand the results of the questionnaire can provide the objective 
evidence need to verify hypotheses arising from analysis of the documentation.
Both pieces of evidence are needed because the situations in the four countries are 
so different and their experiences of strategic planning so diverse, it would be 
impossible to interpret accurately the responses to the questionnaires without 
taking into account the different experiences of strategic planning. It would be too 
easy to misunderstand low or high results.
It is also hoped that a correlation between the survey data and the relevant plan of 
action will produce clearer proof of the value of certain elements of the planning 
process. The variety of experiences of strategic planning should allow for some 
profitable comparisons.
Finally, the survey represents the attitudes of the members at only one moment in a 
process of change that has lasted over four years and is still going on. To 
understand and interpret the results of the survey fully, it is important to see them 
in the context of the documentation and the history of the whole process. In some 
respects, strategic planning has only been a tool in the leadership's efforts to change
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the Society into a more united, efficient, responsive and relevant missionary 
organization. Isolated emphasis on the results of the questionnaire could distort the 
understanding of the whole process.
b] The questionnaire
A questionnaire or attitude survey was used as the data collection method in this 
study because: i] they could be given to a large number of members at relatively low 
cost; ii] they could be self administered and would not require travel to any of the 
countries involved; iii] the responses could be quantified and would not be subject to 
the bias of the researcher and iv] as such they would provide objective evidence to 
check the claims made in the various plans and the hypotheses formed after 
examining them;
The questionnaire was sent on 20th March, 1992, on completion of the third phase 
of the formal strategic planning process. It was sent to all the members of the three 
smaller Regions, Britain [25], Chile [21], Fiji [22], and to a sample of 40 members 
from the larger Region of Korea. A total of 108 questionnaires were sent.
These four Regions were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, they provided a 
representative range of Columban missionary life, a traditional "home Region" in 
Europe, a small Region in South America, a small Pacific Region and finally a large 
and more established Region in Asia. This provides not only a wide geographical 
spread but a wide range of social, political situations and a representative sample of 
Columban apostolates. Secondly judging by the documentation they appeared to 
have had quite different levels of success with strategic planning. Having four 
groups whose success at strategic planning has been mixed also provided some 
possibilities of multi-group comparisons. [McGuigan, 1983],
This method should ensure a wide enough sample from which to generalise about 
the Society's efforts at strategic planning throughout the world. It would have been 
difficult to send the questionnaire to members in all the Regions and Mission Units 
of the Society because of the expense and also because the methodology of this 
study would also have demanded some correlation of the results of the 
questionnaire with the plans and other documentation provided by each 
Region/Mission Unit. There are sixteen Regions and Mission Units in the Society.
Since there are three drafts from almost all these countries the documentation is 
considerable in length, variety and complexity.
c] The design of the questionnaire
An Attitude Survey was constructed [c.f. Appendix 1]. This instrument was designed 
using segments borrowed from a number of Attitude Surveys produced by Professor 
John Hurley's group in Dublin City University's Business School. It and the cover 
letter were further refined in the light of Paul Erdos's, Professional Mail Surveys. 
[Erdos, 1970].
The following guidelines were used in designing the questionnaire:
i] Since it is likely that a lengthy questionnaire would discourage 
careful and thoughtful response and, given the Columban culture, 
may even discourage any response at all, it was decided to 
concentrate on certain key topics relevant to the study. The 
questionnaire tries to verify whether our process of strategic planning 
has resulted in any concrete changes and/or has been effective in:
a] helping the Society gain a clearer and more unified 
sense of direction;
b] enabling the members to identify the missionary needs 
in their environment;
c] helping the Regions to be more realistic about their 
personnel resources;
d] enabling the various Regions to make the appropriate 
changes, expansion in some areas and cutbacks in 
others;
e] improving communication within the Regions;
f] improving morale, a sense of satisfaction and 
participation;
g] lengthening the time horizons of leaders and helping 
leaders and members to think more systematically 
about the future;
h] improving the Directors' and the General Council's 
leadership skills;
i] enabling the Society to become a more flexible, 
adaptable and self-correcting organization;
j] providing the Regions with plans/criteria against
which to measure future decisions.
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ii] Effort was made to make the questions understandable to and 
meaningful for the majority of the respondents. [Erdos, 1970].
iii] The replies would be anonymous and the only demographic question 
would be age.
iv] However, the questionnaires would be coded prior to being sent out 
so that the Region of the respondent could be identified.
v] Space would be provided at the end of the questionnaire and 
respondents asked for additional comments.
vi] The questionnaire would be pre-tested to discover if respondents 
would have any difficulties in understanding the questions. As a 
result of this pilot study changes were made to the wording of a 
number of questions and to the cover letter.
d] Sampling procedure
On March 21st 1992, questionnaires were sent to the British [25], Chilean [21], and 
Fijian [22] Regional Directors who were asked to mail them to all their members 
enclosing a stamped addressed envelope addressed to the author here in Ireland. 
Each survey was accompanied by a personal letter explaining the purpose of the 
survey, the importance of their personal reply and informing them of the 
confidentiality of their replies and of the fact that there were no right or wrong 
answers but requesting their honest opinion, [c.f. Appendix 2] It would have been 
difficult to post the surveys directly to the membership because of the expense 
involved and also because all their addresses are not readily available here in 
Ireland.
The same procedure was followed in the case of Korea except that a random sample 
was selected. At the time of sending the questionnaire there were 75 members 
officially assigned to the Korean Region. However, 9 were not involved in the process 
of strategic planning, either because they were retired or because they were out of 
the Korea for the entire planning period. Another 12 were home on holidays when 
the questionnaire was mailed out. These men were scattered over three continents
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and practically unreachable. That left 54 men resident in Korea and able to be 
surveyed. The sample was chosen by listing the men alphabetically and choosing 
every second one. This process was then repeated with the ones who remained 
producing the 40 to whom the questionnaire was sent.
A total of 88 surveys were returned. A response rate of 81.48%. Of these 21 were 
from Britain [84%], 17 were from Chile [80.95%], 19 from Fiji [86.36%] and 31 from 
Korea [77.5%].8
e] Data
To ensure the analysis of the data produced valid results:
a] data from each survey was entered into a Lex Technical Word 
Processor;
b] the data file was then printed and printouts were compared visually 
with the original source of the data by two other people as well as the 
author;
c] more than 10% of the entries, taken at random, were checked by the 
author and a third person. They proved to be without error;
d] data was transferred to SPSS-X where summary statistics were 
performed to ensure data validity;
e] a range of tests were carried out for all questions.
f] Statistical analysis
The method of statistical analysis will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Briefly it consisted of a comparison of measures of central tendency and of spread 
for each of the four Regions and for the entire sample. Comparisons of frequencies, 
histograms and analyses of variance were used to identify significant differences.
® The return from  Korea is a little disappointing but understandable. There was some dissatisfaction with the 
strategic planning process [c.f. Chapters 4 & 5], so some may have been reluctant to reply. A s  well an Irish mail 
strike was called two weeks after the questionnaire was posted. M ore than half the replies were delivered at the 
end o f  the strike and it is possible that some were returned to sender because a number o f  Asian countries refused 
to accept mail fo r Ireland while the strike was on. T\vo replies did arrive from respondents w ho claimed to have 
reposted their replies after the strike finished.
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Ch a p t e r  4 t h e  Results
Introduction
This Chapter has two parts: Part I - A review of the documentation, of the various 
plans of action; and Part II - The results of the questionnaire. Deeper discussion 
and analysis of the results will be left to Chapter 5.
Part I A Review of the Documentation
The entire documentation for this section runs to more than a hundred pages. What 
is presented below is a brief summary, concentrating on the information necessary 
to evaluate the responses to the questionnaire.
Korea
The context for planning. Korea provided the most difficult context in which to plan. 
The situation is complex and changing rapidly. It is in Korea that missionaries feel 
most deeply the identity crisis referred to in Chapter 1. Korean society is changing 
at a pace rarely seen in the West and Christianity is growing at a similar rate. 
Around 1970 Christians made up only 1-2% of the population. They now make up 
around 25%. What was originally a poor Catholic Church, heavily dependent on 
foreign missionaries, is now a powerful, expanding middle class church controlled 
by local bishops and clergy. All the seminaries and novitiates are full and there have 
been record numbers of ordinations for years past. The Church is also becoming 
increasingly nationalistic. Most Columbans are by training and inclination parish 
priests and there are less and less openings for parish work these days. [The 
number of Columban parishes dropped from 40 to 34 in 1990 and it is expected that 
it will be down to 20 by 1995.] Some Columbans are searching for a new missionary 
role. Some now work in seminaries, in translation or inculturation, with alcoholics 
and gamblers, with farmers and workers, with the handicapped, in universities, in 
spiritual direction, counselling, hospital chaplaincies and so forth. Unfortunately 
there has been some polarisation between those involved in parish and those in 
special ministries.
The history of the planning process. Korea followed the same process as the 
majority of Regions, [c.f. Chapter 3]. Each Region presented three drafts over the 
space of three years. Each draft was commented upon by the General Council and 
returned for reworking.
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First Draft Feedback Second Draft Melbourne Third Draft
February, 1990 by General Council November, 1990 Meeting March, 1992
Figure 4.1
The Region prepared well for the Regional Assembly, February 1990, at which the 
first Korean plan was adopted. A veiy full questionnaire was circulated to the 
members, the results collated, published and discussed by the members in local 
area meetings. Five papers on crucial areas were commissioned, discussed and 
rewritten by the Regional leadership. These papers were then discussed by the 
Regional Assembly and to each Practical Implications and Recommendations were 
added. The result was a list of general directions with some practical 
recommendations rather than an assessment of their present apostolates and a plan 
of action for the future. The Assembly was marked by some polarisation so the 
atmosphere was not a very discerning one. There was no overall mission statement 
or criteria for evaluating apostolates and prioritising them.
The second plan did include an overall vision statement, to make the Korean Church 
more missionary. However, instead of concrete plans, the document outlines the 
challenges facing the Korean Columbans and presents a number of interesting 
possible apostolates or projects.
The third plan was not a plan but a progress report on the various possibilities 
proposed in previous 'plans'. A quarterly mission magazine had begun publication, 
three new men were appointed to mission education, two teams of six lay 
missionaries had been sent to the Philippines, the number of parishes was now 
down to 27. There was little or no progress on the other possible initiatives.
Fiji.
The context for planning. The significant factors influencing the planning process in 
Fiji were i] the ageing of many members of the Region9 and the growing 
indigenization of the local clergy 10, and ii] the two Fijian coups in 1987, The coups
9 10 of the 22 members are over sixty and have been in Fiji for around forty years.
10 The Archbishop and the majority of the local clergy are Fijian. The Fijian Church is fast 
approaching self-sufficiency in clergy.
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were led by a Fijian Army officer, Colonel Rabuka. He and many Fijians were 
frightened they were losing control of their country to the local Indian population. 
The coups and the new Constitution have institutionalised a Fijian dominance over 
the political affairs of the country and to an extent marginalised the Indians. Fijian 
society is multicultural and multifaith. The 1986 Census showed that 52.9% of the 
population are Christian, 38.1% are Hindus and 7.8% are Moslems. Catholics make 
up only 9% of the population and only 1.2% of Indian-Fijians are Catholic. At 
present there is a great need for dialogue and national reconciliation between the 
various cultural and religious groups that make up Fiji. In general the atmosphere 
for planning was mixed. The missionaiy demands of the situation were clear but the 
age of the membership and the growth of the local church did not make planning 
easy.11
The history of the planning process. They followed the same Columban process as 
the other Regions.
First Draft Feedback Second Draft Melbourne Third Draft
February, 1990 by General Council November, 1990 Meeting March, 1992
Figure 4.2
Their first plan was a report of a Regional planning meeting held in early February, 
1990. They decided on 7 major goals which were summarised through the mission 
statement, Walking with the Local Church in its efforts to be more missionary in the 
context of the need fo r National Reconciliation. Unfortunately these goals remained 
more general directions than plans of action. There was no mention of concrete 
objectives, of the resources they would need, of the time frame for implementation or 
of evaluation. The Region refused to prioritise their apostolates for fear that "it 
would appear that some were doing 'more missionary' or 'more important' work them 
others".
By the time of their second draft, November 1990, the seven goals had been 
reduced to three: i] trans-cultural evangelization, ii] national reconciliation in the 
context of Ecumenism and cross-cultural communication, and iii] justice, peace and
11 There was tension between the Fijian clergy and the Columbans after the coup as the Archbishop 
and the majority of local clergy were critical of the Columban protests.
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ecology. The second draft was a progress report rather than a plan. It failed to list 
concrete objectives with timetables, etc.. The major development was the formation 
of two support groups, one for the men involved in Justice & Peace activities and 
one for the Hindi-speaking members of the Region. Both support groups had been 
active in their respective areas.
In March 1992 the acting Director sent the third draft, a Report on a Regional 
meeting of 3rd-6th February, 1992. It appears that there was a genuine spirit of 
discernment at the meeting. Three new support groups were formed: one for 
fostering vocations, one for promoting lay missionaries and the third for men 
working in parish ministries. The meeting decided on 9 criteria and each member 
was asked to prioritise or "colour code" or prioritize the existing apostolates of the 
Region. The results of the individual efforts at "colour coding" were collated and 
published in their report. However, they were never formally adopted by the meeting 
or the Regional leadership. Despite these shortcomings this attempt to "colour code" 
all the works of the Region was unique throughout the Society. The five support 
groups then broke up and came up with plans for each of their areas. These were of 
varying quality but at least some of them were concrete and planned in some detail. 
One shortcoming was that there were far too many objectives for the twenty two 
members of the Region to implement in any realistic way. The Hindi-speaking 
support group alone had eleven objectives. This was further evidence of the Region's 
reluctance to prioritise.
Chile.
The context for planning. The situation in Chile was favourable to planning, i] The 
country was just returning to democracy after 17 years under the dictatorship of 
Augusto Pinochet. Every organization in the country was planning for its new role 
in a democracy, ii] Because there was still a pressing need for priests, the 
Columbans in Chile were not experiencing the same crises about their identity and 
role as other missionaries throughout the world, [c.f. Chapter 1]. There was no 
pressure on them to look for work and considerable pressure to remain where they 
were. They have always had a close relationship with the local Church.
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The history of the Chilean planning process. The process was largely the same for 
each of the Regions. The process can be represented as follows.
First Draft Feedback Second Draft Melbourne Third Draft
April, 1990 by General Council January, 1991 Meeting March, 1992
Figure 4.3
The first Chilean Plan of Action was the best plan submitted to the General Council 
on the first round. They identified five priorities for the next five years: i] to begin a 
missionary apostolate among the Mapuche Indians of southern Chile; ii] to take on a 
territorial commitment in a poor and neglected area of Santiago called "La Florida"; 
iii] to increase their commitment in the north of Chile to four men; iv] to invite all 
members of the Region to assess and submit ideas on how they could make then- 
work more missionary12; and v] the Regional Administration was asked to draw up 
criteria for taking on new commitments and leaving existing ones.
There were other notable aspects of the meeting, a] The leadership prepared well for 
the meeting.13 b] There seemed to be a good spirit of participation in identifying the 
priorities, c] There was an "excellent discernment process".14 d] They were one of 
the few Regions to identify criteria for deciding priorities, e] There was a good deal of 
confidence shown in Regional Administration.15
By the time their second plan was submitted, January 1991, they had made 
progress on almost all their priorities, i] They took on a parish among the Mapuche 
Indians within a month of finishing their April Assembly, ii] They decided that as 
soon as they had personnel they would go to La Pintana instead of La Florida 
because it proved to be a more needy area, iii] They were unable to increase their 
numbers in the north, iv] The Director reported that as far as he could judge "there
12 The word missionary is never defined but it seems to mean to reach out beyond the boundaries of 
the established church to peoples of other faiths, other cultures, and of the poorer social classes.
13 They investigated a number of possible new commitments and provided everyone with a thorough 
position paper, summarising the results of an internal questionnaire and their investigations and 
identifying the challenges facing the Region.
14 This seemed to make for greater openness, better morale and a greater spirit of unity and ownership 
of the resulting plan.
15 They were entrusted with the task of drawing up the criteria for taking on new commitments, with 
drawing up the plan and with putting into practice a couple of priorities which the Region recognised 
should not be part of the plan but on which they wanted some action.
is a greater missionary awareness developing in our present commitments", v] The 
Regional Administration completed the task of drawing up criteria and actually 
decided to withdraw from the more established parish of San Luis, Santiago, vi] They 
also decided to dedicate their regular twice yearly Jomadas or four day seminars to 
missionary themes arising out of their plan of action.
When they presented their third plan in March 1992 they had left the parish of San 
Luis and notified the Archdiocese of Santiago that they would be leaving the Parish 
of San Gabriel In early 1993. They had gone to new "parishes" in La Pintana and 
Valparaiso and moved to a new parish among the Mapuche, Puerta Saavedra. They 
had developed criteria for leaving and taking on commitments and had even decided 
on a sixth priority. The new priority was to promote missionary awareness in the 
Chilean Church. They believed "the time was ripe for Chile to become a dynamic 
and energetic sending church". They set up a working commission to find ways to 
promote more missionaiy awareness in the Chilean Church and to make mission 
education material available.
Britain.
The context for planning. The British Region is the newest Region in the Society. 
Up till April 1988 it was a District of the Irish Region and was dominated by Irish 
concerns. Since becoming a Region it has been characterised by pride in their new 
independence, a marked spirit of co-operation and a search for new apostolates that 
would mark it out as missionaiy in the British context. Traditionally Britain, along 
with Ireland, the United States and Australia/New Zealand have been regarded as 
"home regions". The principal role of "home regions" in the Society has been the 
support of missionaries overseas. They have not been encouraged to take on direct 
missionary work at home. This is now being questioned by some members in "home 
regions". Many British Columbans would like to become directly involved in 
missionaiy work in the multi-cultural and multi-faith Britain of today. So the 
context for planning in Britain was supportive and challenging, but not pressurised.
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The history of the planning process. The British process was slightly different to the 
other Regions in that there was no second draft. The process can be represented as 
follows.
First Draft Feedback Melbourne ‘Third" Draft
-----------------------> ---------------------- >
October, 1990 by General Council Meeting March. 1992
Figure 4.4
Britain was late in presenting its first plan. Their plan was not finalised until 
October 1990. Therefore they had the benefit of feedback from the General Council 
on the progress of strategic planning in the other Regions. Two of the major failings 
of other first plans were that they were more general directions for the future than 
concrete plans of action and the Regional leadership had not been decisive enough 
and had merely collated their members' replies. These were certainly not failings in 
Britain's first plan. Their major objective was quite concrete. They planned to 
establish a "missionary presence" among the marginalised in Newham Deanery, one 
of the poorest multicultural areas of London. A committee of three was proposed to 
search for a house and a timetable was established. As a corollary they proposed to 
the General Council that our present house in Hampstead be sold and a smaller 
property in Acton be bought to handle all the Columbans who pass through London. 
They also proposed to research the possibility of publishing a British edition of our 
mission magazine, The Far East. Finally, another committee was set up to plan for 
the on-going education for the membership.
They did not produce a second plan probably because it was too close to the 
Melbourne Inter-Regional/Mission Unit Meeting. On March 27, 1992 the British 
Director submitted their 'third plan'. It was not a plan but a progress report on all 
their projects. The Newham community was established. The Region still believed 
that the sale of our Hampstead house was a worthwhile proposition. A committee 
was researching the possible publishing of a British edition of The Far East, and 
they had had three short seminars for the on-going education of their membership.
Part n The Results of the Questionnaire
The second source of evidence is the results of a questionnaire sent to 108 
Columbans in the four Regions, Chile, Fiji, Britain and Korea. The assumption is
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that analysis of the results of the questionnaire will provide objective and 
independent evidence to verify the claims made by the Regions in their plans, 
answer questions arising from an analysis of the plans and establish how effective 
the membership thought the process had been. While the results of the 
questionnaire would not be understandable without some knowledge of the various 
experiences of planning, the analysis of the documentation, Part I, would remain 
largely subjective without being verified by the results of the questionnaire, Part II .
Unfortunately the questionnaire had to be designed and distributed before all the 
third drafts of the plans were received and certainly before they could be properly 
analysed. To have waited any longer would have meant that the experience of 
planning would have become a distant memory for the respondents and the 
likelihood of receiving an adequate return would have diminished. The net effect is 
that there is not a perfect fit between the results of Part I and the design of the 
questionnaire but it is adequate.
a] A profile of the respondents
To understand the results of the survey it is important to know something about the 
respondents.
Of the 108 questionnaires distributed to the membership 88 or 81.48% were 
returned. Of these 17 were from Chile, 19 from Fiji, 21 from Britain and 31 from 
Korea.
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Breakdown of participants by Region:
■ Korea
a Fiji
■ Chile
m Britain
Figure 4.6
By age they breakdown as follows:
71 & o v e r  21 - 3 0
61 - 7 0
41 - 5 0
■ 21 - 3 0
■ 31 - 4 0
■ 41 - 5 0
m 51 - 6 0
■ 61 - 7 0
■ 71 & o v e r
-  67 -
And by age and Region:
.... ......Age............ Korea Fiji Chile Britain
21 - 30 „ 2 _ «
31 - 40 1 _ 6 3
41 - 50 9 4 3 4
51 - 60 10 4 4 10
61-70 11 7 4 3
70 & over _ 2 - 1
Figure 4.7
This age distribution would be representative of the various Regions,
b] Statistical analysis
The statistical analysis will comprise a comparison of certain variables for the 
purpose of analysing any statistical differences existing in the data. For the 
purposes of this study, measures of central tendency and spread were used as the 
basis of comparison. Means were compared by Region and frequencies and 
histograms - overall and per Region - were analysed. Suspicions about negative 
elements were then tested by isolating the relevant Region and comparing 
frequencies and histograms for all Regions, then for all excluding the Region under 
suspicion and finally for each Region. This was then verified through a number of 
analyses of variance. Only if the Sig. of F. was less than 0.05 was it interpreted as 
indicating a statistically significant difference. In some cases the means for different 
questions were pooled together to form a single concept before analyses of 
frequencies, histograms and analyses of variance. In all cases of pooling means 
from different questions Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to determine 
whether the various means could be legitimately associated or correlated.
The following section shows both the question and answer patterns using an 
adapted and abbreviated form of the questionnaire. The complete questionnaire can 
be found in Appendix 1.
To avoid "response set" the meaning of some values in the questionnaire was 
reversed. All mean values have been adjusted so that a value of 1 = Negative, i.e. it
- 68 -
disagrees with the statement while a value of 5 = Positive, i.e., it agrees with the 
statement. There are also a number of Yes/No questions and there was ample room 
for comments at crucial stages throughout the questionnaire. These comments were 
used to uncover differences or further information not accessible to a Yes/No or 
multiple value questions.
Various questions contained either 5 or 4 point scales. The type of scale being used 
is indicated at the beginning of each section.
Although the reply rate was over 81%, the total numbers are not great so the margin 
of error will be considerable. This will severely limit the certainty with which 
conclusions can be drawn.
c] Report of results
i] The results are presented according to the major sections as outlined in the 
Questionnaire, [c.f. Appendix 1].
ii] A mean value and a standard deviation value are given for the entire sample.
iii] The only comparison is by Region. Because the planning was done on a 
Regional basis, Regional comparison will provide the best gauge of how effective each 
planning process was. It is hoped that it will also show the value of certain planning 
components done well in one Region and badly or not at all in another.
Thought was given to a comparison by age but rejected because the various 
experiences of strategic planning were so diverse one would not be comparing like to 
like and the results would be seriously skewed. For example, in the 41-50 age 
group, 9 of the 20 respondents are from Korea where the experience of planning was 
arguably worse than in other Regions. A finding that the 41-50 year olds were 
negative about strategic planning would be seriously skewed by the Korean 
experience. Consideration was given to an intra-Regional comparison by age, 
namely under 50 and over 50. The value of such a comparison was doubtful 
because the very small samples involved. An initial investigation through SPSS-X 
confirmed this.
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While designing the questionnaire thought was also given to trying to isolate the 
men in positions of authority so as to be able to compare their opinions to the rest of 
the sample. This approach was also abandoned because it was impossible to do it 
anonymously. Without anonymity too much pressure would be put on the leaders 
in replying, if they did so at all. They would also need a different and longer 
questionnaire.
after a mean value identifies a significant statistical difference between the 
relevant sample and the others.
The Assessment and Planning Process has helped:
[5 point scale] Strongly disagree — > Strongly agree.
Korea Fiji Chile Britain Society
Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv.
Q.1 Clearer 
Direction 16 3 2 3 * .8450 4.05 .5243 3.94 7475 3.90 .8891 3.70 .8463
Q,2 Unified 
Direction 2.84* .9694 3.79 .6306 3.88 .8575 3.95 .8646 3.51 .9825
Q.3 Identify 
Needs Z 81* .7924 3.74 .4524 4.00 .6124 3.81 1.078 3.48 .9220
Q.4 Thorough 
assessment 2.81* 1.046 3.47 .6118 3.59 ,7123 3.62 .9207 3.30 .9366
Q.5 Realistic 
re personnel 3.45 .9252 3.95 .7050 3.65 .9963 3.81 .9284 3.68 .9040
Q.6 Made 
Cutbacks 2.77 1.023 2.79 .6306 3.24 .9034 3.00 .8944 2.92 .8993
Q.7 Identified 
Growth 2.52* .9957 3.37 .6840 3.53 .6243 3.52 .8729 3.14 .9491
Q.8 Prepared 
for Future 2.84* 1.003 3.79 .5353 3.76 ,7524 3.60 .8826 3.40 .9334
Figure 4.8
16 The process for identifying the significant statistical difference of the Korean sample was as 
follows: i] all the data was pooled as one and frequencies and histogram analysis done; ii] this lead the 
author to suspect that there was a negative element among the four samples; iii] each country's 
frequency tables and histogram where then examined; iv] when Korea was suspected as the differing 
sample it was isolated and analysis of histograms and frequency tables for all Regions and all Regions 
excluding Korea confirmed the author's suspicion; v] this was then confirmed by analysis of variance 
for all Regions, the Sig. of F. was .001 clarifying that there was a significant difference between the 
Regions and their answering factors; vi] Korea was then isolated and the author did an analysis of 
variance for the 3 remaining Regions; vii] the Sig. of F. for the remaining three was .811 denoting no 
significant difference between the three of them and showing that Korea is the contributing factor to 
the difference between the Regions. This result was doubled checked through comparing similar 
samples through a Crosstabs/Chi Square analysis. A similar methodology was followed every time an 
initial analysis of frequencies and histograms lead the author to suspect that a significant difference 
existed.
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Main Findings
i] The Society mean values and the Fijian, Chilean and British mean values for 
Qs. 1-5 & 7-8 are positive, i.e., >3.0, indicating a positive overall evaluation 
of the effects of the planning process.
ii] The Korean evaluation is significantly lower for all questions with the 
exception of Qs. 5 & 6 and with the exception of Q. 1 & Q.5 actually negative.
iii] On Q.6 all Regions are far less positive than for the other questions. In fact, 
the Society mean value and the mean values for Korea and Fiji are actually 
negative. This is interesting because Q.6 is the most concrete and verifiable 
question of the 8 questions in this section.
Regional Plan of Action
Q.9 Is your Region governed by plans? [5 point scale] Not at All - Very Much.
Korea HU Chile Britain Society
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Z 74*17 .7732 3.00* .8819 4.00 .9354 3.71 1.0556 327 1.0253
Figure 4.9
Q. 10 Region have a clear plan of action? Yes or No.
Korea Fiji Chile Britain
Yes 12 14 12 19
No 19 5 5 2
Figure 4.10
If yes, please answer 11] and 12].
Q. 11. Major objectives of Regional plan are clear? [5 point scale] Very clear - Very 
unclear.
K o re a  F i j i  C h ile  B r i t a in  S o c ie ty
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
3.07* .8287 3.86 .8644 3.94 .5737 3.74 .8057 3.67 .8231
Figure 4.11
17 A statistical analysis similar to that outlined in footnote 8 above, revealed that both Korea and Fiji 
were like samples and Chile and Britain were also like samples.
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Q. 12 Regional plan is correct? [5 point scale] Strongly disagree - strongly agree.
Korea I i Fiu* ..... Chile :f  Britain 1 Society it-
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
3.69 7511 421 .4258 4.25 .5774 4.05 1.177 4.06 .8272
Figure 4.12
Main Findings:
i] Only Chile and Britain are clearly positive that the activities of their Region 
are governed by plans, Q.9. Both Korea and Fiji are significantly lower and 
Korea is actually negative.
ii] The most significant finding of this section is that a clear majority of 
members in Korea do not believe that their Region has a clear plan of action 
for the future, Q. 10.
iii] The Fijian members are more positive than Korea but there is a significant 
minority who do not believe the Region has a clear plan for the future, Q. 10.
The Process of Planning
[5 point scale] Strongly agree - strongly disagree.
Korea Pitt - Chile Britain Society
Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv.
Q.13
Understand 
the process
3.32 .7911 3.74 .7335 3.82 .8823 3.86 .7270 3.64 .8049
Q.14 Members 
were involved 3.00* 1.00 3.84 .5015 4.18 .8090 3.86 .7270 3.61 ,9276
Q, 15 General 
Council's 
Guidelines 
clear
3.58 .8072 3.74 .8719 4.12 .4851 3.90 .4364 3.80 .7137
Q.16 Region 
gave
leadership
3.23* .9560 3.95 .7050 424 .6642 3.95 ,7400 3.75 .8873
Q17 Helped by 
Discernment 2.65* .9504 3.58 .7685 3.94 .8269 3.71 1.146 3.35 1.072
Figure 4.13
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Main Findings:
i] With the exception of the mean value for the Korean reply to Q. 17, all the 
mean values are positive, indicating a positive response to the questions 
regarding the Process.
ii] The Korean response is again significantly lower on Qs. 14, 16 & 17, and in 
the case of Q. 17 actually negative.
iil] On the other hand, the Chilean Region is generally more positive than the
other Regions in their responses to the questions in this section.
Concrete Results
Q. 18 Any concrete changes
Korea Fiji Chile Britain
Yes 13 12 16 16
No 16 7 1 3
Figure 4.14
Under Q.18 space was given to identify the changes. Of the 13 Koreans who had 
said there had been changes 11 named some. 9 mentioned men appointed to 
vocations or mission education and 4 the cutback in the number of parishes. All 12 
Fijian Columbans who had answered yes to Q. 18 named changes. 8 mentioned the 
new support groups and their priorities and 6 specifically mentioned the new plans 
for lay missionaries. 15 of the 16 Chileans acknowledged changes. 10 of these 
mentioned giving up parishes and 13 taking on new commitments. All 16 British 
Columbans who had said yes to 9-18 identified changes. 13 of these mentioned 
taking on the new apostolate in Newham, East London.
Main Findings:
i] The majority of Koreans who responded, 16 out of 29, did not believe there 
have been any concrete changes introduced because of the assessment and 
planning process.
ii] One third of the Fijians who responded, 7 out of 19, also did not believe the 
planning process had produced changes.
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iii] It may be significant that the two Regions who were clearly positive in their 
response to Q.18 and were nearly unanimous in naming the changes were 
Chile and Britain where concrete new commitments had been taken on.
Communication
[5 point scale] Very Bad - Very Good.
Korea . F «i  Chfle 1 Britain Society
Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv.
Q.19 Between 
Members18
2.87* .9571 3.50 .7071 4.06* .7475 3.62 .5896 3.41 .8964
Q.20 With
Regional
Superiors
3.42 .8860 3.61 .7775 4.29* .7717 3.71 .5606 3.70 .8229
Q.21 With
General
Council
2.77* .8835 3.44 .7048 3.94 .6587 3.57 .6761 3.33 .8716
Q.22 With 
local Church19 2.65* .7549 322 .9423 4.12* .6966 3.55 ,5104 3 27 .9130
Figure 4.15
Communication [cont.] [5 point scale] Strongly Disagree - Strongly Agree
Korea Cfaflc ;■l l l l l l t a in  Society
Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv.
Q.23 Bad 
communication 
- decreased 
effectiveness
2.81*
20
.9458 3.00 .8660 3.59 1,064 3.43 1.076 3.15 1.024
Q.24 Planning 
has improved
communication
2.94* .9639 3.78 .8782 3.88 .6002 3.62 .9735 3.46 .9621
Q.25 Planning 
- better 
understanding 
of others' work
2.87* .9217 3.78 .7321 3.94 ,9663 4.05 .5896 3.55 .9616
Figure 4.16
18 A statistical analysis similar to that outlined in footnote 8 above, revealed that Fiji and Britain were 
like samples and that Korea was significantly lower and Chile significantly lower.
19 A statistical analysis similar to that outlined in footnote 8 above, revealed that Fiji and Britain were 
like samples and that Korea was significantly lower and Chile significantly lower.
20 These figures have been reversed to make them consistent with the other results where the higher 
mean value represents a more positive evaluation.
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Main Findings
i] The mean values for all the Regions, with the exception of Korea, are positive 
indicating an overall positive response in the area of communication for Fiji, 
Chile and Britain.
ii] The mean values for the Korean Region are significantly lower and with the 
exception of Q.20 actually negative indicating dissatisfaction with the level of 
communication in the Region and with the General Council and local 
church.
iii] Chile seems to be the only Region that clearly disagrees with the statement 
that inadequate communication has decreased the overall effectiveness of the 
Society [9.23].
iv] With the exception of Korea, all agree that the planning process has given 
them a better understanding of the work of other members in the Region.
v] The mean values for the Chilean Region are high and in the case of 9s. 19, 
20 & 22 significantly higher than the other Regions. One result that is 
especially noteworthy is their response to 9-22 [Communication with the 
local church]. The contrast with the other Regions and especially Korea is 
remarkable.
Participation
[5 point scale] Strongly disagree - strongly agree
Korea Fiji Chile Britain Society
Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv.
Q.26 Members 
are heard 3.40 9322 3.74 .8057 4,06 .7475 3.76 7003 3.69 .8396
Q.27
Structures for 
participation
3.27* 1.081 3.79 .6306 3.94 .8993 3.95 .7400 3.68 .9213
Q.28 Planning
improved
participation
2.97* .8899 3.84 .6021 3.76 1.033 3.81 .8729 3.52 .9384
Figure 4.17
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Main Findings:
i] The overall response is positive, indicating that members feel they are heard 
and that there are adequate structures for participation in their Region. 
However, Korea is significantly lower than the other Regions on Qs. 27 & 28.
ii] With the exception of Korea, all the Regions agree that the planning process 
has helped improve participation in decision making in their Region, Q.28.
Purpose
Q.29 Society achieve founding purpose? [5 point scale] Not at all - very much.
Korea Fiji Chile Britain Society
Mean St. Dv. Mean St. Dv. Mean St. Dv. Mean St. Dv. Mean St. Dv.
3.55* .8500 4.00 .7454 4.24 .5623 424 .9952 3.94 .8625
Figure 4.18
Q.30 Do you feel the Society in your Region has a clear unified sense of purpose? 
Yes or No.
Korea Fiji Chile Britain
Yes 5 13 12 17
No 24 6 5 3
Figure 4.19
Under Q.30 room was also given for any comments. The 13 Chilean comments were 
mostly positive about their sense of clear unified purpose even the 2 of the 3 who 
had said No made comments like, "there are efforts being made", "we have a clearer, 
more unified sense of purpose. However, we have not made the tough personnel 
decisions". Most felt they were growing in unity through the assessments.
The Fijian Columbans were more hesitant but felt that "since the assessment the 
direction has become clearer". Some felt it was still somewhat "notional". And those 
who were negative highlighted age, differing theologies and attitudes to parish as 
possible sources of division.
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Eight out of the ten British comments were positive but four mentioned doubts 
about whether all the personnel were totally behind the new direction or able to 
implement it.
There were 15 comments from Korean members and 13 of those were from the 24 
who had said No. Their comments can be summed up by the following: "a parish 
versus non-parish split is obvious", "By Society I presume is meant all the members 
- not just administration. I think most try to have the apostolate that suits 
themselves and by and large get it.", "No trying to accommodate everyone!!", 
"Because of polarization between liberal and conservative values and approaches we 
lack a unified sense of purpose - but a dual purpose is being achieved".
9.31 Planning process helped in any way? Yes or No.
Korea Fiji Chile Britain
Yes 22 18 17 19
No 6 1 - 2
Figure 4.20
Respondents were also asked for comments. All of the 10 Chilean comments were 
positive but all mentioned different ways in which the process had helped. From Fiji 
there were 10 positive comments and the major emphases were that it had got them 
talking to one another and forced them to prioritize so as to make the best use of 
their resources. All 15 British comments were positive and the most frequently 
mentioned item was that it had helped them realise what others were doing. 13 of 
the 16 Korean comments were positive and the common thread was that while there 
was still a lot of division and resistance the process had raised issues they needed to 
face.
Main Findings:
i] Only Britain seems to be clearly positive about 9- 30. In both Fiji and Chile 
almost one third of the respondents answered No. In Korea 24 of the 29 who 
answered do not believe that the Society in Korea has a clear unified sense of 
purpose. In their written comments the Korean Columbans make reference 
to polarization and members "doing their own thing". It is interesting that 
the Korean results for 9-30 316 more negative than for the similar 9-10.. It
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may be that it is the addition of the word "unified" to Q.30 that has made all 
the difference.
ii] Yet all Regions including Korea [22 out of 28 respondents] believe that the 
planning process has helped. 9-31. In their comments under 9-31 
respondents claim that the process has at least helped the members to talk 
more to one another and to "face the issues they need to face".
iii] All the Regional mean values to 9-29 are greater than 3.5 and clearly 
positive. Korea is positive but significantly lower than the other Regions.
Current Mission of the Society
9- 32 Current mission statements meaningful?
_______________________ Korea Fiji Chile Britain Tbtal
11 35
9 36
1 14
9-33 "How would you express the mission of the Society today?" Comment.
Among those for whom the Society's current mission statements are "only a little 
meaningful" 2 made rather cynical comments about "doing your own thing", 2 
believed that we need to be more subservient to the local church and 5 made 
statements largely in line with the Constitutions and current documents of the 
Society. 59 of those who answered "very meaningful" or "fairly meaningful" gave 
comments which were also in line with the current mission statements of the 
Society, They emphasise proclaiming Jesus's Kingdom and values to the whole of 
creation but especially the poor, marginalised and those of other cultures and faiths. 
They also emphasise the need for dialogue with other religions and efforts always to 
make the local church more missionary. There was no serious disagreement among 
the answers or with the Society's official mission statements.
Veiy meaningful for 
you 6 6 12
Fairly meaningful 12 10 5
Only a little 
meaningful 11 2 -
Not at all meaningful - - -
Figure 4.21
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Q.34 Your apostolate fulfil the Society's current mission? Yes or No.
Korea Fiji Chile Britain
Yes 27 17 16 18
No 2 1 1 3
Figure 4.22
Q.34 Comments.
Of those who answered No and also gave a comment the common theme is "No, 
because I am working in an established parish or in fund-raising and not reaching 
out to the more missionary tasks". 12 of those who answered Yes would also feel 
that tension but would believe they were missionary enough to answer Yes.
Main Findings:
i] There does not seem to be any serious alienation from the Society and its 
current mission statements in Fiji, Chile and Britain. In fact, they seem to 
be veiy positive about the current mission statements of the Society. Almost 
all their members claim that the current mission statements are at least 
fairly meaningful for them Q.32, they express this mission in terms akin to 
the official Society statements, Q.33, and they agree that their apostolates 
fulfil the Society's current mission, Q.34.
ii] The picture is not so clear in the case of Korea. 11 of the 29 who responded 
to Q.32 found the current mission statements "only a little meaningful" and 
yet they were able to express the Society's mission in terms akin to the 
official statements, Q.33, and 27 out of 29 believed their apostolate fulfilled 
the Society's current mission statements.
Satisfaction
Q.36 [5 point scale] I strongly disagree - 1 strongly agree with the statement, I would 
rather be a Columban.
Korea m Chile! Britain: Society
Mean St. Dv. Mean St. Dv. Mean St. Dv. Mean St. Dv. Mean St. Dv.
4.50 .5724 4.32 .9459 4.59 .6103 486 .3586 4.56 .6595
Figure 4.23
Q.37 If a young man came to you with a genuine interest in a missionary vocation 
would you
Korea Fiji Chile Britain Total f l
Discourage him from 
the whole idea
Encourage him to 27
join the Society
Encourage him to 
join another 
missionaiy society
Encourage him to 
become a lay 1
missionary
Figure 4.24 
Q.37 Comments.
The comments are mostly positive but 11 of the 77 who would encourage the young 
man to join the Society mentioned, even if obliquely, some reservations. They were 
concerned with difficulties arising out of the lack young men in the Society, the 
length of formation and fears for the future.
Satisfaction in daily missionary work. [5 point scale] Strongly disagree - strongly 
agree.
Korea Fiji Chile Britain Society
Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv.
Q.38 Fulfilled 
in work 4.30 .5960 4.32 .4776 429 .4697 4.33 .8563 431 .6157
Q.39 My work
is important 4.07 .9072 421 .5353 4.06 .6587 4.38 .8646 4.17 7807
Q.40 My work 
is effective 4.37 .5561 4,11 .3153 4.35 .4926 4.33 .8563 430 .5929
Q.41 My skills 
are adequate 3.33 .9589 3.58 .6070 3.47 .7998 3.81 1.030 3.53 .8871
Figure 4.25
Main Findings:
i] The Regional mean values for this section are more positive than for any 
other indicating a clear satisfaction with the Society. There is also no
1 -  «  1
17 15 18 77
2 3 6
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significant difference between the Regions indicating that this opinion is 
shared by all Regions.
ii] In the case of Q.36 the Society mean value is as high as 4.56 indicating that 
individual members are positive about their own vocation.
iii] Q.37 [Encourage a young man to join the Society]. Only 1 man would 
discourage him from the whole idea.21 77 out of the 84 who replied to this 
question would encourage the young man to join the Society.
iv] As to satisfaction in their daily work as missionaries, Qs. 38-41, the mean 
values for all the Regions are positive. Only on 9.41 do they dip below 4.
Interestingly the Korean mean value for 9-40 is the highest of all the 
Regions.
Leadership
[5 point scale] Strongly disagree - strongly agree.
Leaders:
Korea Fiji Chile Britain Society
Mean St.Dv, Mean St.Dv, Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv.
Q.42 Provide 
clear sense of 
direction
3.27* 1.015 3.83 .6183 3.76 .6642 4.00 .8944 3.66 .8893
Q.43 Plan well
2.83* .8743 3.72 .5745 3.71 .5879 3.76 .8891 3.42 .8740
Q.44 Listen 
well 3.13* .9732 3.94 .5557 3.82 .6359 3.86 1.108 3.61 .9398
Q.45 Promote 
trust 3.40* .8944 4.00 .6860 4.06 .7719 4.05 .8047 3.81 .8521
Q.46 Decide 
promptly 3.13* .7761 3.44 7838 3.35 .7859 3.76 .7684 3.40 .8012
Q.47
Implement
decisions
3.03* 1.033 3.61 .6978 3.47 .7998 3.76 .7003 3.42 .8874
Figure 4.26
21 Even he did not say this so clearly but it was the interpretation the author drew from the comments 
he made.
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Main Findings:
i] The mean values for all Regions, with one exception, are positive to each 
question in this section, indicating an overall positive opinion of leadership in 
the Society The one exception is the Korean mean value for Q.43, indicating 
that the Korean members have questions about their leaders' ability to plan.
ii] The Korean mean values are significantly less positive on all questions.
Change, Innovation and Flexibility
[5 point scale] Strongly disagree - strongly agree.
Korea Fiji Chile Britain Society
Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv, Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv. Mean St.Dv.
Q.48 Society
encourages
ideas
3.47 1.075 3.79 .5353 4.12 .9275 3.90 .6407 3.77 .8768
Q.49 Society 
life-style will 
continue
3.50 .7311 3.42 .6925 3.47 .6925 3.57 .7998 3.49 ,7132
Q.50 Society 
work continue 3.44 .7279 3.21 .8550 3.65 .7859 3.52 .8729 3.45 .8035
Q.51 Well 
disposed to 
changes
3.84 .6375 3.84 .6882 4.18 .5286 4.10 .8309 3.97 ,6856
Q.52 Society 
has changed 
too much 22
3.52* 1.03 4.00 .8819 4.18 .6359 4.21 .9763 3.91 ,9534
Figure 4.28
Main Findings:
i] The mean values for 9.48 are all positive indicating a good atmosphere 
within the Society regarding change.
ii] The mean values for Q.51 are also positive indicating members believe they 
believe that they personally are open to change
iii] None of the Regions believe that the Society has changed too much, Q.52.
iv] Yet the mean values for Qs. 49 and 50 are also high. It is difficult to make 
sense of these results. Since mission is in a state of crisis and the planning
22 Because of the double negative in the question these figures have been reversed.
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process was an official Society attempt to redefine its role and contribution, it 
is difficult to see how so many could believe that the Society's life-style and 
work will continue in its present form for the foreseeable future. It is 
possible that individual members could believe that although they recognise 
change is necessary they personally hope to avoid it. However, the questions 
relate not to individual's but to the Society's present work and life style. 
Interestingly these questions were grouped together and analysed with 
Pearsons Correlation Coefficients Test. They did not correlate. These 
questions seem to have been poorly designed so the results are inconclusive.
Comments on the Survey
Although 51 members made comments in the space provided at the end of survey 
there were few common themes. The most common comment was to congratulate 
the author on taking this initiative and wish him all the best [7]. 6 people also 
expressed pride in the Society. Other than that there was no theme that attracted 
more than 3 similar comments.
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Ch a p t e r  5 Dis c u s s io n
Introduction
This chapter will have two sections. The first section will be discussion and 
evaluation of the results of the questionnaire and a comparison of the four Regional 
processes to learn if any process has been better than the others and possibly 
isolate aspects of a planning process that were crucial to their success. The second 
section will evaluate how the findings of this study relate to the various theories of 
strategic planning presented in Chapter 2 and hopefully develop some new 
theoretical conclusions.
I. A Discussion and Evaluation of the Results 
a] The most significant findings from the questionnaire
i] The most significant finding is that strategic planning was successful in
three Regions. Fiji, Chile and Britain are all positive in their evaluation of 
their planning processes.23
Majorities in Fiji, Chile and Britain agree they have a clear plan for the future 
[Fig. 4.10] and a clear and unified sense of purpose [Fig. 4.19]. They are also 
positive regarding the degree to which their Region is governed by plans [Fig. 
4.9] although Fiji, like Korea, is significantly less positive than the other 
Regions.24
ii] Strategic planning appears to have helped all the Regions, with the exception 
of Korea, in most of the particular areas the experts claimed it would.
a] helping the Society gain a clearer and more unified sense of direction 
[Andrews, 1980; Ansoff, 1965; Steiner, 1979; Lorange, 1980; MacMillan, 1986; 
Thomas, 1988; Coghlan, 1987; Langley [1988];
Members in Fiji, Chile and Britain believe that they have a clear and 
unified plan for the future, [c.f. Figs. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.19].
23 Their only negative result in the whole questionnaire is for Fiji on the question of making cutbacks 
[Q.6, Fig. 4.8]. This is understandable as they did not decide on any cutbacks despite committing 
themselves to many new objectives.
24 Their "plans" were all reports of meetings rather than plans formally adopted by the leadership.
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b] enabling the members to Identify the missionary needs and 
opportunities in the environment [Andrews, 1980; Ansoff, 1965; Steiner, 
1979]; Lorange, 1980; MacMillan, 1986; Thomas, 1988; Coghlan, 1987];
All the Regions, with the exception of Korea, believe that strategic 
planning has helped them identify needs and make a thorough 
assessment [Fig. 4.8].25
c] helping the Regions to become more realistic about their personnel 
resources [Steiner, 1979; Thomas, 1988; Lorange, 1980; Coghlan, 1987];
All the Regions agree that strategic planning has helped them become 
more realistic about their personnel resources [Fig. 4.8]. However, 
given the personnel projections [Korea and Britain can expect a 35% 
drop and Chile and Fiji a 20% drop in the next seven years] it is 
difficult to believe that any Region is being realistic about personnel 
when it does not consider serious cutbacks. None of the Regions has 
begun to think in terms of cutbacks of this magnitude as yet.
d] enabling the various Regions to make the appropriate changes, 
expansion in some areas and cutbacks in others;
The responses from Fiji, Chile and Britain to Qs. 7 [Identified growth] 
are positive but all three Regions are not as sure about Q.6 [Made 
cutbacks] and Fiji is actually negative [Fig. 4.8]. An analysis of the 
various Regional plans supports this finding. Only Chile made 
cutbacks. Neither Fiji or Britain decided on cutbacks and Fiji 
actually resisted the idea of prioritising in the first round of planning. 
Failure to face up to the limits of their personnel resources is a 
common tendency in religious congregations and it will take time for 
strategic planning to be effective in this area.
e] improving communication within the Regions [Steiner, 1979; Thomas, 
1988; Quinn, 1980; Langley, 1988];
Again with the exception of Korea, members are positive about 
communication and agree that the planning process has improved
25 There was some evidence especially in the first drafts that although they had all collected an 
enormous amount of information they were not as successful in analysing it and building on it when 
planning. It is possible that they need a better system for analysing their environment.
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communication and understanding in their Regions [Figs. 4.15 & 
4.16].
f] improving morale, a sense of satisfaction and participation [Langley, 
1988]:
All Regions are positive about the degree of participation in their 
Regions and all, with the exception of Korea, agree that the planning 
process has improved participation in their Region [Fig. 4.17].
With regard to morale, most members agree the Society is achieving 
the purpose for which it was founded [Fig. 4.18],26 They are also 
positive about the Society's current mission statements although it is 
disturbing to find that 11 out of the 29 Koreans who responded to 
Q.32 found the current statements "only a little meaningful" [Fig. 
4.21].
The results for the section designed to assess the members' sense of 
satisfaction [c.f. Figs. 4.23, 4.24, & 4.25] are more positive than any 
other section of the questionnaire. Members in all four Regions seem 
to be well satisfied with their daily work. They get a sense of 
fulfilment from their work and feel that it is an important and an 
effective way of proclaiming the Gospel. They are also reasonably 
confident that their own professional skills are adequate [Fig. 4.25]. 
The results concerning satisfaction are among the most enigmatic of 
the questionnaire.27 It might have been better if the questionnaire 
had also included questions about how members felt about their 
future.
26 Again Korea is significantly less positive than the others.
27 They are so positive they do not seem to represent the real questioning going on in the mission 
world today [Chapter 1], the decline in numbers and vocations for the Society, the struggle the various 
Regions had to assess, prioritize and plan. As well they are not consistent with the author's broader 
experience o f administration within the Society. It is especially strange that Korea is almost as positive 
as the others in this section and yet so negative on most other questions. It is possible that members in 
all Regions are positive because they feel the Society is moving in the right direction. It could be 
evidence o f  some complacency, or it might be an instance o f rationalisation. The results seem in 
consistent and there is not enough information on which to make an informed judgement. It is a matter 
which needs further research.
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There is no concrete evidence that strategic planning helped increase 
their morale or sense of satisfaction. The suspicion is that morale 
was improved by planning, the members do believe it helped create a 
clearer and more unified sense of direction, improved communication 
and participation and led to better understanding of others' work.
g] lengthen the time horizon of the leaders [Quinn, 1980] force them to 
look ahead [Steiner, 1979; Quinn, 1980] and help them and the members 
to think more systematically about the future;
The Fijian, Chilean and British members agree that strategic 
planning prepared them for the future [Fig. 4.8] and that their leaders 
plan well [Fig. 4.26]. The analysis of the documentation shows that 
strategic planning did force the leaders and members of all Regions to 
look ahead in a way they had never done before.
h] improving the leader's leadership skills [Steiner, 1979; Lorange, 1980; 
Thomas, 1988; Quinn, 1980; Langley, 1988]:
The responses to Qs. 16, 20 and 42 - 47 [Figs. 4.13, 4.15 & 4.26] are 
positive indicating a good opinion of their leaders and of the 
leadership they gave to the process.28 Although there was no 
question as to whether strategic planning had helped improve the 
quality of leadership, the documentation presented to the General 
Council shows that the Regional Directors were learning to take a 
more assertive leadership role.
i] enabling the Society to become a more flexible, adaptable and self- 
correcting organization [Steiner, 1979; Quinn, 1980; Coghlan, 1987; Mintzberg, 
1987];
The evidence from the questionnaire [c.f. Fig. 4.27] is confusing, so 
little can be proved regarding this goal of strategic planning. The real 
test of flexibility and adaptability will only come in later years. At 
present the only concrete evidence that strategic planning did help a 
Region become a more flexible and self-correcting organization is from
28 The only negative mean value was for Korea with regard to their leaders' ability to plan well [Fig 
4.26].
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Chile where the members having implemented a couple of their 
priorities, reassessed their situation and decided on an additional 
priority.
j] providing the Regions with plans/criteria against which to measure 
future decisions [Steiner, 1979; Quinn, 1980];
Chile is the only Region which cam be said to have criteria and a 
concrete plan for the Region against which to measure future 
decisions. All the other Regions are still at a much earlier stage of 
planning and have not yet decided on criteria, assessed and 
prioritised their apostolates, etc.. To that extent the various planning 
processes have failed to achieve this goal as yet. This could be a 
"mixed blessing". It is important that Regions develop criteria to 
guide them in their decisions but given the emphasis of more recent 
authors such as Quinn [1980], Coghlan [1987] and Mintzberg [1987] 
on the need for flexibility it may be an advantage not to be too definite 
in their planning.
In general, the basic hypothesis of this thesis has been verified, at least in 
the cases of Fiji, Chile and Britain. Strategic planning, a management 
technique from the business world, can be successfully used by an 
international missionary organization and it does deliver most of the 
advantages claimed for it.
iii] The Korean experience of planning was clearly much more negative. On the 
majority of questions Korea is significantly less positive than the others and 
often negative.
The majority of Koreans believed their Region did not have a clear plan for 
the future [Fig. 4.10] and the majority grew to 24 out of 29 when asked if 
their Region had a clear unified sense of purpose [Fig. 4.19]. They were also 
the only Region who did not agree that their Region was governed by plans 
Fig. 4.9].
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iv] All Regions agree that strategic planning has helped them in some way. 
Even the Koreans agree [22 out of 28] that it helped them "face the issues 
they needed to face".
v] The Columbans also looked to strategic planning for help in rethinking its 
missionary identity and contribution. Mission is in crisis [Chapter 1], 
Missiology is in the midst of a paradigm shift. It would be asking too much 
of a management technique such as strategic planning to provide the 
missiological paradigm that has so far escaped the best theorists and 
practitioners of mission throughout the world. However, the process did help 
the various Regions to come up with creative insights into the nature of 
mission. In Chile it helped them see the importance of a mission to a 
cultural minority, the Mapuches, and the need for mission education within 
the Chilean Church. Both of these were exciting new insights into the nature 
of mission in Latin America. In Fiji they have been led to appreciate the 
importance of mission education, of work for justice and religious dialogue 
and of lay missionaries. In Britain they saw the importance of mission in 
Britain with its multi-cultural and multi-faith communities. In Korea they 
were able to isolate a number of imaginative new possibilities especially in 
the area of mission education and lay mission. Strategic planning has 
helped begin the search and debate about a new paradigm for mission.
vi] One of the most telling tests of a process of change, like strategic planning, is 
to see if it actually resulted in any concrete changes. An analysis of the 
various reports shows that there have been major changes in Korea, Chile 
and Britain at least. The purpose of 9-18 [Fig. 4.14] was to ascertain what 
the members' perception of change was. The replies were interesting. 
Despite all the changes in Korea a majority of the Koreans [ 16 out of 29] said 
there had been no changes introduced because of strategic planning. A 
possible interpretation of this result is that they did not believe that the 
changes were the result of planning. This was true in the case of the drop in 
the number of Columban parishes from 40 to 27. It was not a planned or 
voluntary change. It was forced on them by the growth of the Korean 
Church. However, the move into mission education, etc., was freely chosen. 
Still it seems that the majority of Korean members do not believe these 
changes were the result of the planning. One third of the Fijians who
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responded, 7 out of 19, also did not believe the planning process had 
produced changes. This is not surprising as the only changes were the 
setting up of support groups and the decision to take lay missionaries. The 
Region did not decide on any cutbacks or make any new appointments. Both 
Chile and Britain agreed strongly that their planning processes had resulted 
in concrete changes and they were near unanimous in what the changes had 
been. It was striking that in both cases concrete visionary types of 
commitments had been taken on. It is possible that this helps to explain the 
British and Chilean members enthusiasm for their plans. Their free choice 
of concrete new projects gave them the sense that they were setting the pace 
rather than being controlled by circumstances. [Quinn,1980].
b] Possible improvements to the questionnaire
Analysis of the results of the questionnaire have revealed a number of areas where it 
could possibly have been improved, a] There was a lack of clarity in the questions 
about the members' attitude to change. It would have been valuable to have 
included a question asking the members what they thought of the future of mission, 
if they thought change was necessary and if strategic planning had helped the 
Society change for the better, b] The questions regarding satisfaction were not as 
revealing as had been hoped and could have been phrased better. It would also 
have been valuable to have included a question about whether the process of 
strategic planning had improved their sense of satisfaction, c] A similar question 
could have been asked about leadership, d] It would also have helped if there had 
have been more questions about the role of discernment and e] some questions 
relating to vision or strategic intent.
c] Comments on the four different planning processes
This section will concentrate on a brief evaluation of the various processes, some 
comments on how this evaluation correlates with the results of the questionnaire 
and any significant questions raised by a particular Regional process.
Coghlan [1987] concluded that there were eight characteristics to successful 
planning processes in religious congregations, i] Each emphasised core criteria that 
became the focus of the different strategic activities, ii] Their strategies pinpointed 
key issues arising out of the core criteria and the needs of the environment, iii] 
Process was very important. Building a process of systematic reflection was a
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critical success factor, iv] Considerable time was devoted to consultation and 
consensus building. They needed a wide variety of top-down and bottom-up 
interaction and participation in defining the strategy, v] All used task forces, vi] 
Organizational structures were adapted, where necessary, to facilitate the 
implementation of strategy, vii] To be successful at planning you also need to focus 
on issues of internal organizational maintenance, such as continuing education, 
care of the retired and elderly, community life, viii] It was crucial that the leadership 
played a clear role in owning the processes and in activating them in their 
formulation and implementation. [Coghlan, 1987 p. 50]. These will be the criteria 
against which each Regional process will be evaluated.
The Korean Process. The major question regarding the Korean process is to tiy to 
explain why it was evaluated so negatively. Since strategic planning was 
successfully used in the other three Regions it does not seem to be because the 
process cannot be transferred to an international missionary organization .
Part of the explanation may lie in their context for planning. Theirs was the most 
difficult context in which to plan. The Korean situation was the most complex and 
dynamic. The local church was fast taking over many of the traditional Society 
works. Many members felt insecure about their future and there was a degree of 
polarisation which undermined much of the process. Ironically it is organizations in 
such rapidly changing environments that have the most to gain from strategic 
planning. Thomas [1988]. However, it seems to require extraordinary courage, 
political skills and wisdom on the part of leadership. It is difficult to tell what 
influence the context had on the results of the questionnaire. All the other Regions 
certainly planned in contexts much more favourable to planning. Would they have 
been as positive if they had been under the same pressure as the Korean members? 
It would be valuable to do more research into planning in such complex, rapidly 
changing and pressurised situations. It is likely that the context is a partial 
explanation for the seeming failure of the Korean planning process to date.
But perhaps the major reason why the Korean process was so unsuccessful was 
because of the way it was implemented. Assessed against the criteria developed by 
Coghlan [1987] the Korean Region was poor in many respects. It did not decide on 
core criteria. It did highlight some excellent objectives and imaginative possibilities 
but these were not planned for in a concrete or effective way. They only used task
forces in the early stages. Unfortunately their first assembly was marred by 
polarisation so there does not seem to have been much emphasis on process after 
that. It seems that in the later phases the development of the plan was left almost 
totally to the Regional Administration and there was little bottom-up input. The 
structures of the Region do not seem to have been adapted to facilitate the new 
"priorities" and there was little on-going education specifically related to the plan. 
The leadership was very involved in drawing-up all the plans but seemed to be too 
cautious about aggravating the polarisation in the Region. Time may yet prove them 
right. On most of Coghlan's criteria the process was not well prosecuted. This may 
explain why the Korean members responding to the questionnaire are more negative 
about strategic planning.
There is potential in the "plan". The Region now needs to prioritize among all its 
works and possible initiatives and to plan in some detail to ensure that these are 
implemented. The data is already there only the decisions have to be made.
The Fijian Process. Judged by Coghlan's criteria [1987], the Fijian planning process 
deserved the positive evaluation it gained from its members. They did concentrate 
on process and building consensus and used task forces. By doing much of their 
work in large assemblies they also took care of on-going education. They developed 
an inspiring mission statement, attuned to the mission needs of modern Fiji. They 
also identified criteria for prioritising their commitments and have tried to "colour 
code" their apostolates. They are open to question in two areas, i] Leadership. All 
their "plans" are reports of meetings and it was difficult to tell from the 
documentation whether their leadership was skilful or weak [Chapter 4 Part I], 
Interestingly, the members who responded to the questionnaire were positive about 
their leadership, ii] Their reluctance to prioritize or make cutbacks. This 
reluctance is reflected in the results of the questionnaire. They were significantly 
less positive than Chile and Britain regarding the degree to which they believe their 
Region is governed by plans. [Fig. 4.9] , one third do not believe they have a clear 
and unified sense of purpose [Fig. 4.19] and they disagree that the Region has made 
cutbacks [Fig. 4.8]. On the whole the Fijian experience of planning seems 
straightforward and the results of the questionnaire consistent with the analysis of 
the documentation. Their are no significant questions requiring detailed comment.
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The Chilean Process. There were a number of good features to their process: good 
leadership, the use of task forces, efforts to build consensus, a good discernment 
process, good participation, criteria to help prioritise, five clear objectives each with 
an established calendar, realism about personnel resources, structural changes, a 
programme of on-going education and a flexible process.
This is supported by the results of the questionnaire in which their process was 
evaluated veiy positively. They fulfil all of Coghlan's criteria for successful process 
of strategic planning in religious congregations and there are no significant 
questions requiring further comment.
The British Process. The planning process in Britain was uneven. Positively, it 
contains one of the most concrete and imaginative projects of all the Regional plans. 
The major criticism of the British plan is that it is limited to one specific mission 
project. There does not seem to have been a thorough assessment of or plan for all 
the other works of the Regions.
It is difficult to assess the British planning process according to Coghlan's criteria. 
They did use task forces. They made at least one dramatic structural change in 
setting up Newham. They did spend time on on-going education. Their Director and 
his Council gave clear leadership to the process. However, their performance on the 
other criteria seemed to be mixed. They did not establish a Regional mission 
statement with core criteria. Their process was mixed. At the early stages many 
members were involved in work-based groups but it is not clear how involved they 
were in the later stages of the planning process.
On the evidence of the documentation alone the author was critical of the British 
process and read the results of the questionnaire with a number of questions. What 
is the attitude of the general membership to this concentration on the Newham 
project? Did they feel they had been adequately involved in the decision? What 
effect does it have on their morale and sense of participation?
It was therefore a surprise to find how positive the membership were about the 
process in their answers. They are almost unanimous in agreeing that strategic 
planning has helped them [Fig. 4.20] and that they now have a clear [Fig. 4.10] and 
unified sense of direction [Fig. 4.19]. The members also have a positive opinion of
the process of communication [Fig. 4.15 & 4.16], of participation [Fig. 4.17] and of 
their leadership [Fig. 4.26].
However, a significant question remains: Why do the members of the British Region 
rate their process so highly when it concentrated almost exclusively on the Newham 
project and did not contain any mission statement, criteria or assessment of all 
other works of the Region?
d] A comparison of the processes in the Four Regions
In picking four distinct Regions with quite different experiences of strategic planning 
it was hoped that a comparison of the various processes might reveal which process 
was the best and isolate the reasons why.
The initial analysis of the documentation led to the belief that the Chilean plan and 
process was superior to others [c.f. Chapter 4 Part I], However, there was no clear 
evidence to support this conclusion in the results of the questionnaire. The Chilean 
members are very positive and are significantly more positive than the other Regions 
regarding communication: between members [Q. 19], with their Regional superiors 
[Q. 20], and with the local chinch [Q. 22]. But they are not significantly more 
positive than Britain or Fiji on a sufficient number of questions to establish that 
they were clearly superior. Actually the British members had almost as positive an 
opinion of their process as the Chilean members had of theirs. This was a worrying 
factor for some time because it still did not seem to have been as good a process and 
its plan was much more limited in scope than the Chilean plan.
One possible explanation for the positive evaluation of the British members for their 
process may be the enthusiasm of the members for the new British Region. They 
were all searching for a new and distinctive identity. There was a good spirit of co­
operation and a desire to ensure that the new Region was a success. This probably 
does help to explain some of their enthusiasm for and positive opinion of their 
planning process, but there may be another reason more intrinsic to the nature of 
planning and more revealing for the purposes of this thesis.
Pascale [1988] and Hamel & Prahad [1989] stressed the value of "strategic intent" or 
vision rather than formal detailed planning. It is vision that gives the members 
unity and enthusiasm for the goals of the organization. Vision also encourages them
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to develop the Initiative and flexibility necessary to meet the challenges of the future. 
There is a new vision for mission in Britain implicit in the Newham project and it 
seems that it has given inspiration, direction and unity to the British Region. It is a 
vision that emphasises a positive and distinctive mission for the Columbans in 
today's multi-cultural and multi-faith Britain. The plan for Newham also had a 
number of the characteristics that Quinn [ 1980] Identifies with successful plans. It 
is easily understood and decisive. It has motivational impact. It is compatible with 
the environment, but sets the pace and determines the course of events rather than 
just reacting to them.
The importance of Newham and similar projects in the planning process may have 
been undervalued. It seems that, although they fall far short of a comprehensive 
plan, they may be capable of providing the vision that Pascale and Hamel & Prahad 
believe is crucial in building up morale and encouraging unity and initiative. One or 
two imaginative and freely chosen projects may make up for other deficiencies in 
planning. Although the Newham project may have had little to do with the daily 
work of many members at the same time it may have symbolised the way they feel 
the Region should be going and hence have provided inspiration and a sense of 
direction. It is also likely that freely chosen, imaginative projects have a significant 
effect on the members' attitudes across the board by giving them the sense that they 
are determining the course of events rather than being controlled by them. [Quinn, 
1980]. Such positive feelings of being in control would then have a carry-on effect on 
questions about sense of direction, unity, morale, satisfaction, communication and 
participation.
It would require further research to establish the importance of imaginative projects 
in planning but there is possible support for emphasising their importance in both 
the Chilean and Korean results. Like the British, the Chileans chose a new 
imaginative project and there is considerable enthusiasm in their Region for their 
planning process. On the other hand the negative evaluation of the Koreans may be 
partially explained by the fact that they were under the most pressure and could 
only react to rapidly changing events.
What conclusions can be drawn from the four different processes? The comparison 
does seem to establish the validity of Coghlan's eight characteristics of successful 
planning in religious congregations. [Coghlan, 1987], There is also some evidence to
show that the freely chosen projects that determine the course of events rather than 
reacting to them can have a significant effect on the evaluation of the process by the 
members. [Quinn, 1980]. However, it has not been possible to identify which process 
was the best or to isolate the reasons why. With the exception of Korea, the 
experience seems to have been very positive in each country. As well the situations 
and planning processes In each of the four Regions were so diverse and the 
differences in the processes so numerous that it is difficult to isolate any one factor 
as being the significant factor, the difference between success and failure.
n. Discussion of the Major Theoretical Issues
There is no all embracing definition of strategic planning. Mintzberg [ 1990 b] in his 
review of all the schools identified as many as ten distinct schools. The differences 
between the schools can be small enough at times but the major division would be 
between the earlier schools, Andrews [1980], Ansoff [1965], Porter [1980] & Steiner 
[1979] who see planning as an intentional prescriptive process based on a rational 
model of decision making and the later schools Quinn [1980], Mintzberg [1987], 
Pascale [1988] and Hamel & Prahad [1989] who emphasise the gradual and 
emergent nature of strategic planning. As the world became more complex and 
dynamic and growth became more problematical, experts came to view 
organizations more as social and political systems and emphasised learning, 
incrementalism, flexibility, leadership and vision rather than rational, intentional, 
pre-planned approaches. The schools are so numerous and the differences so subtle 
that there is little purpose in running through each school. The following are the 
key areas of contention: a] the advantages of an emerging, incremental approach 
over a rational and prescriptive one; b] the need for a long term political process 
rather than a pre-determined rational plan; c] the importance of vision-driven 
change rather than problem-driven management; d] the need for cultural and 
structural change; and e] differing understandings of the role of leadership. These 
issues provide a useful framework under which to discuss the major findings of this 
thesis. Besides these five headings it will be important to consider some of the 
special concerns faced by an international religious organization.
al Incremental versus rational and prescriptive
The principal criticism of the earlier formal schools of planning was of their rational, 
intentional, and prescriptive nature. People like Wrapp [1988], Quinn [1980] and 
Mintzberg [1987] questioned whether managers actually worked in such a formal
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and rational way, whether implementation can only start when plans are fully 
formulated and whether fully articulated plans did not create rigidity and resistance. 
They preferred a more open, flexible approach where the "plan" emerges over time 
and is often only recognisable after the event. The plan or pattern is built up 
gradually by leaders making wise decisions according to the changing needs. It is 
vital to remain open and flexible to make the most of opportunities and even 
mistakes.
However, the Columbans in the early stages of their planning processes were largely 
unaware of the incremental or learning schools. Their early approach was based on 
Coghlan [1987] and Steiner [1979]. The original Guidelines sent out by the General 
Council at the beginning of the process of strategic planning in July 1989 were 
modelled on Coghlan's formal approach. The General Council's comments on the 
early plans were inspired by formal planners such as Steiner [1979] and Thomas 
[1988]. Steiner is a member of the formal, rational school and Coghlan, at least in 
his earlier writings, as a follower of Andrews [1980] and Hax & Majluf [1984], also 
had a formal, rational approach to planning.
In other words, right up till the time of the questionnaire, the basic approach to 
strategic planning was that of the formal, rational school. Yet it seems to have been 
successful in helping at least three Regions assess, plan, gain a clearer and more 
unified sense of direction and improve communication, morale, participation, 
leadership and so forth. It never seemed to run into the major problems highlighted 
by the critics of formal strategic planning. Fortunately the process was never so 
rigid that there was no learning along the way. In fact, it was preeminently a 
learning process going through several drafts. A number of changes in approach 
have been made as the Society learnt from mistakes or from serious deficiencies. 
Plans were never set in stone in a way that stifled initiative or attracted internal 
resistance. As a religious organization with "more markets than competitors" the 
Society was not concerned with profit maximisation and growth in market share so 
the Regional processes were not excessively mathematical or mechanistic. They 
were able to escape much of the excessive detail and paralysis by analysis that 
bedevil formal planning in business sector.
Perhaps this is because of Coghlan's process [1987]. Coghlan's end product is a 
strategic posture rather than a detailed plan. A strategic posture is made up of a
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mission statement with three or four criteria or challenges for the next 3-5 years and 
some corporate objectives arising from these key challenges or issues. This 
approach, although strictly within the formal school, also seems close to the concept 
of strategic intent or vision as championed by Mintzberg [1987], Pascale [1988] and 
Hamel & Prahad [1989]. In religious organizations the process of change is 
necessarily more gradual. Efforts are made to bring ministries into line with the 
criteria rather than planned out of existence. The process is more democratic. 
Because all involved are permanent members of the congregation greater attention 
must be given to encouraging participation and building consensus. Although the 
commitment and involvement of leaders or superiors is crucial, they do not have the 
dominant role recommended for them in secular strategic planning. They do not 
determine the mission statement or long term goals on their own. These emerge 
only after much reflection and discussion by the whole congregation. So, of 
necessity, the Columban process of strategic planning was slow, iterative and 
interactive. It involved much learning, adapting and reformulating as the process 
went on. The emphasis had to be on the process more than the concrete plans 
although every effort was made to try to get the Regions to be as concrete as 
possible. Finally, strategic planning was so new to the membership that they are 
still coming to grips with aspects of strategic planning like mission statements, 
criteria and the details of planning, implementation and evaluation.
In general, it seems that the formal approach to planning has worked for the 
Columbans and that many of the criticisms of the other schools did not prove 
entirely valid. However, there are lessons to be learned from a more detailed look at 
the various schools.
Disjointed incrementaHsm. Wrapp [1988] believed that Good Managers Don't Make 
Policy Decisions instead they play the power game, keep their options open and 
muddle with a purpose. Loasby [1988] thought long-range planning would block 
fresh thought and imagination and advised managers to do as little planning as 
possible. Lindbolm [1959] wrote of The Science of Muddling Through or "disjointed 
incremenLalism". Policy making must be serial, remedial and fragmented. 
Managers solve problems with little regard for ultimate goals.
These theories proved of little use in the Columban process of strategic planning. 
They do highlight the need for leaders who are flexible and have political skills but
this does not seem to have been a problem for the Society in the past. If anything, 
most leaders have been "shrewd, resourceful problem-solvers" with a keen sense of 
the political realities in their Regions. However, the Society was in a state of crisis, a 
crisis of identity, personnel resources and leadership. Many members felt the 
Society was drifting. Refounding Groups were set up to demand better leadership 
and a more coordinated sense of direction. The "science of muddling through" was 
not seen to be enough, so the General Assembly decided on a process of strategic 
planning that we have seen has not resulted in the dangers foretold by Wrapp, 
Loasby and Lindbolm.
Logical Incrementalism. Quinn [1980] took up many of Lindbolm's criticisms but 
insisted on a style of management that was logical not disjointed, incremental not 
piecemeal. Quinn is acutely aware of the political problems of formulating plans 
and believes that leaders develop them best incrementally. Once again the strength 
of Quinn's theory is that it takes the political and process sides of developing a 
strategic plan seriously. It was important for the Regions to build consensus and to 
involve members in drawing up the plans.
However, it was only as a result of the General Council's constant requests that the 
various Regions engage in a specific programme of strategic planning and be as 
specific as possible that real progress was made. Before the assessment and 
planning process began the Regions and their leadership seemed to be prepared to 
"muddle through" from decision to decision. Little attention had been given to 
planning systematically for the future and the Society was suffering a crisis of 
leadership. Its leaders were good "disjointed incrementalists" but often uigent 
matters forced the more important matters of future planning off their agendas. 
Quinn seems to have extraordinary faith in the quality of leaders for he suggests 
leaders with a vision that they are consciously manoeuvring into place throughout 
the organization. At the beginning of the process there were few leaders of that 
calibre in the Society, few who had a developed vision for the future. Perhaps it was 
expecting too much of them in a time of such transition. It took a formal process of 
planning and the demand to think concretely and to plan in some detail to bring 
about that kind of thinking. Interestingly enough Quinn [ 1980] himself claims that 
the three times when it is best to be more specific with your plans are when you 
want to precipitate action, in times of major transition and after a crisis when you 
need distinct, clear goals to focus action. The Columbans were in a time of major
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transition and the leadership needed to precipitate action, so a more explicit and 
specific public process was needed.
Crafting strategies. Mintzberg's classic image of the planner is that of the potter. 
Mintzberg [1987]. The potter at her wheel has a vision of what she wants to produce 
but no detailed plan she relies on her experience and skill to shape the wet clay into 
her vision. It emerges slowly and often mistakes become opportunities. Mintzberg 
criticised the rational, formal school of planning:
i] because of its highly stylised, formal and rational nature it denies the 
organization a chance to develop. In the Columban case this does not seem 
to have been proven true. Most of the time the plans developed with each 
new stage. Perhaps that was because the process was not overly formal or 
detailed.
ii] because of its promotion of thought independent of and prior to action it 
has denied itself the opportunity to learn. Once again this has not proven 
true. Although the basic inspiration of their planning process came from the 
rational, formal school it was not applied rigidly. In the Columban case it 
was very much a process of planning - acting - reflecting - planning - acting.
iii] because strategies are both plans for the future and patterns from the 
past. Often it is only possible to discern the pattern as we look back over the 
past. Attention had to be given to the Columban past but, as Mintzberg 
[1987] himself points out, although change often seems to be continuous, 
there comes a time when, as the world changes, a strategic revolution must 
take place. The Columbans were facing just such a time. They could not go 
on planning in a continuous way. The pattern had to be broken. Their 
missionary identity and role was also in transition and it was not helpful to 
try to discern the future pattern from the past.
iv] because strategies need not be deliberate - they can also emerge from the 
potter's hands. As we saw in discussing the Incrementalists, at this stage of 
the Columban history this did not seem to be happening and it was only after 
serious formal efforts at planning were undertaken that plans began to 
emerge. Mintzberg [ 1987] also moderated his position on this question when
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he admitted that "strategy making walks on two feet, one deliberate, the 
other emergent". By this statement Mintzberg appears to build a bridge 
between the two main conceptions of strategic planning.
bl The need for a long term political process
Strategic planning has proved to be a far bigger and more profound project than the 
Society imagined when they started. When it was begun the General Council 
thought that it could be completed within a year. It has now lasted more than four 
years and is proving to be the major programme of its whole administration. What 
is really at stake is an organization-wide, consistent and long-term programme of 
development, change and renewal. The assessment and planning processes proved 
to be a valuable tool for promoting systematic reflection about the future, 
substantial change and for training in leadership. However, it would have been 
better if the Society from the beginning had have approached planning more 
consciously as a process of managed change.
Michael Beer in his book, Organization Change and Development [ 1980] argues that 
there is substantial evidence that organizational change is only possible when 
dissatisfaction among the members is high, so high that it is greater than the cost of 
change to the majority of individuals and groups that make up the organization. 
Nygren & Ukeritis (1993] in their comprehensive three year study of more than 
10,000 United States religious make a similar point. Religious life in the United 
States is in crisis for much the same reasons as missionaiy life is, falling numbers, 
crisis of identity and widespread questioning of their traditional works. To survive it 
is in need of transformational change, but transformation usually only begins with a 
crisis that indicates that the members' current shared understandings are no longer 
adequate. The crisis must be strong enough to "unfreeze" present understandings 
and open them up to the process of change.
This highlights one area in which the Columbans could have improved their process 
of strategic planning, namely preparation. The General Assembly had decided that 
it was necessary but no systematic effort was made to prepare the members or even 
the Directors who were going to have to administer the process. Laycock identifies 
four key questions an organization must ask itself before beginning a process of 
strategic planning: i] Is the organization strong and stable enough for this 
undertaking? ii] Is the need for change recognised? iii] Are the necessary resources
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of time, money and personnel available? iv] Is there enough commitment? [Laycock, 
1990].
The Society proved strong and resourceful enough but in the early stages the 
General Council could have done more to convince the members of the need for 
change and to build commitment and competence for planning. The General 
Council did not understand the process itself and relied on the authority of the 
General Assembly's mandate. In hindsight this was not enough. A special effort 
should also have been put into training the Regional leaders in planning for, by 
necessity, much of the project had to be left to them to administer. As an 
international organization working in 16 different countries it was impossible for the 
General Council to be responsible for Regional processes. Their role was co­
ordination and up till the Melbourne Inter-Regional Meeting in 1991 all contact with 
the Regional Directors was by mail. There was little opportunity for the face-to-face 
conversations or seminars that would normally be necessary to ensure middle 
management understood what was required of them and was confident and 
enthusiastic about the project. The Melbourne meeting did provide a considerable 
boost for the process.
With the exception of this weakness in preparation, the General Council has 
administered and co-ordinated the planning process well. The constant emphasis 
has been on the process being even more important than the plan. The need for 
leadership, participation and discernment have been continually stressed. The 
various Regions have been uneven in the way they implemented these processes but 
as can be seen from the results the Regions that did have good, participative 
processes and an atmosphere of discernment seem to have been more successful. 
After the first drafts proved largely disappointing the General Council has engaged in 
a constant dialogue with each of the Regions trying to build an awareness of the 
crisis facing the Society and of the real questions it needs to face. It has also tried to 
provide leadership training for the various Regional Directors. Now that the process 
is well under way and the serious questioning is beginning perhaps more attention 
needs to be given to providing the second element Beer [1980] highlighted in his 
analysis of the possibility of change, namely a new model or vision of the future.
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cl Vision-driven change rather than problem-driven management 
Pascale [1988] in studying the success of Honda in the United States concluded that 
their success could not be put down to the big brains of their planners but the little 
brains throughout the organization who contributed incrementally to the success of 
the organization. Hamel & Prahad [1989] claim that the cohesive and driving force 
that enables Japanese organizations to be so successful and flexible is "strategic 
intent" or vision. It is the responsibility of an organization's leadership to provide a 
vision of the future and a structure and culture within the organization that will 
encourage initiative and flexibility. [Hamel & Prahad, 1989; Pascale, 1988; Peters & 
Waterman, 1982; Kantor, 1989; Handy, 1989; Burnes, 1992].
The Columban process of strategic planning received a real "shot in the arm" when 
members came to realise the serious implications of the Society's declining 
numbers. This came around the time of the Melbourne Inter-Regional Meeting. 
Before that most Regions tended to ignore their real personnel limitations and wrote 
vague visionary documents committing themselves to even more goals than they had 
previously. They resisted thorough assessments of their apostolates, prioritising, 
cutbacks and so forth. At the Melbourne meeting they were able to get a Society- 
wide picture and the General Council began to convince them of the seriousness of 
world-wide personnel situation. There was a marked improvement in subsequent 
plans and a greater willingness to prioritise and "colour code" their apostolates. This 
was something most Regions did not want to do and still dislike doing even though 
they may now believe it is necessary.
However, there is some evidence to show that planning motivated purely by 
problems, such as declining numbers, will not get the Society too far. There is little 
hope, no vision and no life in such a problem-driven approach. As well numbers are 
declining at such a rate that as soon as all the positions are filled a gap appears 
somewhere else. Events always seem to be ahead of the planners and the 
impression grows that they are no longer in control just trying to catch up all the 
time. Such a feeling had a serious negative effect on the Korean experience of 
planning and there was a dramatic difference in the British and Chilean evaluations 
partially because they freely chose imaginative new projects that gave them a sense 
of setting the pace and being in control.
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A life-time missionary vocation entails many sacrifices but it thrives on idealism. 
Missionaries need a vision to give their lives for and to motivate their planning. 
Senge [1900] talks In terms of creative tension. "Without vision there is no creative 
tension. Creative tension cannot be generated from current reality alone. All the 
analysis in the world will never generate a vision. Many who are otherwise qualified 
to lead fail to do so because they substitute analysis for vision. They believe that, if 
only people understood current reality, they would surely feel the motivation to 
change. They are disappointed to discover that people 'resist' the personal and 
organizational changes that must be made to alter reality What they never grasp is 
that the natural energy for changing reality comes from holding a picture of what 
might be that is more important to people than what is." [Senge, 1990]. Nygren & 
Ukeritis [1993] make a similar point in their survey of U.S. religious. They conclude 
that if religious life is to survive one of the things that is most needed is leaders who 
can focus the attention of their members on a vision that will unite and inspire.
Although the Columbans needed the realisation of crisis to give impetus to their 
process of change it seems they now need a new model, vision or statement of 
strategic intent to carry the process further and to mobilise the members 
commitment and creativity. [Pascale, 1988; Hamel & Prahad, 1989; Senge, 1990; Beer, 1980]. 
People motivated by a vision and with the positive feeling of being in control are 
going to be much more committed and creative. The vision-driven process of change 
also has the advantage that, in a time of decline in numbers, it will keep the 
members' minds focused on the vision and protect the goals from being undermined 
by the many daily problems that often pull the leaders and members in other 
directions.
dl The need for cultural & structural change
The culture of an organization can have a profound hold on its members and the 
deep Influence on its future, [c.f. Chapter 2] Unfortunately little work has been 
done by the Society in this area of cultural change and little attention was given to it 
in the questionnaire so it is not possible to give much more than impressions.
It seems clear that cultural change is one of the major challenges facing the Society 
if it is to successfully adapt to the future. Much more work will have to be done 
along the lines suggested by Schein [ 1985], Aigyris [ 1983 & 1990] and Senge [ 1990] 
if the Columbans are to be able to understand the culture of the Society and then
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surface and challenge its "defensive routines", assumptions, prejudices, fears and 
deeply held beliefs. This will be needed to guarantee change in the future.
Although there has been little formal analysis of the Society's culture there are three 
aspects that often seem to hinder strategic planning. The first is the "religious or 
missionary" culture which does not encourage people to think in terms of mission 
statements and criteria, nor of prioritising for fear of hurting others, nor of cutbacks 
because missionaries And it difficult to renounce good works. They tend to take on 
more and more rather than face up to their limitations.
The second relates to the basic configuration of the Society. In Mintzberg's terms 
the Society has many of the characteristics of a professional bureaucracy. [Mintzberg, 
1983]. The Society is a service-oriented organization made up of highly trained 
professional missionary priests who would normally expect to be allowed to meet the 
needs of their people or parish in relative freedom. Much the same as doctors in a 
clinic, they tend to regard the administrator and organization as necessary to allow 
them to do their work but their concentration would be more on their speciality and 
they would not always have a great feel for the whole organization. With the 
Columbans this is exacerbated by the international exposure of the Society with 
vastly different needs in each of the countries. There is a strong culture of 
democracy which limits what leaders can do. There are also strong demands for 
consultation in decision making processes. The cohesion of the organization comes 
not so much from rigid organizational control but from their common professional 
training. But the professional loyalties can cut across loyalty to the organization. 
Many members have great loyalty to the priesthood and to their diocese and parish 
and it is only recently that they have been experiencing a tension between their 
normal priestly understanding and loyalties and the new priorities of the Society.
Finally, there is a lack of a culture of leadership in the Society. Traditionally strong 
leadership has not been encouraged and in recent years there would have been 
considerable ambivalence about the role of leadership in the Society. This is a trend 
Columbans share with many modem day religious congregations. Some equate 
leadership with authoritarianism and resent it. Others insist on a style of 
leadership where everyone is responsible for everything and no one has a special 
responsibility to lead.
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Strategic planning, with its demand for leadership, vision, planning, prioritising, 
cutbacks and so forth, is a direct challenge to all these negative aspects of the 
Society's culture. However, much work remains to be done.
el The importance of leadership
Leadership is seen as crucial by all schools of planning, [c.f. Chapter 2] A review of 
the Columban planning process shows that leadership has been mixed but that it is 
improving because of the attempt to plan.
The General Council's Leadership. The General Council has been very committed to 
the process of planning. It has demanded three drafts and devoted an entire Inter - 
Regional Meeting to the assessment and planning process. It has also called for 
another such meeting to be held in Omaha, the United States in 1993. In many 
respects the planning process has become the key tool and central project of their 
administration. It has also been able to involve the local Regions in the process, have 
created a climate of trust and continued a steady dialogue with the Regions over the 
last three years. The response to the two questions explicitly devoted to the General 
Council in the questionnaire, Qs. 15 & 21 are positive [Figs. 4.13 & 4.15]. However, 
in hindsight their initial Guidelines could have been improved by including a more 
focused mission statement with criteria. It would have given more direction to the 
process in the early stages and would also have provided criteria for the Regions 
with which to plan. This was to prove a central difficulty with planning in almost all 
the Regions. None of them came up with criteria on the first round. Korea and 
Britain still did not have criteria when the third round was completed. It was only 
after the second drafts of Regional plans of action had been submitted that the 
General Council recognised the need for it to provide a focused mission statement 
and implementable criteria to enable the various Regions to decide priorities and 
cutbacks. These criteria were presented to and approved by the Melbourne Inter- 
Regional Meeting and have helped provide direction to many Regions since then. 
However, there were two problems in coming in so late: i] it seriously undermined 
the quality of planning process over the first two phases, and ii] by the time they 
came the planning processes in each Region were well under way and commitments 
had been made so it was harder to integrate them into their processes.
On the other hand, it could be argued that it was fortunate that a mission statement 
was not imposed on the Society at the beginning. It was only after tiying to decide
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priorities that Regions and the General Council learnt to appreciate the need for a 
mission statement and criteria. This was an important instance of the reflection- 
action-evaluation-intervention-action- nature of the process. It also meant that the 
mission statement and criteria were more acceptable when they did come. Directors 
also felt they had been involved in drawing them up even if only indirectly. As 
Alvarez [19841 pointed out it is crucial for religious congregations that the members 
be formally involved in decisions about mission statements. Arbitrary imposition by 
the central government would be seen as authoritarian and counter-productive.
Regional leadership. With the exception of Chile and Britain29 the quality of 
leadership on the first round of the planning process seemed poor. The General 
Council had to write to all Directors asking them to take leadership over the 
planning process in their Region. In recent years Society leaders have been more 
managers than leaders. This has worked well up till recently but the crisis brought 
on by the radical change in the understanding of mission and the steady decline in 
the number of personnel has increased the demand for genuine leadership. The 
Society now needs bold leaders with vision who are builders of learning communities 
Senge [1990] and creators of a culture of change. Schein [1985] and Burnes [1992]. 
As Senge [1990] points out, the rate at which organizations learn may become the 
rate at which they will survive. In times of rapid change the Society needs vision - 
driven leaders not problem-driven managers. [Senge, 1990; Leavy ?]. Leaders must be 
responsible for generative learning rather than adaptive or problem-solving learning.
Recent research into the crisis in religious life has confirmed these insights. 
Sheeran [1993] has stressed that if religious life is to be renewed it needs leaders 
who are prepared to intervene in the life of the congregation to force it to 
assessment, choices, planning, renewal and ultimately conversion. Nygren & 
Ukeritis [1993] identified leadership as the critical factor in the transformation of 
religious orders. Leaders are needed who can communicate a vision and sense of 
mission. Nygren & Ukeritis [1993 b] have also published the results of their 
extensive research into the differences between what their survey identified as 
"outstanding leaders" and "typical leaders". The differences are similar to those 
between leaders and managers outlined by Zaleznik [1992] and Leavy [1992]. The 
outstanding leader has deep faith, a clear vision of the future, ability to articulate
29 Because their first draft was the last to be formulated the British leadership had the advantage of 
being forewarned about the need for leadership.
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and implement that vision, a high need to achieve and is characterised by both 
objectivity and compassion. While sensitive to individuals he or she is less 
concerned with counselling individual members and does not need to belong.
However, for the Columbans it is not just a question of the quality of leadership. It 
has also been a question of culture. Previously, there was no culture of leadership, 
but the planning process has improved this by lengthening the time horizons of the 
leaders and forcing them to think more systematically about the future. It has also 
highlighted the importance of leadership and begun to create a culture supportive of 
it. Now it is important that the General Council provides for the Society's leaders 
training in leadership that will enable them to be more confident and competent in 
their leadership role.
f] Planning in religious organizations
Sheeran [1993] in his analysis of renewal in religious congregations has come to the 
conclusion that what is really at stake is conversion. Religious do not need more 
analysis, information or updating but a thorough assessment of their present 
apostolates and the courage to make some hard choices and act on them. Renewal 
without hard choices and action has proved ineffective. If the problems of religious 
life are identity, relevance and declining numbers then a radical evaluation of its 
apostolates is an essential component of authentic renewal in any congregation. He 
believes it is most important to reappraise the long standing, dominant and 
established apostolates. There will be great resistance to such a reappraisal but the 
reality is that these apostolates frequently serve needs far removed from their 
original purpose. Often it is the congregation's commitment to these traditional 
works that may be the chief obstacle to change. Religious are also particularly 
vulnerable to "good works". Frequently they cannot give some apostolate up 
because it is a "good and worthwhile work". For Sheeran the important question is 
not is this a good work but is it the most relevant or appropriate to the needs of the 
world. He has come to the conclusions that in some ways "good works" and our 
inability to relinquish them constitute a crisis for religious congregations and "the 
principal obstacle to real change is not the recalcitrance of 'bad' religious but the 
intransigence of ’good’ ones". [Sheeran, 1993 p. 85].
There have been echoes of this in the Columban experience of planning. The 
General Assembly mandated strategic planning because it wondered if it was not
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time to question the appropriateness of many of the Society's "good works". But 
each Region found it difficult to prioritize among its many good works and they 
found it even more difficult to give up "good works". It takes time to be able to affirm 
that a work can be good but still needs to be given up because there is something 
even more relevant that should be done. It seems to takes a lot of faith and courage 
to renounce a good work. Indirectly Sheeran has highlighted a number of reasons 
why strategic planning is a very appropriate tool for renewal in religious 
organizations. It does require assessment and rethinking, force decisions, demand 
faith, and encourage participation and communication.
The importance of 'discernment' in planning for religious organizations. No leader in 
a religious congregation can ignore the importance of faith and the members' sense 
of vocation in planning or managing change. "The rational, political, contingency 
approaches to decision-making of the secular arena are insufficient for the faith 
perspective religious bring to decision-making. Religious decision-making must be 
grounded in the faith on which mission and vocation are based. Discernment is the 
process that integrates prayer and decision-making, taking the process of making 
decisions beyond what is rational or political to the level of the sense of the 
promptings of the Holy Spirit." [Coghlan, 1987 p.47]. Nygren & Ukeritis [1993] also 
stress that an essential skill of the transformative religious leader is the ability to 
tap the spiritual energies of the group.
The General Council in its original Guidelines stressed that discernment was a 
crucial part of the planning process and they have issued separate Guidelines on 
discernment for all important decisions especially the selection of Regional 
Directors. The theology and theory behind this is that it is only by placing these 
important decisions in the context of faith and vocation that members will be able to 
get in touch with their deepest shared motivations, overcome their normal 
prejudices and fears and find the freedom to make difficult decisions. Chile had an 
excellent discernment process guided by a Chilean Jesuit skilled in discernment. 
Fiji and Britain did not have as formal or professional a process of discernment, but 
they met often as a total group and tried to consciously put their decision in a faith 
context. Korea alone had little formal discernment during their planning process. 
This is reflected in the results of the questionnaire. Chile is very positive, Britain 
and Fiji are also positive and only Korea is negative. [Q. 17, Fig. 4.13]. It is 
impossible to isolate this as a major reason for the success of the Chilean, Fijian and
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British processes or for widespread dissatisfaction with the planning process in 
Korea but a more serious effort at discernment might have helped the Korean 
Columbans overcome some of their polarisation. It is also difficult to prove that the 
Chilean process of planning was significantly better because of a better discernment 
process. However, three aspects of the Chilean planning process suggest support for 
the value of discernment, i] The significantly higher evaluation they give to 
communication within their Region, ii] They were the only Region that actually 
decided on voluntary cutbacks, iii] They did come up with criteria to assess all their 
commitments. Improved communication is one of the promised outcomes of a 
discernment process and voluntary cutbacks and criteria are significant 
achievements because they are rare in religious groups. [Alvarez, 1984]. Normally 
cutbacks can only be achieved in the context of an appeal to a member's most basic 
sense of vocation. That it was done successfully and cheerfully in Chile may be 
evidence of the value of their discernment process. It may also explain why they 
were so positive about their process, and about participation and communication. It 
is an area worth more research.
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Ch a p t e r  6  C o n c l u s io n s  a n d  a  S h o r t  R e f l e c t io n  o n  t h i s  T h e s i s
Introduction
This final chapter will have three sections. The first section is devoted to listing the 
major conclusions of the thesis. The second is a reflection on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the methodology of the thesis. The final section will identify areas 
of possible further research.
I. Conclusions
1 ] The results show that strategic planning can be successfully transferred from
the world of business to an international missionary organization and that it can 
help such a congregation improve: i] its sense of direction and unity: ii] 
communication; iii] participation; and iv] morale. It is a good tool for leadership 
training because it forces one to look ahead and to ask and answer the type of 
questions leaders must face.
2] In religious groups it is Important to focus on a few core criteria, to spend a 
lot of time on process, discernment, consultation, task forces and on-going 
education. It is crucial that leadership is committed and involved. There is some 
evidence to show that a good discernment process can improve communication and 
participation and unite and motivate people to make the difficult decisions needed 
for effective strategic planning. It is possible that business organizations could also 
benefit from some adapted form of discernment process.
3] It is important that plans be easily understood and decisive, determining the 
course of events rather than just reacting to them. One or two freely chosen, 
imaginative projects can have a significant influence on the morale and sense of 
purpose of the members and possibly make up for other defects in the planning 
process.
4] The Columban experience of planning also indicates that the more formal, 
rational approach to planning is the best approach for religious and missionary 
congregations, at least in the early stages. Missionaries, priests and religious need 
the discipline of the rational approach with its stress on mission statements and
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criteria, environmental scans and internal reviews plus the demand to prioritize and 
plan concretely and in some detail. There is ample evidence in the literature and in 
the Columban experience that missionaries and religious people find all these tasks 
difficult. The unspecified and intangible nature of their mission allows them many 
escape routes, conscious and unconscious, from the rigours of planning. The 
formal, rational approach can force them to be more concrete, to face up to their 
limitations, to be more specific about their mission statements, to develop criteria, to 
prioritise and to plan.
5] The history of the Columban planning process shows how difficult it was for 
them to assess, prioritise and plan. The General Council had to constantly push 
Regions to be more concrete, to be more realistic and to give more explicit 
leadership. It is doubtful that a more incremental, learning, crafting approach 
would have worked, especially at the earlier stages. Actually the principal reason 
the Society decided on a process of strategic planning was to arrest the drifting that 
had resulted from many years of incremental management and change. It was also 
a time for a more revolutionary change, when more assertive leadership and more 
specific and deliberate plans are needed.
6] The real goal of strategic planning is not the production of a detailed plan but 
the development of an organization's capability to become more creative and 
responsive. It is the capability of the Society, in terms of its structure, systems, 
culture and management style, that is the strategic solution.
7] A sense of crisis was important in motivating the Columbans to begin to 
change but alone it will not take the Society very far. Now that the process has 
begun more attention should be given to developing a vision, to cultural change, to 
training leaders and to the on-going education of its members. Strategic planning 
can be an excellent vehicle for a consistent, long-term programme of change and 
renewal in an international missionary organization.
8] The school of planning that probably most accurately reflects what has 
happened with the Columbans is the configurational school Mintzberg [1990 b]. 
Mintzberg, in his debate with Ansoff, came to admit that the deliberate and learning 
schools go hand in hand. [Mintzberg, 1991]. He and other members of the 
configurational school believe that there is no one right way to plan instead we
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should take into account the different configurations of organizations within their 
different environments and the distinct period of their life cycle. You must use each 
of the different possible methods at its own time in its own place. This is verified by 
the Columban experience. The Society needed a more deliberate, rational, 
intentional and centralised approach to get the process going. To ensure that the 
process continues they now need a more political, cultural, process and learning 
approach.
9] If a similar international missionary organization decided to begin a process 
of strategic planning, the following lessons learned from the Columban experience 
would be valuable to keep in mind, a] It is important to prepare well for planning. 
This will involve convincing the members of the need for change and training their 
Regional leaders. The General Council should meet with all their Regional Directors 
before the process begins to build commitment and to train their Regional leadership 
in strategic planning and the management of change. They would still have to learn 
by doing and there would still be a need for further meetings between the General 
Council and the Regional Directors but an early meeting would ensure a far more 
effective process. It might also bring greater unity to the various processes, enrich 
them all and assist Directors where the situation for planning was more difficult, b] 
They will need to devote time to leadership training. Normally leadership training for 
religious concentrates on presentation skills, handling of individuals and groups and 
on managing conflict. However, if there is to be real change in religious 
congregations these skills will also have to be complemented by training in planning, 
managing change, envisioning the future, prioritising and building learning 
communities and cultures.
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n. The Advantages and Limitations of the Methodology
From the beginning, the methodology of this study has been flexible and involved a 
process of on-going learning and adaptation. Each stage has been adapted or 
reformulated in the light of the results of the previous stage. This method of 
research enjoys most of the advantages mentioned by Burgess [1985] and Sherman 
& Webb [1988] for such a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research: the 
researcher works in a natural setting; the methodology is consistent with the topic 
being studied; the studies may be designed and redesigned as needed; the process is 
more experiential, participative, collaborative and, therefore, encourages a sense of 
mutual learning. The author, the General Council and the membership were all 
learning together, if not at the same pace. In the long run this may result in a 
greater sense of participation and a more effective process of change. Because of the 
author's role as a senior executive, he has had comprehensive access to strategic or 
organizational issues and to individuals. He has not had to rely on informants. He 
has inside knowledge of the culture and politics of the organization and may have 
found more acceptance from the members than a researcher from outside with a 
separate personal agenda. [Gummesson,1991].
Openness and flexibility have been crucial to the Columban process of strategic 
planning and to this study. As the process progressed and the documentation 
mounted the shortcomings of the various plans and planning processes became 
clearer and some of them were able to be corrected and redesigned. It was obvious 
that everyone was constantly learning. The aim of the study was not the verification 
of a predetermined idea or theory, but discovery leading to new insights, better 
planning and more thorough change.
Traditional researchers may have doubts about the scientific worth of such an 
Action Science approach. Many might question the validity and possibility of 
generalising the results of such a local, participatory and constantly changing study. 
Action researchers recognise that one of the alma of research is to generate theory 
but their attitude and approach to generating theory is different. Being action or 
change-oriented people their concentration is local and their approach a 
combination of scientific and hermeneutical approaches. [Gummesson, 1991]. Their 
theory is therefore "local" or specific to the particular process of change they are
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Involved In. This theory is then tested in action when the researcher participates or 
intervenes. Theory can then be verified or modified through action. In the long 
term, the researcher can develop a more general theory based on his experience in a 
series of individual action research projects. "Theory can then be developed from a 
specific, local theory [substantive theory] to a more general theory [generalized 
substantive theory and formal theory]. This creates an opportunity for researchers 
to increase their theoretical sensitivity and ability to act when presented with new 
situations." [Gummesson, 1991 p. 180].
This thesis has been very specific or "local" in its focus. It has been confined to four 
Regions of a small international missionaiy organization. The sample for the 
questionnaire was small of necessity. The subject was complex and diverse and the 
methodology flexible so it is difficult to reach definite conclusions. But it has been 
possible to gain insight and increasing "theoretical sensitivity". Hopefully the thesis 
will extend the literature of strategic planning to another new area, the international 
missionary organization and add to the number of local theories from which 
practitioners, researchers and theorists will be able to draw some more general 
theory or at least hypotheses.
Interestingly, Mintzberg came to a similar conclusion at the end of his review of all 
the schools of strategic planning, "we believe the starting point for research should 
increasingly be case and context as opposed to concept. We need to ask more 
questions and generate fewer hypotheses - to allow ourselves to be pulled by the 
concerns out there rather than pushed by the concepts in here. And more often we 
need to be comprehensive - to concern ourselves with process and content, statics 
and dynamics, constraint and inspiration, the cognitive and the collective, the 
planned and the learned, the economic and the political." [Mintzberg, 1990 b p. 208]. 
Mintzberg was moved to this conclusion by the narrowness of the various schools, 
something that has been mirrored in the analysis Columban process. No one theoiy 
is an adequate basis on which to plan. All are useful at different places, for different 
configurations and at different stages of their histoiy.
Of course, there are disadvantages to the researcher also being a senior executive of 
the organization in question. The author has found that as a senior executive his 
primary focus was on action or change. Research was secondary. He did not always 
have enough time for adequate documentation, reporting and research as he tried to
- 115 -
maintain the pace of change. He found it hard to maintain distance all the time. He 
was accepted as belonging and understanding, witness the 81.48% reply rate to the 
questionnaire, but he was concerned that members might have, consciously or 
unconsciously, told him what he wanted to hear. Fortunately there is no evidence of 
this in the wide variety of responses. Finally as a practitioner he often found himself 
long on first-hand experience and questions but short on the theoretical 
understanding necessary for practice and research. This was shown by the author's 
and the Society's almost total ignorance of the literature when the process was 
begun. The author's knowledge of the various schools grew as the process 
progressed. While this has enhanced the sense of everyone learning together it has 
impoverished the actual planning process and the study.
The questionnaire is a particular case in point. It had to be sent out in March 1992 
while the process was still fresh in the minds of the members. To have waited any 
longer would have risked getting fewer and more distorted replies. It would have 
been better to have completed all the theoretical reading before sending out the 
questionnaire. Now the author has the problem that when he comes to analyse the 
results of the questionnaire with a theoretical background much richer than the 
theoretical background on which the questionnaire was designed.
m. Areas for Possible Further Research
i] Further study further on why the Korean process received such a poor evaluation 
is necessary. There were defects in the way they carried out the process but it 
would also be interesting to see whether strategic planning needs to be adapted for 
situations which are so complex, dynamic and pressurised. Ironically it was the 
Region most in need of planning but where planning seemed to be most difficult. 
Thomas [1988] quotes studies by Kallaman and Shapiro and Thune and House, 
"which indicated that planning was easiest in stable environments but improved 
performance the most in dynamic, complex environments", p. 13. Others like Quinn 
and Mintzberg would be more sceptical. It would be good to do further research on 
the process and value of strategic planning in complex, dynamic and pressurised 
situations.
ii] It would also be valuable to do more research on the questions raised by the 
Configurational School. [Mintzberg, 1990 b]. For example, what effect does the
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configuration of the organization, its environment and the particular stage in its life 
cycle have on the style of planning process required?
iii] The positive evaluation of their process by the British members raised the 
question of the importance of vision and the value of one or two visionary projects in 
creating a sense of unity and purpose in a Region. This could be another topic for 
useful research.
iv] As yet there has been only a limited amount of research into strategic planning 
in religious organizations. There are two areas in which more research would be 
valuable: i] the place of discernment in planning for religious congregations, and ii] 
the value of strategic planning as a tool for leadership training, renewal and 
substantial change.
v] More work could be done on how to successfully coordinate processes of strategic 
planning across so many countries. There is almost no literature on this for 
religious organizations.
vi] Finally, further research into how to manage cultural change is vital. This seems 
to be a pressing challenge facing the Society if it is to build on what it has achieved 
through strategic planning.
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A ppe n d ix  1
Attitude Survey about the Effectiveness of Strategic Planning
in the
Missionary Society of St. Columban
1. The aim of this survey is to establish how effective the recent process of 
strategic planning throughout the Missionary Society of St. Columban has 
been.
2. If the survey is to be helpful, it is important that you answer each question 
as thoughtfully and frankly as possible.
3. You will notice that most questions are answered according to a 5 point scale 
ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree". The purpose of 
providing scope for a range of answers, from the most negative to the most 
positive, is to avoid influencing your answer. There are no right or wrong 
answers. The important thing is that you answer the questions the way you 
yourself see things or the way you feel about them.
4. As the answers to the questionnaire will be completely confidential, please do 
not sign your name.
5. The answers you give will be combined with those of others and will be 
reported for groups of members. It will be impossible to identify individuals.
6. It is vital that each individual complete the survey and answer all the 
questions he can for the results to be valid and useful.
7. Guidelines for answering the questionnaire are given at appropriate places 
throughout the questionnaire.
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
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Strategic Planning in the Missionary Society of St. Columban
The Assessment & Planning Process
I feel that the process of assessment and planning:
1 ] Has given the Region a 
clearer sense of direction.
Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree 
Disagree
1
2] Has given the Region a more 
unified sense of direction.
3] Has provided us with a better 
idea of the missionary needs of 
the local church.
4] Has enabled us to make a 
thorough assessment of our 
present apostolates.
5] Has made us more realistic 
about our personnel resources.
6] Has enabled us to make the 
necessary cutbacks
7] Has enabled us to concentrate 
on the growth areas for mission.
8] Has made us better prepared 
to face the future.
[Please circle one number on each line.]
Regional Plan of Action
9] lb what extent are the 
activities of your Region 
governed by plans?
Not at 
All
A Little To Some 
Extent
Quite 
A Bit
[Please circle one number on the line.]
Strongly
Agree
5
5
5
5
5
5
Very
Much
10] Does your Region have a clear plan of action for the future? Yes 1
[Please circle 1 or 2, whichever is applicable.! No 2
If yes, please answer 11] and 12] below.
11] I feel the major objectives of 
the Regional plan are
Very
Clear
Very
Clear Average Unclear Unclear 
2 3 4 5
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Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strong
Disagree Agree
12] I believe the broad outline
of our Regional plan is correct 1 2 3 4 5
[Please circle one number on each line.]
The Process of Planning
Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strong
Disagree Agree
13] I believe I understand the 
process of assessment and
planning adequately. 1 2 3 4 5
14] I believe the members were 
sufficiently involved in the
planning process. 1 2 3 4 5
15] I believe the General Council's 
Guidelines gave an adequate 
explanation of what was
expected. 1 2 3 4 5
16] I believe the Regional Admin­
istration gave leadership and
direction to the process. 1 2 3 4 5
17] I believe we were helped by
a good discernment process. 1 2 3 4 5
[Please circle one number on each line. ]
Results
18] Have there been any concrete changes introduced because of the assessment 
and planning process?
[Please circle 1 or 2, whichever is applicable.]
Yes 1 
No 2
If yes, could you please list the changes
Communication
In my opinion communication:
Very Very
Bad Bad Fair Good Good
19] Between the members
of the Region is 1 2 3 4 5
20] Between Regional sup­
eriors and the members is 1 2 3 4 5
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21 ] Between the General
Council and the members is 1 2 3 4 5
22] Between Columbans and 
the local Church is 1 2  3 4
[Please circle one number on each line.]
Communication Cont.
Disagree
23] Inadequate communication 
between members of the Region 
has decreased the overall 
effectiveness of the Society. 1
24] The assessment and plan­
ning process has improved 
communication in our Region. 1
25] Because of the planning 
process I have more under­
standing of the work of other 
members of the Region. 1
Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly
Agree
[Please circle one number for each line across.]
Participation
Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree
26] I believe that members are 
heard in most important
matters. 1 2 3 4 5
27] There are adequate struct­
ures for participation in our
Region. 1 2 3 4 5
28] The assessment and planning 
process has helped improve 
participation in decision
making in our Region. 1 2 3 4 5
[Please circle one number on each line across.]
Purpose
29] In your opinion, to what extent is the Society achieving the purpose for which it 
was founded? [Please circle one number.]
Not at all 1
A little 2
To some extent 3
Quite a bit 4
Very much 5
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31] Has the assessment and planning process helped in any way?
[Please circle one number.] Yes 1
No 2
Any comment
Current Mission of the Society
32] Are the current mission statements of the Society, Columban Mission Today & 
Becoming More Missionary [Please circle one number. ]
Very meaningful for you 1
Fairly meaningful 2
Only a little meaningful 3
Not at all meaningful 4
33] How would you express the mission of the Society today?
34] Do you feel that your present apostolate is fulfilling the current mission 
statements of the Society? [Please circle one number.]
Yes 1 
No 2
Any comment
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Satisfaction
Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree
36] I would rather be a member 
of the Columbans than of most
other congregations I know. 1 2 3 4 5
[Please circle one number.]
37] If a young man came to you with a genuine interest in a missionary vocation 
would you
Discourage him from the whole idea 1
Encourage him to join the Society 2
Encourage him to join another missionary society 3 
Encourage him to become a lay missionary 4
[Please circle one number.]
37 cont.] Any comment
My daily work as a missionary:
Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree
38] I get a sense of fulfilment
from my work. 1 2 3 4 5
39] I feel my work is
important for the Region 1 2 3 4 5
40] My work is an effective
way of proclaiming the Gospel 1 2 3 4 5
41] My own professional skills
are adequate 1 2 3 4 5
[Please circle one number on each line across.]
Leadership
In your opinion does leadership in the Society:
Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
42] Help provide a clear sense
of direction to the Society 1 2 3 4 5
43] Plan well for the future 1 2 3 4 5
44] Listen well 1 2 3 4 5
45] Promote a climate of trust,
openness and mutual trust 1 2 3 4 5
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46] Reach their decisions 
promptly
47] Are good at implementing 
decisions 1 2 3 4
[Please circle one number on each line across.]
5
5
Change, Innovation and Flexibility
48] The Society encourages 
people to put forward 
new ideas
Strongly Disagree Uncertain 
Disagree
49] The life-style of the Soc­
iety is likely to continue in its 
present form in the foreseeable 
future
50] The work of the Society is 
likely to continue in its present 
form in the foreseeable future
51] I am well disposed towards 
the introduction of changes 
affecting the work of the 
Society
52] I feel the Society has 
changed too much
Agree
[Please circle one number on each line across.]
Strongly
Agree
Age
53] Which of the following age groups are you in? 
[Please circle whichever number applies.]
1.
4.
21-30 
51 - 60
2.
5.
31-40 
61 - 70
3.
6.
41-50 
71 & over
Any Comments
I would be interested in hearing any other comments you may wish to make.
Thank you once again for your cooperation.
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A ppe n d ix  2
The Accompanying Letter
21st March, 1992.
Dear Confrere,
I am writing to ask you to do me a personal favour. I am completing a Masters 
thesis at Dublin City University. In the thesis I attempt to gauge the effectiveness of 
the Society's efforts at assessment and planning. While the study is personal, I hope 
that it will improve my contribution to the General Council and help provide the 
Society with a more unified sense of direction, improved morale and better 
leadership training. It may also prove useful to other missionary societies facing 
similar questions to ourselves.
A crucial part of this thesis will be the results of the enclosed questionnaire. The 
questionnaire is being sent to a limited number of Columbans in Korea, selected by 
a chance method. The random nature of the selection will guarantee the accuracy 
and representativeness of the results, but only if everyone cnosen replies. For this 
reason your reply is extremely important to the success of my study. Lack of an 
adequate sample would render the thesis and most of my work null and void. Please 
answer as many questions as you can and as frankly as you can.
It will take only a relatively short time to answer the questions on the enclosed 
questionnaire and to return it in the stamped addressed envelope.
Your answers will be completely confidential. In fact, unless you chose to sign the 
questionnaire I will not be able to identify any individual's reply. It will only be used 
in combination with others to give a composite picture.
When the thesis is completed I will write a short summary of the major conclusions 
for Columban Intercom but I would be happy to provide a longer summary for you 
should you request it.
Please return the completed questionnaire as soon as possible and no later than the 
end of April. Thank you for your help.
Peace,
Noel Connolly.
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